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7F O R E W O R D
For the literature reviewer, social capital poses problems.  As this work 
shows, there is a sense that social capital has no real settled meaning, 
that it is an amalgam of terms and phrases only loosely tied together. 
For some, this may be a strength and perhaps it accounts for some of 
the bolder claims made under its banner, but, from a literature review 
point of view, it is hard to know just what to include.  By in large, this 
review concentrates on social science research concerning social capital, 
although there are several studies that come from practitioners.  
Th is review of research in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union oﬀ ers a chance to investigate the policy 
applications of research.  As the reviewer points out, in the context 
of the transition in the 1990s, research into the sources and nature 
of social capital appeared to be both timely and practical.  While 
economic and political science tended to focus on grand macrolevel 
models and reforms, social capital directed attention towards the 
social dimension of development, focusing on questions of trust and 
collective action.  Social capital research seemed to oﬀ er scientiﬁ c 
support for the burgeoning NGO sector and, as the decade progressed, 
its application moved into ﬁ elds such as economic development, 
education reform and even healthcare. Social capital began to interest 
more political scientists and economists as well as the sociologists and 
anthropologists.  As the author, Dimitrina Mihaylova, makes plain, 
there are distinct ideas about what is a proper way to research social 
capital.  Attempts to “colonize” new research ﬁ elds enjoyed some mixed 
receptions.  Nevertheless, as witnessed by the amount of research and 
its diversity, there was an increasing belief that social capital could be a 
“missing link” as well as a potential “cure.”
8International agencies such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and more famously, the World Bank, 
embarked on several major research initiatives.  Not only did there 
appear to be a relative consensus of its deﬁ nition, there were increasingly 
innovative approaches to its measurement and potential application. 
As studies included here demonstrate, social capital has been used 
to explain everything from the levels of premature death amongst 
middle aged males to the attitudes of cross border traders towards their 
extended kin.  For many, there is a certain intuitive attractiveness to the 
idea of social capital and this is especially true for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union.  For example, 
social capital research directs attention to the importance of informal 
networks as ways of getting things done. Not only does this appear to 
show things how they really are, it also seems to explain why things 
don’t work out the way reformers said they would. 
In terms of drawing the lessons of research for policy work, social 
capital by no means oﬀ ers clear conclusions.  Over time, there may 
have been a scaling down of expectations, particularly amongst those 
who thought social capital could act as a bridge between disciplines and 
policymakers. For the reviewer here, some of these disappointments 
are down to methodology, an overreliance on one type of data and an 
under-appreciation of local context.  At the same time, any assessment 
of the policy implications of social capital has to take into account the 
fact that it has no natural institutional home.  As it crosses disciplines, 
so does it cross government departments as well.  Th ere appears, at least 
in the later research works, an increasing recognition that the strategic 
use of social capital has to consider its role in combination with other 
types of capital.  In this regard it implies cooperation and coordination 
to a degree perhaps beyond the capacity of current governments.
Th is is not to say that the works included indicate that there is no 
role for the state in developing social capital.  As many authors included 
point out, there are institutional measures and backgrounds that allow 
strangers to have trust in each other, there are ways of encouraging the 
9development of networks that can bridge as well as bond communities 
and there are increasing recognition of the beneﬁ ts of joint activities 
between the public, the private and the civil sector.  In this sense, 
social capital research has a positive heuristic value in encouraging 
institutional and policy innovation.  
Th e works included in this review are not exhaustive or wholly 
representative.  Th ey were brought together to oﬀ er critical reﬂ ection 
of several key themes within the literature.  We would like to thank 
the author for all her hard work in producing this review as well as the 
reviewers who added constructive comments.
Andrew Cartwright
Violetta Zentai
Center for Policy Studies
June 2004
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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since the early 1990s, the concept of ‘”social capital” has been widely 
adopted in both research and development. Popularized by Robert 
Putnam’s book on Italian civic culture (Putnam 1993) as well as 
by claims from the World Bank that social capital was the “missing 
link” in development, the phrase has entered public debate and 
development practices worldwide. Social capital has become one 
of the most inﬂ uential concepts in economics, sociology, political 
science and development studies. As Ben Fine (2001) argues, studying 
the economic consequences of “membership in groups” or “local 
associations” has become almost a “cottage industry.” Until now, this 
has been the most inﬂ uential way in which social capital has been 
measured (Harriss 2001:89). Yet as Adam and Roncevic (2003: 157) 
amongst others point out, this broad applicability of the concept has 
not solved basic problems with deﬁ nition, operationalization and 
measurement, notwithstanding disputes concerning its sources, forms 
and consequences. Adam and Roncevic (2003:158) identify a similar 
structure to almost all publications on social capital. In the beginning, 
the author narrates the origins of the concept based on its three main 
“fathers”: Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. Secondly, the author 
deﬁ nes his or her own position vis-à-vis those traditions and provides 
one possible deﬁ nition of social capital. Th is is usually followed by an 
examination of a particular case or cases within the theoretical and 
methodological conﬁ nes established at the outset. Not to break with 
tradition then, Bourdieu deﬁ nes social capital as
 “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” (Bourdieu 
1986:248 in Adam and Roncevic 2003:158)
He also refers to it as “a capital of social connections, honorability 
and respectability” (Bourdieu 1984:122). Bourdieu’s aim was to analyze 
Is social capital the missing link 
in development?
?  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  S E R I E S
16
diﬀ erent forms of capital such as cultural, social, political, symbolic and 
economic and how these may convert into each other. In so doing, he 
sought to explain how social stratiﬁ cation is reproduced and persists 
over time (Adam and Roncevic 2003). Bourdieu oﬀ ers a materialist 
reading of culture through the use of the concept of “capital” and a 
dynamic, holistic analysis in the study of how diﬀ erent types of capital 
are transformed (Schuller et al. 2000). Bourdieu is more concerned 
with social capital as an individual attribute in terms of individual 
networks or forms of capital. In contrast to this individualist position, 
the other “father” of modern social capital research, the late American 
sociologist James Coleman, favored a broader notion of social capital 
which encompassed social groups, organizations and societies (Adam 
and Roncevic 2003). 
Coleman deﬁ ned social capital according to its function. He argued 
that “it is not a single entity, but a variety of diﬀ erent entities having 
two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social 
structure and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons 
or corporate actors—within the structure” (Coleman 1988:S98, cited 
in Adam and Roncevic 2003:159). Coleman’s research primarily 
addressed educational achievement and social inequality (Schuller et al. 
2000). He measured social capital by the physical presence of parents 
per number of children in the family so as to determine the amount 
of attention that children received. Amongst other factors inﬂ uencing 
educational performance, he measured the number of times a child had 
to change schools because the family moved. Coleman argued that social 
relations (both family relations and relations with the wider community) 
constitute useful capital because they establish obligations, expectations 
and trustworthiness. Th ey also create channels for information, and set 
norms that can be backed up by sanctions (Schuller et al. 2000:6). As 
Schuller et al. (2000) pointed out, there were striking similarities in the 
respective approaches of Coleman and Bourdieu although they did not 
formally acknowledge each other. In contrast to Bourdieu, Coleman 
approached social capital mainly in functional terms and argues that 
If so, what kind of resource is 
social capital?  Is it something 
that is held by individuals or 
groups?
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social capital is largely an unintentional function. Moreover, he focused 
on individual behavior and used that to draw conclusions about larger 
social entities. Coleman’s premise was that actors operate according to 
a single principle of action, that is, to maximize their realization of 
interests. Th us, he worked within the elementary model of rational 
choice, inﬂ uential in current sociology and political science in the 
USA (Harriss 2001:17). Apart from being criticized by opponents of 
rational choice theory, Coleman has been criticized for providing rather 
a vague deﬁ nition of social capital, one that according to at least one 
author “opened the way for re-labeling a number of diﬀ erent and even 
contradictory processes as social capital” (Portes 1998:5).
Th e third “father” of social capital, Robert Putnam, is usually 
credited with introducing trust and civic participation into the ﬁ eld, in 
particular the role that they play in democratization and development. 
It was largely due to Putnam’s work that “social capital” entered into 
the development and political mainstream. He deﬁ nes social capital as 
those “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks 
that can improve the eﬃ  ciency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam 1993:167). Th e deﬁ nition of social capital adopted 
by the World Bank is very close to Putnam’s. In the Bank’s view, 
 “Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable 
collective action. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion—
social capital—is critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable 
human and economic development.”1 
Putnam’s followers usually apply those measures devised by 
Putnam. Th ey measure behavioral attitudes and variables: trust, norms, 
and values. More recently, he has shifted the emphasis from trust to 
reciprocity in recognition that people can trust each other and yet still 
remain inactive (Schuller et al. 2000:10). Some authors take only one 
of Putnam’s three elements as the most signiﬁ cant attribute of social 
1 www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm.
On the other hand, does social 
capital refer to certain qualities 
of social organization such as 
the prevalence of trust and 
norms of reciprocity?
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capital. For example, Francis Fukuyama, who deﬁ nes social capital 
as being identical to trust, compares low-trust (for example France, 
Taiwan, Italy) and high-trust (for example USA, Japan, Germany) 
societies in order to investigate the consequences of such diﬀ erences in 
levels of trust. He acknowledges that low-trust societies are characterized 
by having a great deal of social capital (trust) in the family. 
Th e so-called “Putnam’s instrument” measures four indicators 
of social capital: vibrancy of associative life; incidence of newspaper 
readership; referenda turnout and preference voting (Putnam 1993: 
91–94). Harriss (2001:42) argues that a metaphorical notion of social 
capital emerges from Putnam’s work. According to Harris, Putnam 
does not provide a theory of trust but rather a confusion of various 
concepts: interpersonal trust; generalized trust (social solidarity); belief 
in the legitimacy of institutionalized norms and conﬁ dence in their 
implementation; and cultural traditions. Perhaps some of the strongest 
criticisms of Putnam refer to his neglect of power and conﬂ ict (see Fine 
2001, Harriss 2001, Adam and Roncevic 2003). For example, Harriss 
(2001:42) argues that social capital is very often treated as if it only 
referred to horizontal voluntary organization. In his view, this obscures 
the role that state-backed institutions have in creating the conditions 
for civic engagement. Indeed, this disregard for the state and politics in 
general oﬀ ers a reductionist view of “civil society.” Harriss (2001:1–92) 
seeks to demonstrate that local or grass roots social organizations have 
to be viewed in the context of the overall structure of social relations 
and of power. 
An alternative approach to measuring social capital focuses on those 
variables, which indicate the position of the individual inside social 
networks. Th is is a synthesis of network research and certain aspects 
of Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s work (Adam and Roncevic 2003:163). It 
usually involves the study of networks in commercial enterprises. Burt, 
for example, has demonstrated how smaller networks, dense networks 
or hierarchical networks place more constraints on individuals (Burt 
1997, cited in Adam and Roncevic 2003:163). 
How can we measure 
social capital?
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Th e complexity of social capital is further demonstrated by the fact 
that it is sometimes identiﬁ ed as a positive phenomenon or a negative 
one, or even both. Some research stresses its social beneﬁ ts, some its 
inﬂ uence on the individual, other research shows how social capital 
may restrict opportunities and individual freedom and lead to excessive 
claims on groups members. Th e operation of social capital may produce 
networks that are closed for outsiders (Portes 1998). Th us, social capital 
has a potential “downside” (Portes & Landholt 1996): communities, 
groups or networks that are isolated, parochial, or working at cross-
purposes to society’s collective interests can actually hinder economic 
and social development. In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, 
authors frequently point to the existence of a “missing,” “negative,” 
“premodern” or “primitive” social capital (for example Paldam and 
Svendsen 2000, Rose 1999). 
“Social capital” could be examined using bottom up or top-down 
approaches (Adam and Roncevic, 2003). Th e former refers to the study 
of social networks and civic associations on the ground (for example 
Putnam 1993), while the latter tends to refer to the study of the role of 
the state in creating a state-society synergy (for example Evans 1996). 
Michael Woolcock (1998) has attempted to link these two divergent 
approaches by deﬁ ning three type of social capital: bonding, bridging 
and linking. Bonding social capital describes strong bonds between 
people such as family members or members of the same ethnic group; 
bonding social capital is good for “getting by” in life. Bridging social 
capital is characterized by weaker but more crosscutting ties for example 
between business associates, acquaintances, friends from diﬀ erent 
ethnic groups, friends of friends, etcetera Th e ﬁ nal form of social 
capital is linking social capital. Th is describes vertical (or hierarchical) 
connections between people in diﬀ erent positions of power. 
Th e wide range of social phenomena covered by the three main 
schools (Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam) demonstrates the diﬃ  culties 
in establishing one deﬁ nition or one measurement of the concept. 
Moreover, as Adam and Roncevic argue, social capital is very much a 
Social capital is very much 
a context dependent 
phenomenon.
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context dependent phenomenon (2003:161) and this creates further 
diﬃ  culties for the elaboration of a single deﬁ nition. While there are 
many writings on social capital, Ben Fine (2001), John Harriss (2001) 
and Adam and Roncevic (2003) all provide very insightful and useful 
reviews on the sources, dimensions and consequences of social capital. 
Th e principal criticisms of Ben Fine (2001) concerning the utility 
of social capital as an analytic tool address the lack of possibility for 
social change, its functional, ahistorical and acultural premises, its 
misinterpretation of the social as two unrelated and separate entities 
and its status as a “cure-all” social theory. In the end of his book he 
leaves open the question why there has been so little criticism of social 
capital compared to the extensive number of people who utilize the 
concept uncritically. 
Th e overall aim of this study is to provide a critical introduction into 
the published English language research on theoretical and empirical 
issues addressing social capital in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia. It is 
beyond the scope of this review to provide an exhaustive commentary. 
Instead eﬀ orts were directed towards presenting the variety of 
approaches within the ﬁ eld that could be deﬁ ned as employing a “social 
capital approach.” 
Th e review is supplemented by an annotated bibliography.2 Th e 
bibliography was created after an extensive search via the web, through 
correspondence with individuals and various institutions and via 
various bibliographic and library resources. A lot more literature was 
gathered and read before the ﬁ nal selection was completed. Some pub-
lications not included in the annotated bibliography were either not 
representative of the ﬁ eld, were of lesser quality, or were discovered at a 
later time (after the country, the theme or the discipline they address was 
already reasonably well represented in the annotated bibliography). 
2 Available at http://www.ceu.hu/cps/pub/pub_papers.htm.
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E  ?
21
Th is review is organized in several sections that were ﬁ nalized follow-
ing the preparation of the annotated bibliography. Th e main sections 
are: institutional change, civil society, health, education and economy. 
Access to public services is included as a topic in various other subheadings 
while the general ﬁ elds of health and education were kept separate in 
order to demonstrate the applicability of the concept of social capital. 
Because of the limited period for this mission, the limitations in 
the number of annotations and the size of the report, some relevant 
and high quality works will have undoubtedly not found a place in this 
report. Research published before 1989 was largely excluded on the 
grounds that it is predominantly in local languages and its inclusion 
would have undermined the quality of the review by changing the 
focus to a set of diﬀ erent methodological problems.  
In the course of the bibliographic research I found little research 
in English on social capital and its synonymous concepts in Kosovo, 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. Th e 
spread of research carried out also reﬂ ects the general state of social 
research in the CEE region whereby the most studied country is 
Russia, followed by the Central European countries, and only then 
the Balkan countries. In some cases, the lack of academic research was 
compensated by professional publications.
Although professional published research has been included, it does 
not represent all the richness of the published reports concerning the 
abundant development projects in the region that address the concepts 
reviewed here (for example civil society). I have given priority to the 
academic literature, and, then, only to the major developmental agencies 
and funding bodies (Th e World Bank, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development OECD, United Nations Development 
Program UNDP, United States Agency for International Development 
USAID, UK Department for International Development DFID, Th e 
Open Society Foundations, and some others) as well as to some think 
tanks in the region. A full assessment of the professional reports on 
social capital lies outside the purpose of this review and has to be a 
separate study. 
The spread of research 
carried out refl ects the general 
state of social research 
in the CEE region.
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As is widely recognized, “social capital” is a phrase whose deﬁ nition 
ranges from individual and speciﬁ c statements, to badly deﬁ ned and 
unclear statements to concepts that encompass many social phenomena. 
Th us in some cases research concerning other synonymous concepts 
were also examined. I have included research that covers major themes 
and concepts deﬁ ned by various authors as equivalent or part of the 
social capital concept (cf. Schuller et al. 2000: 1).
I have excluded certain ﬁ elds, which form part of the social capital 
debate on the web site of the World Bank. Th is was because these 
research themes are too wide in themselves and/or overstudied (for 
example ethnic and national issues). In Central and Eastern Europe 
some of these research ﬁ elds remain unaﬀ ected by social capital 
approaches, as indeed they may be in Western countries, for example, 
migration and refugee studies. 
1 . 1  T h e  A r r i v a l  o f  S o c i a l  C a p i t a l  i n  
  C e n t r a l  a n d  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  ( C E E )
Social capital is a relative newcomer in research carried out in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE).3 Interest in the topic has been largely 
stirred by the activities of developmental agencies such as the World 
Bank and the United Nation’s Development Programme. Much of 
the social capital research published in English is somehow related 
to practical developmental initiatives, particularly after 1996 when 
the Bank proclaimed that social capital could be the “missing link in 
development.” For this reason, much of the research on social capital 
in CEE could be considered a political dimension of the various 
developmental strategies in the region. 
3 Th ere have been a number of large-scale research projects investigating social capital in 
the region, some based in the region such as the interdisciplinary program “Honesty 
and Trust: Th eory and Experience in the Light of Post-Socialist Transformation” based 
at the Collegium Budapest www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/ and the “Bluebird” project 
www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/proj/proj_open.htm.
Interest in social capital 
has largely been stirred by 
international development 
agencies and consequently 
much of the research is related 
to practical  initiatives.
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Th e literature on social capital worldwide deals with innumerable 
aspects of social life. In CEE the academic and practitioner work 
on social capital addresses the most central debates in CEE 
“transitology”: the relationships between markets, states, formal and 
informal institutions, and the signiﬁ cance of cultures. To a lesser or 
greater extent, all of these works address two basic questions: how to 
improve economic growth and how to achieve successful institutional 
change. 
Th e World Bank initiatives in the region have undoubtedly 
provided an important stimulus to interest in the topic. Th e Bank has 
organized several workshops on social capital, for example in Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Leading scholars and practitioners 
have taken part in order to help train local participants on the use of 
the concept and carry out eﬀ ective research. Th e approach of these 
studies has been relatively sympathetic and research has tended to 
have an intermittent engagement with polemics in the social capital 
ﬁ eld worldwide. I would argue that, in part, this reﬂ ects its relatively 
recent entrance in the ﬁ eld of applied development studies (insightful 
exceptions are Adam and Roncevic 2003, Tardos 1996, Angelusz 
and Tardos 2001) and its undeserved reputation as a cure-all option 
(cf. Portes 1998:2). Some authors who have long studied the region 
now employ social capital against the background of their extensive 
experience in CEE. On the whole, they tend to be critical of various 
assumptions made concerning social capital and of ﬁ ndings that appear 
to be unjustiﬁ ed considering the methodologies of the research (for 
example Adam and Roncevic 2002).
At the same time, the theoretical and empirical debates addressed by 
social capital research exist in numerous other publications that belong 
to earlier academic and practitioner’s traditions in the region. Most of 
these have not utilized the concept of social capital. For example, one 
of the largest bodies of social science research on Central and Eastern 
Europe addresses ethnic and national issues and yet in 2002 the ﬁ rst, 
and as far as this reviewer is aware, only paper to address social capital 
Gender has been largely 
neglected by social capital 
studies despite being an 
important aspect of the 
postsocialist transition. 
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and ethnicity appeared: Social capital, ethnicity and support for democracy 
in the post-communist states (Dowley and Silver 2002). In the same 
period though, research on ethnicity and nationalism in CEE has been 
proliﬁ c. Gender has also been largely neglected by social capital studies 
despite being an important aspect of the postsocialist transition and 
development projects in CEE (for example Corrin 1999, 2001, 2002).
1 . 2  T h e  D e f i n i t i o n  o f  S o c i a l  C a p i t a l  i n  C E E
As is the case elsewhere, the deﬁ nitions of social capital used in CEE 
diﬀ er tremendously not only from discipline to discipline but also 
from author to author. Some adopt the deﬁ nition given by Putnam, 
others subscribe to the rational choice theories of Coleman and a 
limited number employ the approach of Bourdieu. Others claim to be 
using mixed approaches. Th e following are only some examples of the 
variety:
1.2.1 Social Capital as Networks and/or the Resources 
  Acquired through Th em4
Social capital in the sense of being synonymous with networks is used 
by a number of authors. It can refer to anything from individual to 
institutional networks. Works on the informal economy, subsistence 
economy, institutional change, elites, social support, social cohesion, 
and participation fall within this category. Many authors do not utilize 
the term “social capital” but rather use “networks” or others such as 
“network capital” in Sik and Wellman 1999, blat in Ledeneva 1998, 
and “weak and strong ties” in Sik and Wallace 2000. Th e work by 
Torsello and Pappova (2003) provides excellent examples of qualitative 
social network analysis. Angelusz and Tardos (2001) use the concept 
4 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional Change” for more detail.
Social capital or networks 
or network capital?
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“social-network resources” as they believe it is more neutral and theore-
tically less biased than social capital which is deﬁ ned as having a meaning 
closer to economic capital with related concepts such as exchange, 
investment, accumulation, etcetera (p.300). Th ey argue that “through 
this approach we can get closer to those instrumental types of network 
resources that may contribute in some fashion to the elevation of one’s 
social status.” (p.300). “Social capital” as meaning networks is also pro-
minent in the literature on health where the previously much criticized 
social support theories or participation theories have found themselves 
revived with the interest in social capital (Pearce 2003).5 Th e world 
literature on network analysis is extensive and cuts across a number of 
disciplines and when we analyze social capital as network, this literature 
cannot be neglected (a range of examples are to be found in the journal 
Global Networks: A journal of transnational aﬀ airs, the journal Social 
networks, the anthropological literature since 1970s, e.g. Boissevain and 
Mitchell 1973, for a brief overview see also: Hilly, Berthomiere and 
Mihaylova 2004).
Th e Centre for Policy Research at the University of Strathclyde has 
produced several publications on social capital based on the growing 
Barometer databases. Many of these publications also regard social 
capital as networks. Rose (1999) deﬁ nes social capital as “the total 
stock of networks that produce goods and services in a society.” 
However, according to Rose, networks that “reallocate or mis-allocate 
goods and services do not increase the national product in aggregate” 
(p.3, footnote 1). He distinguishes between the socialist and post-
socialist types of networks and between “premodern,” “modern” and 
“antimodern” social capital. “Premodern social capital” is based on 
informal, face-to-face ties of family and neighbors. “Modern social 
capital” involves a structural shift in society’s networks of institutions 
towards more formal institutions and provides a frame for markets and 
civil society to operate with security. According to Rose, “antimodern 
“Social capital” as meaning 
networks is prominent in the 
literature on health.
5 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Health” as well as “Social Capital and 
Education.”
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social capital” is the type of social capital most often met in Russia where 
the informal networks exist at the basis of the formal organizations that 
promote individual welfare (p.11). Th e author uses measures of social 
integration and deﬁ nes these as forms of social capital. He argues that 
social integration determines welfare alongside other sources of welfare 
such as human capital. (p.12). 
Mateju (2002) suggests that social capital in CEE should be studied 
in the ﬁ rst place as weak ties and how they shape the people’s choices 
in life. He suggests that social capital is to be examined carefully at the 
individual level as it relates to the positions of the individual in the 
social structure (status, prestige) and to the amount of political capital 
a person has (members or not of the Communist party, for example). 
Paldam and Svendsen (2002) add the terms “missing” and “negative” to 
social capital to describe the gray/black networks after socialism that 
have transformed from necessary survival strategies to negative networks 
which fall within the category of corruption. Pahl (2000) also discusses 
social capital in terms of informal networks but focuses on a diﬀ erent 
form of it that has some positive results: friendship. While he warns that 
informal social networks in terms of friendship in Russia and China 
“is not necessarily to be welcomed…” (for the dangers that it maybe 
converted into negative networks), he also adds that “conviviality and 
warmth invariably found there was in marked contrast to the stiﬂ ing 
formality and hypocrisy of public life” (p.156). Th us, social capital 
becomes a particular resource upon which people can rely. 
Kolankiewicz (1996) investigates the assets of social capital. He 
approaches social capital as various networks brought into play by 
the absence of conventional capital. Studying these networks shows 
who the winners of transition are, why they are the most successful in 
adapting to the market situation and how they achieved it. He proposes 
that social networks are being converted so that certain individuals 
and groups can exert control and inﬂ uence during the transition, 
for example, manipulating or withholding information during 
privatization. Th e author argues that success in the transition depends 
as much on the social networks as it does on the convertibility of assets. 
How do an individual’s weak 
ties shape their life choices?
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Following Bourdieu, he suggests that the volume and structure of 
capital determines the advantage in a particular ﬁ eld. In postsocialism, 
it is crucial how much capital refers to the network and the levels of 
resources it can mobilize (p.436). 
1.2.2 Social Capital as Culture
Some authors place “social capital” within the general ﬁ eld of culture. 
For example, Stulhofer (2001) states that social capital is “a cluster of 
cultural characteristics which create and maintain mutual trust and 
cooperation within a community or a social group.” In this sense, social 
capital is born out of everyday interactions and not through legislation. 
It stimulates and facilitates cooperation and it is a collective resource 
that positively inﬂ uences development (p.27). Th is author distinguishes 
it from clan or family loyalty where the beneﬁ t to the family group is 
supposedly at the expense of the community. 
Raiser et al. (2001) describe social capital as a cultural phenomenon 
signifying the extent of civic-mindedness within a society and very much 
along Putnamian lines suggest that it is also in the existence of social 
norms promoting cooperation and trust in public institutions (p.2). 
An important argument, if not one of the central themes of this 
“school” is the diﬀ erence between the West and CEE in terms of the 
quantity of social capital (as an attribute of culture). Most authors 
claim that social capital in CEE is very low and/or even diminishing in 
comparison with Western Europe or Northern America. Another, very 
small, group of authors, argue that social capital in CEE is not much 
diﬀ erent or, in some rare cases, that it is even partially higher than in 
the West. 
Th e divides between the two regions are occasionally explained 
by using Huntington’s (1993) categorical divisions between the East 
and the West (e.g. in Bjornskow 2001, Aberg and Sandberg 2003). 
Although these authors occasionally argue that some countries can 
“leap across the civilizational divisions” they assume that such divisions 
are real and accept them uncritically. 
Social capital is born out of 
everyday interactions rather 
than legislation.
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For example, Bjornskow (2001) argues that Slovenia looks more 
like a Western country than an Eastern one unlike Estonia and that 
this is proof that it is possible to jump across the gap between East 
and West (p.22). Aberg and Sandberg (2003) describe, similarly to 
Huntington, democracies as dependent on their historical, social and 
cultural foundations. Th e authors believe that a politico-cultural “clash” 
patterns the initial phases of postcommunist democratization paths. 
Raiser et al. (2001) assume that there is a low level of social capital in 
Eastern Europe compared to Western countries despite the huge human 
potential (large numbers of well-educated and well-qualiﬁ ed) in CEE. 
Th e authors argue that it has been easier to build a civil society in those 
countries that are closer geographically to Western Europe and that 
this has supported the transitional process. One of the policy recommen-
dations they make is to keep alive the myth of return to Europe to help 
the building of social capital in the rest of the countries (p.22).  
A similar logic, although in a completely diﬀ erent situation, 
operates in the work by Petro (2001). He sees cultural and social capital 
as mutually reinforcing in the process of reviving the old traditions of 
Novgorod (of the 12th–15th century). Contrary to the positive attitude 
to this process in the article itself, the invention of tradition and the 
essentializing of one’s culture may also be associated with some negative 
eﬀ ects, or at best be a double-edged sword. For example, the past 
may also be similarly reinvented to back up regional nationalistic or 
populist policies (for example in the speech cited in the article calling 
for the revival of “Lord Novgorod-Th e-Great where Rus’ originated”). 
Rather uncritically, the author sees cultural and historical myths as 
contributing positively to social capital because he argues that the past 
is functioning more as a model and inspiration than a burden. 
Th e idea that there is a lack of social capital in CEE is criticized by 
Marsh (2000). He argues that in Russia, various regions have diﬀ erent 
amounts of social capital and thus, it cannot be claimed that Russia 
as a whole does not have social capital. His empirical research proves 
that there is social capital in Russia, but the amount and form vary 
from area to area. Th e author also questions whether social capital was 
Is there a defi cit of social  
capital in CEE countries...
...or would that be to fall into 
the trap of cultural misreading?
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missing during socialism as claimed by some researchers. He bases his 
argument on already existing research on formal networks in Russia 
during socialism such as the one by Ledeneva (1998). 
 
1.2.3 Social Capital and the Socialist Legacy
In order to explain the current situation, most articles on social capital 
in CEE begin with a description of social capital during socialism. 
Within this, there are two diﬀ erent trends. Th ose who deﬁ ne social 
capital as informal networks either claim either simply that there was 
abundant social capital (for example Marsh 2000) or that it was of a 
type termed generally as “negative” or  “primitive” or “premodern” (e.g 
Rose 1999, Paldam and Svendsen 2000). Th ese authors then debate the 
various ways in which these networks were converted or not during the 
transition from socialism to postsocialism6. 
For example, Marsh (2000) has acquainted himself with the work 
of Ledeneva (1998) showing large amounts of social capital in terms of 
networks and norms. As a result, he provides a critical counter analysis 
(grounded in historical sources and qualitative data from contemporary 
Russia) to the propositions by some scholars that social capital is entirely 
missing from Russia. He suggests that, in contrast, the blat relationships 
(Ledeneva 1998) could be a distinctively Russian form of social capital 
(involving trust and reciprocity horizontally) and an equivalent of 
social capital in  Northern Italian. Th e author also questions some of 
the propositions by Putnam in studying social capital and argues that 
the Eastern European context needs a more speciﬁ c understanding of 
diﬀ erent types of social capital and its regional distribution. It is unclear 
in his work, though, how blat would be useful for civic participation 
and strengthening of democracy.
Rose (1999) also underlines the existence of social capital networks 
during socialism. At the same time, he argues that it was premodern 
economy in which goods and services were produced in households, 
and informal networks and families sought to isolate them from the 
6 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional Change” for more detail.
What kind of social capital 
existed during the socialist 
period?
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state. Th e author believes that this may be peculiar in the West but was 
rational in the USSR. He describes a socialization theory according to 
which all adults brought up during socialism in Russia today will have 
an antimodern social capital. Th e case is not that there was no social 
capital, but that there was a particular type of social capital. 
Rose and Haerpfer (1994) use the data from the Russian Barometer to 
measure the “individualists” against the “collectivists” in Eastern Europe 
and conclude that individualists outnumber collectivists. Th e reason for 
that they see in the experiences of communist style collectivization, which 
has made people more individualistic (p.18) (cf. Kideckel 1993). Th is 
contradicts some of the anthropological work such as Swain (2000), 
Burawoy and Verdery (1999), Hann (2002) and Hivon (1998) who 
demonstrate lasting collectivist identities of rural population in CEE 
even until today. Creed (2002) adds a diﬀ erent dimension by pointing 
to the present economic crisis as a major reason for the decrease of 
communal rituals, and the growing inequalities and the impoverishment 
of people are outlined as explanations to the increase of noncollective 
practices in the Voices of the Poor World Bank reports (1999). 
Mishler and Rose (1995) criticize the view by Seligman (1992) that 
the creation of distrust and fear is central to understanding socialist 
regimes. Th ey argue that this would be a simplistic picture of socialism. 
Th ey examine how the socialist legacies operate in relation to trust, 
distrust and skepticism and conclude that the legacy of socialism has 
little or no direct inﬂ uence on trust in contemporary institutions, 
but that it has indirect inﬂ uence through the individual perceptions 
of freedom today in comparison to the past. Th e anthropology of 
socialist societies has been able to provide an in-depth description of 
how socialism operated in everyday practice. Buchowski (1996) for 
example argues that there were civic associations during socialism, such 
as Solidarity (see also Hann 1990; Hann and Dunn 1996; Burawoy 
and Verdery 1999)7. 
Socialism has little direct 
infl uence on trust in 
contemporary institutions, 
rather it exerts an indirect 
infl uence via current 
perceptions of freedom.
7 Some examples of works that contain extremely useful insights on real life society 
during socialism are those by Chris Hann, Katherine Verdery,  David Kideckel and 
Gerald Creed.
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E  ?
31
A further group deﬁ nes social capital in terms of civic participation, 
norms or generalized trust (as opposed to trust between individuals). 
Th ey paint a picture of socialism as a system that virtually destroyed 
this type of social capital leaving transition societies to start the changes 
with zero social capital in stock. In this scenario one of the main aims of 
transition becomes to build social capital. Nichols (1996) for example 
argues that socialism is the explanation for the today’s halted process 
of democratization in post-Soviet society (p.631). He believes that the 
Soviet system destroyed social capital – the broad voluntary network 
of social engagement that breeds trust, reciprocity and “spontaneous 
sociability” which leads to public associations and, in turn, democracy 
(p.631). For Nichols it is “clear” that civic networks were destroyed and 
spontaneous citizens’ interaction was replaced by forced association. 
Seligman (1992) also highlights the crucial role of socialism in the 
creation of distrust and cynicism.8 Kideckel (1998), Raiser (1999) and 
Lovell (2001) add to echo the view that socialism left a legacy of dis-
trust (p.7), which explains today’s situation. 
A similar approach is found in Holland (1998). She lays the blame 
for the lack of civic engagement not simply on socialism but on the 
whole past of the Albanian people. Holland argues that in Albania 
“…the level of development is considerably lower, while cultural 
deprivation has prohibited modern forms of civic engagement and stiﬂ ed 
social relations. Instead of trust and networks of civic engagement, the 
history has produced a vicious circle of distrust, reinforcing a form of 
primitive social capital which resided in the private world of family and 
clan, not in the networks of the market place where risks could be taken 
and economic cooperation sought” (Holland, 1998:70).9 Coulton who 
8 Th is author is criticized by Mishler and Rose 1995 for assuming that all trust was 
destroyed by socialism.
9 An interesting parallel could be found in the study by Christou (2003), which 
automatically disqualiﬁ es the “primitiveness” in Holland’s terms of Albanian clan 
loyalties. Based on extensive empirical research, Christou argues that the social capital 
of middle to upper-middle class second-generation Greek-American returnees in 
Greece is based on equally strong kinship loyalty.  
Alternatively there are those 
who argue that the socialist 
system all but destroyed social 
capital and that a main aim 
of the transition has been to 
replenish these lost resources.
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claims that history has predisposed Russians to mistrust (cited in Marsh 
2000) exposes the same view. 
1.2.4 Social Capital as Trust10 
Trust, as synonymous with social capital, has become one of the 
central themes of research into institutional change and particularly 
the interaction between formal and informal institutions in CEE. One 
of the starting points is that trust in institutions in CEE is low. Many 
authors argue (even though sometimes without much speciﬁ c evidence) 
that socialism destroyed most types of trust: either interpersonal or 
extended, or both (for example Lovell 2001, Nichols 1996, Raiser 
1999, Raiser et al. 2001, Seligman 1992); and that previous courses of 
history (that shaped the culture) of the CEE region contributed to the 
low contemporary levels of trust (for example Holland 1998). Some 
authors counter that it is not distrust but skepticism that dominates 
the transition (Mishler and Rose 1995). Kolankiewicz argues that levels 
of trust in postsocialist transition societies are actually high. In his 
view they provide an element of predictability, which is absent in the 
system that often lacks formal rationality (1996:447). Mateju (2002:7) 
disagrees and argues that the postsocialist transition is characterized 
by low trust. On the whole, most authors tend to agree that there is 
a lack of conﬁ dence in the state and limited trust in institutions. Th is 
situation is considered to be one of the most salient problems in CEE. 
Some of the main debates center on trust production and whether 
institutional change produces trust or is itself a product of trust. Trust 
is viewed as being beneﬁ cial to economic growth in that it lowers 
transaction costs. In politics it is seen as a source of legitimacy and 
collective action (Stulhofer, 2001:27). Although there is widespread 
agreement that trust is important, there is less consensus on which 
type of trust (interpersonal trust, trust in institutions, or general 
10 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional Change” for more detail.
Distrust or skepticism?
Which type of trust 
is decisive in the creation
of democratic institutions 
and market economy?
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trust) is decisive in the creation of democratic institutions and market 
economy. Often, the deﬁ nitions of trust combine very diﬀ erent ideas, 
concepts or social practices such as “motives,” “believes,” “dispositions,” 
“circumstances,” “interests,” and “power” (cf. Dasgupta1988, Gambetta 
1988, Harris 2003, Harriss and Mihaylova 2003). 
Th e relationship between trust and economic growth is examined 
in most detail by Raiser et al. (2001). Th e authors in this volume argue 
that generalized trust is not related to economic growth in CEE in the 
same ways that it is in developed market economies. Instead, they argue 
that it is trust in institutions, what they call “formal social capital,” that 
will lead to economic growth in CEE countries.
1.2.5 Social Capital as Civic Engagement11 
Many researchers ﬁ nd that levels of civic participation in CEE 
are considerably lower than in the Western democracies. Th is is 
usually blamed on the socialist past or a combination of this and 
the contemporary socioeconomic and political environment. Some 
researchers do provide more reﬁ ned analyses of the complex inﬂ uence 
the past has on the present (Buckowski 1996, Spulbeck 1996, Anderson 
1996). However, another group of scholars regards contemporary state 
ineﬃ  ciencies as being the main explanation for low levels of civic 
participation (Alapuro 2001). Th is focus on civic participation has 
led to an examination of voluntary associations (or forms of civic 
engagement) as forms of social capital. Th e relationship between 
NGOs and local and central governments has been a key issue within 
this ﬁ eld. At the same time though there is a striking lack of eﬀ ort (with 
a few exceptions) on understanding why voluntary organizations may 
be fewer in number in CEE than in Western democracies.
Letki (1999) examines the nature of citizens’ membership in 
voluntary organizations in CEE and ﬁ nds that the correlation 
11 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Civil Society “ for more detail.
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between social capital, democratization and citizens’ membership in 
organizations is very weak. Scores on an associational index reveal 
very little engagement in voluntary organizations in each of the CEE 
countries. At the same time, the diﬀ erence between the countries 
of highest and lowest scores is not great. According to Letki, this 
demonstrates that there are only weak links between organizational 
aﬃ  liation, citizens’ satisfaction and social capital. Contrary to Putnam’s 
or Nichols’s suggestions, membership in voluntary organizations does 
not function as a main indicator of a truly democratic system. Th e 
author argues that, because membership in associations and the stocks 
of social capital were unrelated before 1989, they do not exert much 
inﬂ uence over each other in the transition (p.11). Although stocks of 
social capital have been of crucial importance for the success of the 
political and economic reform, actual levels of civic engagement are not 
meaningful reﬂ ections of them. Any understanding of democratization 
in Central and Eastern Europe must take into considerations the 
speciﬁ c circumstances of the region. Letki concludes that Putnam’s 
approach of linking social capital to democratic legitimacy cannot be 
used in CEE as it was in Italy (p.12).
Th is variety of meanings of social capital is largely a result of the 
diﬀ erent disciplinary approaches. It is striking that there is very little 
interdisciplinary communication and as a result there are arguably 
numerous misconceptualizations that might have been considered 
lack of professionalism in other ﬁ elds; for example, the way socialism 
is viewed in terms of its legacies. Similarly, it is vital to consider the 
practical applications of research on social capital. Often, such research 
serves to legitimize one line of policies at the expense of others: for 
example, research on social networks and health (for example Rose 
2001) tends to argue that neoliberal policies can be less problematic 
for the population in their everyday life. Th ere are dissenters, of course, 
such as Bateman (2003). Whether life styles or structural factors 
should be prioritized for developing healthcare systems may be an 
alternative questions for social capital researchers in the healthcare 
The correlation between 
social capital, democratization 
and membership in 
organisations is very weak.
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ﬁ eld. Similarly, how inequalities in general or restrictions on access to 
public institutions are relevant if slightly neglected subjects in the social 
capital ﬁ eld. Th e theoretical and practical dimensions of the role of the 
state, the ways formal and informal institutions are interweaved and the 
ways economic relations are socially embedded could all be addressed 
more directly by research on social capital. Th e following chapters 
examine social capital research in several distinct ﬁ elds: institutional 
change, health, education, economic activities, and civil society. Th e 
conclusion contains recommendations for future research. 
2 .  S O C I A L  C A P I TA L  A N D  I N S T I T U T I O N A L  C H A N G E  
2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Institutional change in CEE has predominantly been studied from 
a macrosocial and structural perspective. It has remained largely a 
preoccupation of economists and sociologists and there are two main 
spheres where social capital is set in operation: ﬁ rst, market economy 
and transformations of economic institutions and, second, democracy 
building and transformation of political institutions. Traversing these 
two ﬁ elds is the research on the relationships between formal and 
informal institutions in transition societies. Here, a major focus, 
which will be discussed in more detail below, is given to the multifold 
role that informal institutions have in postcommunist societies for 
democracy and market economy building. Th is is where social capital 
becomes an important tool of investigation. If one considers the vast 
body of transitology research, then it would be fair to say that social 
capital is utilized only in a small number of works. Yet, in order to 
better understand the utility of the social capital concept, one must 
situate it within general debates in these larger theoretical ﬁ elds. Only 
in this way may its analytical limitations and strengths be assessed. It is 
important to bear in mind that when some authors use social capital in 
The relationships between 
formal and informal 
institutions has been 
a key theme.
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a certain ﬁ eld, others who are addressing the same issues do not refer to 
social capital. In this review only the most general trends in the research 
in CEE and social capital are outlined. Th e problem of institutions and 
the question of the conversion of capital between the social, cultural, 
political, human and economic ﬁ elds are the main focus of this section 
of the study.
In general, research on institutional change where social capital has 
found or could potentially ﬁ nd application has been concerned with 
the following questions:
• Is institutional change in CEE a transformation, a consolidation 
or a transition? Do reformed institutions create values or vice versa? 
How do people judge institutions? Which arrangement of insti-
tutions is most suitable to developing democracies? More speciﬁ c 
questions include how do local level institutions function and how 
can the principle of participation be applied to governance? 
• Th e establishment of market economy, in particular, the question 
of the social embeddedness or disembeddedness of economic rela-
tions. What might be the obstacles to and the shortest ways of 
building a market economy? 
• How can political, human, cultural and social capital be converted 
into economic capital and vice versa? Th e interplay between eco-
nomic, political institutions and cultural institutions has been a 
major ﬁ eld and some of the main questions have been: What is 
the reason for existence, the scope and the importance of informal 
institutions (including informal networks)? What should be the 
role and the position of the state in institutional change? How do 
economic and political institutions function in their social and 
cultural settings? 
Social science research has provided numerous answers to these 
questions and has generated issues for further exploration. Th e 
following sections explore some of the main themes where social 
capital has found an application. Th e examination of some of the 
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interdisciplinary debates is presented below and it is followed by four 
further sections devoted to some of the main themes within the social 
capital genre: networks, elites, trust, and state and local institutions. 
Sociological research related to capital theory falls mainly within 
two categories: the distributional process (“who gets what”) and the 
institutional mechanisms (“how rules change”) (Rona-Tas, 1998:108). 
Th is involves studies on the outcomes of institutional change and the 
changes of the institutions themselves. Th e ﬁ rst is concerned with 
gathering and analyzing data on individuals (through surveys) while the 
latter observes the institutions at mezzo and macrolevel (usually through 
in-depth case studies) (Rona-Tas, 1998: 109). Th e dialogue between 
the two approaches is made possible by the concept of capital, which 
has become a central concept in stratiﬁ cation research. Institutions 
determine the utility of capital and set rules for its application. Th us, 
they inﬂ uence its value and decide how widely it may be used. One 
type of capital is social capital (Rona-Tas, 1998:114) and sociological 
theories have often addressed constraints (both material and symbolic) 
to social action that have evolved in the past. On the other hand, 
economic research tends to regard social action as a series of choices 
made by rational individuals based on their expectations concerning 
rewards and penalties (Rona-Tas, 1998:130). 
While sociologists recommend softer liberal policies and sometimes 
stress the importance of the state, economists usually argue for self-
regulating markets and less state intervention (Rona-Tas, 1998:130). 
Anthropologists emphasize the importance of informal institutions 
and culture in the economic and political process in CEE. Th ey often 
argue for context speciﬁ c development policies, which may stand 
against Western models of state, market and society relations (Hann 
2002). Th e relative lack of dialogue between these three disciplines 
may be overcome through debates on social capital and the process of 
institutional change.
Despite claims that institutional change has been well documented 
(e.g in Rona-Tas 1998:117) signiﬁ cant questions remain unresolved, 
Institutions determine the 
utility of capital and set rules 
for its application.
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especially concerning the mechanisms of interaction between political, 
economic and social capital. Both sociology and economics have 
produced disputable arguments on this subject, while anthropology, 
despite some promising results in limited thematic and geographical 
areas, has made only a limited contribution (Hann 2002).12 
Rona-Tas (1998) provides a useful summary of the main socio-
logical theories of transition: political capitalism; simulated transforma-
tion and informality; recombinant property and networks of assets and 
liabilities; managerialism and merchant capitalism. Th e problem of 
path dependence remains central throughout these debates. Does the 
present or the past or both determine current institutions and in what 
ways? Some scholars stress the recombinant properties of old and new 
structures (see Stark 1992, Stark 1996, Stark and Bruszt 1997)13, others 
stress the durability of social networks developed under socialism. A 
third group examines the evolutionary trends that began before 1989 
(Rona-Tas 1998:120–121). Despite the apparent continuity of some 
institutions, some researchers place their stress on the importance of 
adaptation to new institutional forms and contexts as a prerequisite of 
economic and political success (Lampland 2002). Th e acquisition and 
character of capital is explored in relation to the path-dependence of 
institutions. According to Rona-Tas, whether social capital is ﬂ exible 
or rigid depends on such factors as its divisibility14, fungibility15, 
12 Th e best summary of the anthropological literature is found in the introductory 
chapter in Hann (2002). 
13 Th e main argument of Stark is that postsocialism will not produce completely new 
property relations and will instead be characterized by a process of recombination of 
old and new elements, hence the term “recombinant property” (Stark 1992, 1996, 
Stark and Bruszt 1997).
14 In Rona-Tas (1998) “divisibility of social capital” refers mainly to social networks 
(pp.128–129) and how one could choose to cultivate certain blocks of networks and 
ignore others. Th e author examines also the divisibility of cultural and human capital 
(p.128).
15 “Th e internal structure of networks can be described by the fungibility of their ties. In 
some networks there are multiple ways of moving among various members. One tie 
can be substituted for by many other ties. [...] Not only ties but entire networks can 
be fungible.” (Rona-Tas 1998:125–129).
Whether social capital 
is fl exible or not depends 
on whether it is divisible 
fungible, or alienable.
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alienability16, acquirability17, and whether it is aﬀ ected by self-reinforc-
ing mechanisms, for example in elite reproduction18 (1998:125–130). 
Incongruous complementarity is another important issue connected 
with the unequal development of institutions, for example, the dynamic 
interaction between the privatization process and the development of 
the legal system or various new entitlements and the “lock-in” character 
of certain economic institutions (Rona-Tas 1998:124–125). 
Th e discrepancies between legal frameworks and social practice 
have been a main topic for anthropologists working in the region19 
(Verdery 1998; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Hann 2002; Giordano and 
Kostova 2002; Creed 2002; Lampland 2002). In their examination of 
the gap between legal prescriptions and practice, anthropologists 
question the Weberian approach that sees legality and legitimacy as 
intrinsically linked. Th e land reforms and their unexpected results, 
for example, reveal rifts between legality and legitimacy as the new 
property framework is under constant challenge by social practice 
(Giordano and Kostova, 2002). 
As mentioned, one theme related to institutional change and social 
capital is the potential for transferability between economic and political 
capital. It has been demonstrated, for example, how those who had key 
positions of power during socialism were able to accumulate capital at 
the expense of others during the transition. Studies on this theme deal 
16 It is argued that social capital (as well as cultural capital) is inalienable and cannot be 
alienated or redistributed between people and anyone who wants to have them must 
acquire them for themselves (Rona-Tas 1998:127).
17 In order to acquire social capital there are supposedly two strategies to choose from: 
join existing networks or build new ones. Th e latter is a diﬃ  cult route as presented in 
the literature on collective action by for example Mancur Olson (1965) the logic of 
collective action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Rona-Tas 1998:128).
18 Self-reinforcing mechanisms could be vicious or virtuous cycles and are based on 
“positive feedback, which makes processes resistant to external pressures from their 
environments. Rational adaptation is thus overridden by internal momentum.”(Rona-
Tas 1998:122)
19 Sociolegal scholarship dealing with similar themes has remained out of the scope of 
this review.
Those holding key positions 
during socialism were able to 
accumulate capital 
at the expense of others 
during the transition.
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mainly with elite transformation in politics or in the economic sphere.. 
Th ey demonstrate both the high potential as well as the limits of social 
capital in building other types of capital. 
Verdery (1998) provides a sound analysis of past and present local 
institutions in Romania drawing on qualitative data collected through 
many years of participant observation. She demonstrates how local 
elites were able to maintain their power as leaders of collective farms and 
local councils since socialism. Th e author shows that popular opinion 
was often against the introduction of exclusive property rights because 
these would unjustly transform collectively accumulated resources into 
private hands. Verdery argues that property is about social relations and 
political processes at the local level. She argues that these considerations 
are crucial aspects in the practice of property relations. Her paper is a 
very important contribution to understanding the real life of legislation 
and institutional transformation as “complex interactions between 
macrosystemic ﬁ elds of force and the behaviors and interconnections 
of people caught up in them.” In the view of the author, a special ﬁ eld 
of political, social and cultural relations has yet to be created so that 
exclusive private ownership can crystallize. 
Th e comparison between the numerous, mostly anthropological 
studies, of privatization and land restitution is one way to demonstrate 
how social capital convertibility is highly situational and how it is hard 
to isolate a single decisive factor (such as social capital) in determining 
the transition’s winners (cf. Kolankiewicz 1996 discussed further 
below). Swain (2000) and Lampland (2002) both study how former 
managers of cooperative farms were able to acquire private farm pro-
perties and how their previous contacts gave certain advantages in 
running their new businesses. While Swain ﬁ nds suﬃ  cient evidence 
that social capital from socialism has been crucial for the success of the 
managers, Lampland argues that it was rather their ability to adapt to 
the new situation that was the critical factor.
Sandu (1999) addresses the problems of institutions and conver-
sions between social, cultural, political, human and economic capital. 
However, it was their ability 
to adapt  that was key 
to whether they could maintain 
such capital.
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He suggests that social capital refers to a stock of accessibility to 
structures of social life. He argues that, being a relational capital, social 
capital has the potential to convert into material, human, symbolic or 
other capital. However one cannot predict the exact values that may 
be brought about. Th e reason for this lack of predictability lies in the 
multifunctional structure of social capital. Social capital can sometimes 
become material, or sometimes symbolic or aﬀ ective capital. (Sandu 
1999:4–5). Th e elements of social capital also develop independently 
from each other: trust does not always become cooperative behavior 
and generalized reciprocity does not always engender trustworthiness 
or cooperation; cooperation may be enforced or related to interests 
or accompanied by very low trust (Sandu 1999:5). However, Sandu 
(1999:5) deﬁ nes social capital only as that particular type of productive 
sociability that has consequences for the increase of stocks of capital such 
as material, human or even social capital. Th is issue of convertibility is 
further explored in the following sections.
One set of important problems in the research of transforming 
institutions stems from comparison between Western institutions and 
postcommunist institutions. Many researchers working in CEE have 
been critical of the direct transfer of Western type institutions that have 
overlooked “the strong threads of continuity that mark even the most 
dramatic of social ruptures” (Hann et al. 2002:5). Some examples from 
anthropological research concern the problems with the introduction 
of the “market principle,” the introduction of Western models of 
consumption, or the development programs of Western development 
agencies (for example Sampson 2002, Wedel and Creed 1997).
Strong critiques of the neoliberal ideology, policies and institutions’ 
imposition in CEE can be found in the literature (for example Stiglitz 
2002, Elster et al. 1998). According to Bateman (2003), the World 
Bank and the IMF imposed a standard neoliberal policy model as the 
guide for both postcommunist and postconﬂ ict reconstruction and 
development. In so doing, the international ﬁ nance institutions (IFIs) 
paid little heed to the many lessons learned from successful postconﬂ ict 
The elements of social capital 
can develop independently 
from each other.
So long as it only supports the 
initiation of weak connections 
to those in power, the social 
capital “industry” runs the 
risk of creating vibrant 
entrepreneurial ghettos.
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and post-system-change reconstruction and development. Nor have 
the IFIs taken on board the serious failures of the neoliberal policy 
framework even though it is now becoming clear that the neoliberal 
policy model has largely failed to lead to sustainable reconstruction and 
development in south-east Europe (Bateman 2003).
Bateman examines three case studies: the new wave microﬁ nance 
institutions; the independent Business Support Centers and the social 
capital development projects whose broad aims were to reduce poverty 
and strengthen institutions. In practice many of these projects have 
so far failed to demonstrate any capacity for positive transformation. 
Moreover, the social capital “industry” can actually restrict eﬀ orts to 
develop greater solidarity/social capital within poor communities. So 
long as it supports the idea of initiating weak connections to those in 
power, the social capital “industry” runs the risk of creating vibrant 
entrepreneurial ghettos (Bateman 2003).
Signiﬁ cant voices within both the research and development ﬁ elds 
challenge an ethnocentric, “orientalist” or even neocolonialist nature 
of transition debates.20 Girodano and Kostova (2002:74–75) criticize 
the view of Oﬀ e and his colleagues in Elster et al. (1997) that CEE 
democracies have yet to be consolidated while the Western ones are 
since long well established and fully consolidated. While Giordano and 
Kostova reject this view, they do suggest that the study of “democratic 
consolidation” can highlight the critical issue of the legitimacy of legal 
power and the state in CEE. Many postsocialist citizens rely more on 
personalized networks then on a state that repeatedly fails to perform 
its fundamental duties, especially its responsibility to guarantee a space 
where they can trust each other through the “rule of law” (Giordano 
and Kostova 2002:75). Th e case study from Bulgaria examined by 
Giordano and Kostova (2002) shows indeed how legal instruments 
20 Similar criticisms can be found on the pages of the journals Labour Focus on Eastern 
Europe and New Left Review.
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E  ?
43
devised by the Bulgarian state to privatize agriculture and restitute land 
expose the gulf between the political elite and the rural population 
(p.75).
An additional topic that has generated much comment and 
controversy is the view that a simple change in institutions will be 
suﬃ  cient to transform economies and remove barriers to international 
commerce (see Hann 2002; Verdery 1998; Burawoy and Verdery 
1999; and Lampland 2002 amongst others). As Lampland makes 
plain, institutions are peopled by local actors who live within complex 
social relations (2002:32). Professional and personal networks help 
structure these new institutions. Institutional change may be instigated 
or aﬀ ected by cultural, political and socioeconomic changes. Several of 
these complex issues are addressed in the following sections through 
an investigation of the main concepts that link social capital theories 
to those of transition: networks, trust, elites and formal/informal 
institutions.
2 . 2  N e t w o r k s
Th e concept of networks is central in the examination of social capital 
and institutional change. Th e focus of most works is on the importance 
of informal networks and whether they were transformed or remained 
rigid after socialism. Th e main debates center on the interaction 
between informal networks and formal institutions and in what 
ways informal networks could be conducive to market development 
and democratization. Some authors argue that socialism demolished 
voluntary social networks and created a sterile social environment. 
Nichols for example, claims that there is an absence of voluntary social 
networks (and hence of social capital) that have to be created from 
scratch after socialism (Nichols, 1996:637). By contrast, other authors 
argue that informal networks, had and, despite transformations, 
still have a signiﬁ cant role to play (for example the study on “blat” 
connections by Ledeneva 1998) and could thus be regarded as available 
Are informal networks 
conducive to market 
development and 
democratization?
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social capital (Marsh 2000). Th is view has been discussed by other 
authors who have claimed that these forms of social capital are in 
fact “negative” or premodern or antimodern (for example Paldam 
and Svendsen 2002, Rose 1998). Th e main themes of this debate are 
explored in the following sections.
2.2.1 Networks: Coping Strategies or Market Obstacles
Rose (1999) demonstrates that there were and are many social 
networks in former socialist countries but these are of, what he calls 
an “antimodern” or “premodern” type. He (1999:3) deﬁ nes social 
capital as: “the total stock of networks that produce goods and services 
in a society.” However, according to Rose, networks that “reallocate 
(or misallocate) goods and services do not increase the national 
product in aggregate.”21 Premodern networks are deﬁ ned as “primarily 
informal, face-to-face associations of people in villages or a close knit 
urban neighborhood.”22  Adhering to the modernization paradigm 
strictly, Rose argues that modern society is dominated by formal 
institutions and the rule of law. Th e author creates a model according 
to which networks in Russia are classiﬁ ed as modern, antimodern and 
premodern. According to Rose, reliance on antimodern networks is an 
obstacle to creating a dynamic and modern society.23 Networks in Russia 
are a combination of antimodern, modern and premodern relations. 
Because of a limited demand for the rule of law, the antimodern ones 
are becoming dominant. Th is situation prevents the establishment and 
functioning of a modern society, and of both market economy and 
democratic institutions. 
Raiser (1997) examines one particular subset of institutional change, 
namely the role of informal institutions in economic transition.24 
21 (p.3, footnote 1).
22 ibid.
23 (p.29).
24 (p.2).
A reliance on anti-modern 
networks is an obstacle 
to creating a dynamic and 
modern society.
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He states that, at a practical level, it is less important that informal 
institutions are constraints or opportunities than the fact that they 
can fundamentally inﬂ uence human behavior without being directly 
amenable to policy (p.2). In a similar vein to Rose (1999), Raiser 
sees that informal institutions are partly replaced by more formal 
institutions in the course of economic development. Such replacement 
is not considered complete even in advanced market economies (in 
contrast to Rose, 1999, who is closer to the modernization paradigm). 
He also describes informal networks as an obstacle to the development 
of a market economy. He believes that the reliance on closed informal 
networks reduces the availability of economic opportunities (p.8). On 
that basis, the author argues that the informal economy cannot be a 
basis for market economy, since its networks are closed for outsiders 
(p.7). However, if possible or if stirred, the expansion and opening up 
of existing networks could create extended trust. Th is process could 
lead to networks transformation that could allow members to seek 
outside institutions. Th e capacity of the state is seen as an important 
determinant in the process of formalizing informal institutions. Th ese 
arguments are explored in three case studies of institutional change in 
transition: China, Germany and former Soviet Union. Th e conclusion 
strengthens the views concerning the important role governments can 
play in building extended (or generalized) trust (that is social capital, 
in Raiser’s view, where “generalized” trust is synonymous with social 
capital) and contributing to the successful institutional changes.
Paldam and Svendsen (2002) use game theory and the approach 
of Robert Putnam to investigate how gray/black networks have 
switched, in their opinion, from being necessary during socialism 
to being harmful after socialism. Due to lack of control systems that 
existed during socialism these networks expanded and, according to 
the authors, this leads to institutional weakening and the creation of 
“negative social capital,” which is a barrier to economic development 
(cf. Rose 1999). Th eir research is based on “the dictatorship theory 
of missing social capital.” Communism destroyed what the authors 
call “normal social capital” and when such regimes are abolished, 
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the available social capital needs to be transformed from a negative 
form that may prevent economic development.25 Th e pervasive fear 
and mistrust engendered by the socialist system combined with the 
destruction of voluntary organizations, may be an explanation for the 
low gross domestic product (GDP) in CEE compared with the levels 
of physical and human capital. In conclusion, the authors assume that 
a couple of decades may be suﬃ  cient for building positive social capital 
and that active interference in the process should be avoided. Instead, 
governments should provide passive support that could create a “proper 
enabling environment for social capital generation and ﬁ ghting the 
negative social capital.”26 
While some authors mainly see the negative sides to informal 
networks, others emphasize their everyday signiﬁ cance as a means of 
survival. Marsh (2000) argues that while, at ﬁ rst sight, vertical patron-
client type relations have dominated in CEE societies, studies such 
as that by Ledeneva (1998) demonstrate that horizontal networks of 
trust are also very widely spread. At present, the latter are a principal 
means for survival in the economic crisis. Marsh, however, believes in 
the crucial importance of generalized trust for economic development. 
Anthropologists also argue against simpliﬁ ed models of transition that 
ignore the continuity of social relationships. Despite the convergence 
of anthropological approaches with some neo-institutionalists and 
evolutionary approaches in economics (Stark, Grabner and Stark 
1997), anthropologists have long been against the strict separation of 
formal and informal institutions (Lampland 2002:37, cf. Hann 1990, 
2002). Lampland (2002:37–36) asks: “Is this division between formal 
structures and informal networks, routines and practices a helpful one 
in analyzing the historical impact of socialism?” Her answer is that such 
divisions may “tell us how people wished to live their lives, but not in 
actuality how their lives were lived.”27 
Is this division between formal 
structures and informal 
networks helpful?
Might it tell us more of how 
people wish to live their lives 
rather than how they actually 
live them?
25 (p.2).
26 (p.12).
27 (p.38).
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Mateju (2002) compares the situation in CEE and Western Europe 
and concludes that in CEE generalized trust is not so important as in 
the West. By contrast, interpersonal trust and the social capital that 
draws on informal exchange networks play a signiﬁ cant role. Th is allows 
people to create successful coping strategies and to accumulate capital. 
However, he also claims, although without examples, that these may 
hinder, at least temporarily the development of market mechanisms 
and consequently of economic growth (p.7). Mateju suggests that 
scholars who study social capital in CEE should focus on how “weak 
ties” in Granovetter’s terms, or “networks” in Bourdieu’s terms, shape 
people’s life chances. Th is, he suggests, could be achieved through the 
examination of two sets of indicators: the ﬁ rst one is related to one’s 
position in the social stratiﬁ cation and power hierarchy; the second 
one is related to one’s active involvement in building networks based 
on mutual recognition of usefulness of various kinds of exchange (as in 
Mateju and Lim 1995).
Bougarel (2002) prefers the term social relations instead of networks. 
He attempts to identify the quality of interpersonal relations, trust, 
forms of cooperation, and conﬂ ict management among individuals 
and groups (rural/urban; rich/poor, of various ethnic and religious 
background). Similarly, the reports of the World Bank Voices of the Poor 
(1999) contains extremely useful data showing that the most eﬀ ective, 
trusting and supportive institutions are the informal social networks 
in various forms: connections, patronage, kinship and friendship, 
neighborhood and workplace relations. Th e report on Bulgaria 
demonstrates that the social networks can be both replacements as well 
as help grant access to formal and informal institutions.28 However, 
these networks are also seen to be shrinking for lack of investment 
(socializing for example can be an expensive activity for the necessary 
involvement of food and drink). Shrinking social networks close oﬀ  
access to both services that formal institutions can and cannot provide. 
When social networks shrink 
though lack of investment, they 
close off access to the services 
that formal institutions 
provide.
28 (pp.82–84).
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One possible successful way to improve the socioeconomic situation 
could be through investment in social activities that renew the social 
networks, for example those that could help one ﬁ nd a job (cf. Creed 
2002). 
Angelusz and Tardos (2001) prefer to use the term “social network 
resources” as they believe it is a more neutral term. In their view, social 
capital is closer to the economic meaning of capital and has a more 
instrumental use (p.302). Th e authors examine how the transition 
to market increases the signiﬁ cance of weak ties. Th ey conclude that 
in the context of postsocialism, networks of diﬀ erent social strata 
become more isolated from each other. People from one social stratum 
tend to move and interact mostly within their boundaries (p.314). 
As a result, weak ties are modiﬁ ed signiﬁ cantly although the authors 
contend that this is not the case with kinship and friendship ties. Th e 
authors conclude that with growing diﬀ erences in wealth and political 
involvement, network resources are more polarized from each other 
with regards to the assets of broader social relations (p.314), that is, 
they separate from each other and become increasingly closed in. Th us, 
access to network resources is diminished and becomes one aspect of 
the growing postsocialist inequalities. 
Regarding closed networks, Ganev (2001) provides an insightful 
analysis on how closed social networks can be detrimental to 
institutional development in CEE. Th e strategic interests and actions of 
such groups hinder successful implementation of institutional reforms 
with diminished state capacity and organizational coherence between 
administrative bodies as a consequence. Th e author contributes to 
greater understanding of the mutual eﬀ ects between a particular type 
of closed elite network and “state weaknesses.” He explores the nature 
of redistributive conﬂ icts within an historical perspective, illustrating 
their silent and underreported character to argue convincingly that 
the strength of the “winners’ networks” perpetuates deﬁ cits in good 
governance.
In postsocialism, networks of 
different social strata become 
more isolated from each other 
as people tend to interact 
mostly within their boundaries.
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2.2.2 Informal Networks as a Basis for Entrepreneurship
Th e nature of the informal or second economies in CEE, eﬀ orts at 
formalization and the development of small sized businesses are the 
principal research themes in the examination of social networks and 
entrepreneurship. Most prominent in this ﬁ eld are the Hungarian 
scholars, among whom Istvan Gabor is one of the most highly regarded 
researchers (for example Gabor 1991, see also the works by Endre Sik). 
Gabor (1991) examines the networks of small-scale producers and 
concludes that they provide little basis for cohesion and cooperation. 
Th e fact that they tend to be of low density and extensiveness means 
that they cannot provide much help to form the social and political 
infrastructure. Th e fact that they are not clan-like means that they 
cannot oﬀ er much support to the development of the market economy 
either (Gabor 1991). 
Using a rational choice approach, Sik and Wellman (1999) argue 
that network capital under communism was a substitute for deﬁ ciencies 
in the state and market. Under postsocialism, the incomplete shift 
from state distribution to market exchange has led to the expansion of 
network capital as an addition to the state and the market. (p.240). Th e 
authors suggest that the reasons for the increase of informal networks 
during postsocialism are many. Th e main ones are that culture in CEE 
favors them—“the wheeling and dealing practices of using network 
capital that developed under communism”(p.243); that they are 
available; and, that they are reliable in dealing with decreasing state 
control and increasing opportunity and uncertainty (pp.243–244). Th e 
most important sphere for the operation of the informal networksf is the 
informal economy, where, the authors argue that “trust is everything” 
(p.245). Due to an ineﬃ  cient market and bureaucracy, postsocialist 
“network capital is even more useful to cope [with uncertainties] and 
grab [opportunities]” (p.250). 
Th e use of network capital cannot only be explained as incomplete 
transitions from socialist times. People behave rationally by relying 
on their already existing practices in order to exploit postsocialist 
Informal networks increased 
during postsocialism because 
the culture in CEE favors them 
and because they are reliable 
for dealing with decreasing 
state control, and increasing 
opportunity and uncertainty.
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opportunities and cope with economic crisis. Th e article contains 
an insightful case study concerning a successful taxi driver strike in 
Budapest. Th e informal network that originated as part of the informal 
economy played a signiﬁ cant role in the establishment of their 
entrepreneurial business as a quasi-corporate network and of regulating 
their formal relationships with the state. Th e government reduced the 
price increase of gasoline after the successful (quick, well-organized and 
ﬁ rm) blockade of the Danube Bridges by striking taxi drivers. 
Wallace and Sik (2000) argue that in some postcommunist societies 
informal social networks constitute a dominant organizational principle 
(p.754). While most research tends to agree with this, only a limited 
number of studies actually investigate how networks are constructed 
and reconstructed for particular entrepreneurial activities. Wallace and 
Sik demonstrate how investing in social capital can reduce transaction 
costs, risk and anxiety and create bounded solidarity through kin, 
ethnic or other social networks (p.752). However, the authors point 
that too much solidarity can suﬀ ocate small-scale trading and for this 
reason traders have to maneuver creatively among diﬀ erent types of ties 
and to actively construct and deconstruct even kinship relations. Th e 
authors show how diﬀ erent kinds of solidarity are invoked as part of 
dynamically changing set of relations (p.753). 
David Stark (1992) asks whether old networks will promote or 
inhibit entrepreneurship in the market and, if so what would be the 
preconditions for these processes? Th e author suggests that density; 
symmetry and asymmetry; similarity to old patterns; stability and 
ﬂ uidity of networks should be examined. He argues that the network 
importance should be revealed through the investigation of how 
informal networks operate apart from the oﬃ  cially sanctioned ties, 
whether this is found in the interstices of the bureaucracy or outside 
it altogether (p.302). In his later work with Grabner, the same author 
(Grabner and Stark 1997) further develops these ideas in a volume that 
provides an extremely useful introduction to the network perspective of 
institutional change in CEE. 
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E  ?
51
Grabner and Stark (1997) combine the latest achievements of 
network analysis and evolutionary theories to provide an alternative 
conception of development to neoclassical analysts. As the authors 
state, the central premises of the volume is that networks linking ﬁ rms 
and persons across them provide a more fruitful focus for analysis rather 
than the individual ﬁ rm as a discrete economic unit. Networks are seen 
as active units of restructuring and not only as objects that need to 
be transformed. Th e authors argue that usually researchers examine 
localities as sites where proximity shapes shared meanings. In contrast, 
these authors deﬁ ne localities as sites where the interdependence of 
multiple meanings and social action shape shared meanings. Adhering 
to path dependency theories, the authors argue that legacies are 
important for the future development of the economies in a dual way 
– they could either block or support transformations. Th ey argue that 
the principle of compartmentalization demonstrates the relevance of 
an organization of diversity in order to recombine organizational forms 
in Europe. Conceiving networks solely in terms of assets (for example 
network capital) undermines the relational dimension of networks 
analysis. Rather than study networks as capital, the authors propose to 
investigate the properties of diﬀ erent kinds of networks.
Kolankiewicz (1996) deﬁ nes social capital as constituting various 
networks that are brought into play by the absence of conventional 
capital. Studying these networks shows which groups are the winners 
from the transition, why they are the most successful in adapting 
to the market situation and how they achieved it. He proposes that 
social networks are in the process of being converted so that certain 
individuals and groups can control and inﬂ uence the transition (for 
example some made use of privatization and redistribution). Th e 
author argues that success in the transition depends as much on the 
social networks themselves as it does on the convertibility of assets. 
Following Bourdieu, he suggests that the volume and structure of 
capitals determines the advantages held in a particular ﬁ eld (p.436). 
Kolankiewicz ﬁ nds a connection between social capital accumulation, 
Networks are active units 
of restructuring and not 
only objects that need to be 
transformed.
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transmission and reproduction and social class formation. He further 
deﬁ nes the market situation as network situation and expands the 
deﬁ nition of social capital as “trust.” 
Th e author concludes that for structural as well as for cultural 
reasons social network capital was prevalent during socialism and that 
it has been central to the emergence of new entrepreneurs (for the 
access to foreign relations, inside knowledge, vertical networks and kin 
ties, cf. Sik and Wellman 2000). Th ese networks today are forming the 
diﬀ erences between social classes. Th e growth paths of entrepreneurial 
networks have been very diverse. Th ere have been complex networks 
among young specialists with little old order organizational resources 
and dense networks among the old routinized bureaucratic apparatus 
(p.438). Both sets have included successful entrepreneurs. On the other 
hand, some networks, such as the ones linking managers to workers 
and they in turn to local communities, have hindered privatization and 
consequently entrepreneurship because they do not allow for economic 
units as self-interested bodies free of reciprocal obligations (p.438). 
In a critique of Kolankiewicz, Pahl (1996) argues that we know 
“so little” about the networks of the new ﬁ nancial capitalists. While 
Kolankiewicz implies that networks themselves are crucial, Pahl argues 
that it is more important to know what makes one network more 
powerful than another. Pahl argues that in the postsocialist context 
power may lie in “guns, thugs and ﬁ nancial linkages,” which he does 
not see as necessarily dependent on previous social capital (for a counter 
argument see Ganev, 2001, above). Instead, he proposes that in order 
to become wealthy or provide Western education for their children, 
the rich in CEE today need to get a secure access to a “diamond mine” 
or a “well” (p.446). Pahl ﬁ nds the arguments of class formation out of 
networks unsubstantiated in the work of Kolankiewicz: it is not clear 
how what mechanism turns a set of social practices (what Pahl calls 
the social networks and trust concept in Kolankiewicz) into a social 
structure of any sociologically enduring signiﬁ cance (p.445). Th e debate 
over the convertibility of networks and social capital and institutional 
change has been the focus of a series of studies and particularly those 
In the postsocialist 
transformation, it is crucial 
to fi nd out how much capital 
refers to a network and how 
much resources it can mobilize. 
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E  ?
53
on the emerging elites in CEE (see further below). Th e transmission 
of social, political and cultural capital is the subject of the next section, 
which examines the elite formation, reproduction and circulation after 
socialism.
Some of the recent anthropological studies, for instance, Lampland 
(2002) and Giordano and Kostova (2002) oﬀ er interesting insights into 
the relationship between networks and entrepreneurship. Giordano 
and Kostova (2002) rely on extensive ethnographic research and some 
illuminating case studies. Th ey show how a local winner in the transition 
owed his success as an arendator (leasing land) to the wide social network 
he possessed at national and local level (p.85). Th rough his connections 
he was able to obtain credit at a lower interest rate as well as important 
information about agricultural policy and market conditions. Locally, 
his position as patron to members of the old cooperative allowed 
him to recruit the best workers for his enterprise. In other words, his 
position before 1989 (as a manager of the farm) brought him payoﬀ s 
after socialism. A similar albeit more limited success was achieved by 
another ex-socialist chairman. He relied more on family and kinship 
ties and was, perhaps because of that, less successful. At the same time, 
it also attracted less envy and sabotage from others (p.85).
Lampland’s (2002) ethnographic study of managers of cooperative 
farms during and after socialism demonstrates how social networks 
were very important resources to maintain powers from the socialist to 
the postsocialist context. She shows how “successful entrepreneurship 
depends in the ﬁ rst instance on a variety of social relations, often 
including relations by kin.”(p.47). At the same time, she adds, that 
often there could be strong pressures from family to share proﬁ t, 
although family relations deﬂ ect demands from non-kin (for example 
friends and former colleagues), (cf. Lawson and Saltmarshe 2002). 
Lampland deﬁ nes former cooperative managers’ extensive networks 
of countrywide and national contacts in the agrarian economy as “the 
most valuable form of social capital” and that “these contacts range 
from simple friendships to complex bureaucratic and commercial 
connections” (p.48). Th e reliance on these relationships is seen as 
Although, it would be a mistake 
to exaggerate the importance 
of personal contacts...
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diﬀ using some of the uncertainties of the new market economy and 
giving entrepreneurs an advantage (p.48). Despite this, Lampland 
convincingly shows that negotiation of a good contract or a fair 
price for one’s goods cannot and should not be attributed to personal 
contacts alone. Here, the author makes a very important contribution 
by stressing the greater importance of knowing how to run eﬀ ectively 
the business as the most signiﬁ cant factor for success. She illustrates this 
with several case studies of successful and unsuccessful managers. 
Another signiﬁ cant contribution this study makes lies in its warning 
against exaggeration of a manager’s personal or family history as the 
reason for success or lack of success. Th is emerges out of an analysis 
of the current ideologies of success and failure. One could often 
simultaneously hear self-aggrandizing accounts of managers alongside 
villagers’ charges of corruption. Although this is not a new practice, it 
may be aggravated in the current context. Th us, the individuation of 
success and the essentialist claims from both sides disguise the speciﬁ c 
and crucial management practices: the expert knowledge and the 
extensive experience (pp.46–47). Th is is a useful reminder of the need 
not to take at face value some answers to surveys that are not measured 
against a knowledge of the local context. In this way, the advantage of 
qualitative studies becomes apparent especially when the goal is the 
thorough understanding of the very mechanisms and processes related 
to various forms of social capital.
2 . 3  E l i t e s  a n d  S o c i a l  C a p i t a l
Some authors argue that understanding the nature and role of elites 
provides key insights into the process of institutional change in CEE. 
(Gill 1998; Petro 2001, Adam and Tomsic 2002). Such studies tend to 
focus on the debate concerning the circulation or the reproduction of 
elites and, thus, of social capital. Szelenyi and Szelenyi (1995) provide 
a useful summary of the academic debate on the role of elites in 
postcommunist countries. 
...the dynamics of elite 
formation has been seen as a 
useful way for investigating the 
outcomes of reforms. 
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Th e theory of “elite reproduction” claims that the power of the old 
elites remains despite their transformation. By contrast, the “circulation 
of elite” theory recognizes some lasting powers of the old elite while 
identifying an emerging role for the new, anticommunist elites. Th ese 
new elites may have less political capital but perhaps more human 
and cultural capital (better education and technocratic experience). 
It remains questionable whether they will gain political or economic 
power (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995). 
Th e hypothesis is that where the technocracy was co-opted by the 
nomenklatura there would be a high degree of elite reproduction, as 
well as in those countries in which there was no counter or dissident 
elite. Circulation is expected to dominate where co-option of the 
technocracy did not take place or where the counter elites were strong 
(p.620). 
Th e survey (interviews and collections of life-histories) was 
completed by 1994 for six countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia. In each country about 2000 
people were interviewed, almost half belonging to the new economic 
elite and half to the old nomenklatura. About 5000 persons in each 
country were randomly interviewed in order to obtain a baseline 
comparison of the models of elite reproduction. Th e special issue of 
the journal Th eory and Society is devoted to an analysis of this survey. 
In their article, Szelenyi and Szelenyi explore in detail the ﬁ ndings of 
a survey for Russia, Poland and Hungary. Th e top-level communist 
elites and bureaucrats mainly gave out powers while the technocrats 
(managers, specialists, etcetera) retained powerful positions. Some 
space (mainly in politics but also in culture and economy) was created 
for the entry of new elites. Th e results support neither a theory of elite 
reproduction nor elite circulation. To a certain extent both theories are 
plausible although in certain cases the authors do argue that the theory 
of elite circulation is the more plausible of the two. 
Similarly, Adam and Tomcis (2002) argue that a degree of 
circulation in the sense of rotation and competition between factions 
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of the political elite, as well as the entry of new actors is a necessary 
precondition for developing democracy and sustainable economic 
development. Th e authors argue that in small social systems like 
Slovenia, elite formation should not be addressed in a politicized sense 
but instead through arguments related to the quality of human resource 
management. Th is issue should be approached as a matter of rational 
public discourse concerning national priorities. Th e role of the old 
elite is not seen as crucial as the formation of counter elites and the 
establishment of a dynamic interaction between various segments of 
the elite. Th e practical measure suggested is an indirect involvement in 
elite formation through incentives to increase the educational stratum 
and through insistence on meritocratic principles as a way of social 
promotion.
Th is paper leads into the research of decommunization and 
the forced political changes of elites. Th e studies of Letki (2002), 
Szczerbiak (2002) and Tarifa and Weinstein (1995/6) address the 
process of lustration, in other words, determining eligibility for 
public oﬃ  ce by screening for past involvement with the communist 
regimes. Th ey analyze the importance and the lasting popularity 
of lustration in some countries as well as the relationship between 
lustration and democratization. Th e institutional clearance of the 
old nomenklatura is not only related to the past events but is also part 
of the contemporary power contest between elites. Th e ﬁ rst author 
provides a wide comparison between the Central and East European 
countries in terms of the general mechanisms through which lustration 
was introduced and its eﬀ ects. She concludes that while there is no 
causal link between democratization and lustration, if it is seen and 
executed as a forward looking justiﬁ cation rather than a punishment 
for the past (cf. Oﬀ e 1996:88), lustration can have more positive than 
negative eﬀ ects. In the process of democratizing institutions, it can 
support the consolidation of a new democratic system. If it used as 
an “ad hoc political measure” lustration can be harmful or useless. As 
was the case in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czech Republic 
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where lustration is a planned political measure, it can be valuable in 
overcoming nondemocratic legacies. Szczerbiak (2002) focuses on 
lustration in Poland and concludes that more research is needed on the 
use of lustration as a tool in elite struggles and legitimation. Th e third 
author explores the decommunization process in the Albanian society 
in terms of the associated loss of human capital. As a result of lustration 
a new autocracy is being created where technical experts from the 
previous regime are not used. Th e authors argue that “forgetfulness” 
is also necessary for a successful implementation of transformation 
processes that endorse tolerance and an environment that provides an 
eﬀ ective foundation for the future. 
Comparative studies of elites such as that by Dinello (2001) are 
particularly useful. She describes two virtually opposite models of 
transformation in CEE grounded in the diﬀ erent histories of two states 
and their elites, as well as in the geographical location and international 
interaction. Th e metaphors of plan and clan are used to analyze the 
cases and evaluate the factors, processes and outcomes of the ﬁ rst decade 
after socialism. Th e research also explores the patterns of privatization 
and investment, vertical and horizontal accountability. 
Th e Hungarian model is referred to as clan for market, with a 
domestic tradition of self-regulation and organization. Th e Russian 
model, by contrast is called clan for plan. Th e ﬁ rst one favors the state 
as a vehicle for establishing legal order and enforcing universal rules 
whereas the second model, in contrast, describes a situation when self-
imposed rules fail, or have not been attempted at all, and the strong 
arm of the state is employed to instill norms and discipline. (p.591) 
Th e state in Russia is seen as an absolute and “divine” state, and in view 
of the author, there is a longing for certainty and paternalism, which 
acts to bolster it. Hungary is a country of diﬀ erent endowments. Th ere 
is a culture of compromise and adjustment, receptivity of state and 
society to business and ﬂ exibility and the independence of political 
and economic units, which is nurtured by constitutional reforms 
(p.591). Th ere was greater degree of consensus amongst the Hungarian 
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elites after socialism. Th e smaller privatization stakes help to render 
superﬂ uous some of the expansive, closed and violent clans found in 
Russia (p.607).
Th e author defends the applicability of the term “clan,” and then 
explains the “plan” and the “clan” metaphors in detail, reviewing the 
major works in the ﬁ eld. Th e role of informal elite networks in the two 
countries is detailed. An extensive state history overview supports the 
main arguments. 
Th e Hungarian elite networks are described as being more open, 
ﬂ uid and inclusive due to the bourgeois tradition of pragmatic proﬁ t 
seeking and bargaining according to the principle “give in order to get.” 
Th ey are also more diﬀ use and while they are coherent, they constantly 
change members and positions. Concerns are more instrumental rather 
than primordial considerations of value and identity, something that 
stands them in contrast to the Russian elites. Th ese Hungarian features 
are also combined with a higher level of accountability through its 
well-developed political organization and small but still active civic 
associations. 
Although there can be some positive role for the Russian clans 
(stabilizing transformations), there are also more dangers in this model 
than in the Hungarian one, namely, a potential backlash against the 
failure to enforce a social contract which could lead to social stagnation 
(suppression of individual freedoms and legal rights) under the 
pretext of stabilization. Th e author also highlights the dangers in the 
consolidation of the Russian elite against the international one, that is, 
to protect the Soviet legacy of a closed economy in an increasingly open 
world market. According to the author, this was designed by domestic 
ﬁ nancial-political clans, which could keep their power only by 
remaining exclusive and Dinello concludes that this has the potential 
to be a recipe for disaster (pp.608–609). 
Matsuzato (1999) explores the sociological structure of the Russian 
local elite, their electoral politics, bibliographical proﬁ le, and the process 
of elite reconﬁ guration and succession. He ﬁ nds that the continuation 
Hungarian elite networks 
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of elites is more signiﬁ cant in Samara than in Tambov. Th e author 
sees diﬀ erences between the two regions in political culture: pragmatic 
(Samara) versus idealistic (Tambov). Th e Samara elites proﬁ ted by the 
lack of electoral attention concerning their moral or political consti-
tuency as long as they were good managers. In contrast, in Tambov, it 
was important whether the leader was a “defector” or not. Th us, Samara 
elites have consolidated their position despite radical preferences of the 
Samara electorate in federal issues, while the Tambov elite is more 
vulnerable to the federal political situation. Th e relationship between 
regional and subregional elites has also been an important factor. In 
Samara, the relationship is described as “live and let live” or “tutelage 
and control” in contrast to the sporadic and tactless interference 
demonstrated by the Tambov elite. Th e local representative organs in 
Tambov have greater competence and a higher status than in Samara. 
Th is restrains the development of caciquismo (one party dominance at 
the local level based on administrative, informal resources, Matsuzato 
1999:1367) and demonstrates a tendency towards competitive electoral 
politics based on formal party structures. 
Th e author concludes that postsocialist caciquismo emerges where 
the political culture is pragmatic and votes are not cast for programs, 
but for concrete interests or conﬁ dence in leaders, and where the 
local administration helps local bosses to consolidate their positions 
(Matsuzato 1999:1393–96). 
Petro (2001) examines why local elites give their support to change 
(p.239) ﬁ nding that small entrepreneurs were encouraged by local 
administrations at the same time as traditional industrial elites were 
forced to accept foreign investment. Th is is seen as playing a crucial 
role in this process. Trust in government results from elites and society 
sharing a common vision that should act as an incentive for reform-
minded governments to encourage social capital formation: Apart 
from “benesﬁ ts to administrative eﬃ  ciency, it also oﬀ ers the prospect 
of forging social consensus between elites and nonelites upon which 
social stability, ultimately, must rest” (p.237). Th is research opens up 
?  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  S E R I E S
60
another large ﬁ eld of investigation in the sources of social capital and 
institutional change—the examination of trust.
2 . 4  T r u s t
Trust, as a synonym or as an accompanying concept to “social capital,” 
has become one of the central concepts in research on institutional 
change and on the interaction between formal and informal institutions 
in CEE. Th ere is a predominant view in the research that trust in 
institutions in CEE is at a low level, see for example Mateju (2002:7). 
Many authors argue (though sometimes with little speciﬁ c evidence) 
that socialism destroyed most types of trust: either interpersonal or 
extended, or both (for example Lovell 2001, Nichols 1996, Raiser 
1999, Raiser et al. 2001, Seligman 1992); and that previous courses 
of history (that shaped culture) contribute to the contemporary dearth 
(for example Holland 1998). Other authors take issue with such views 
and argue that it is not distrust but skepticism that dominates transition 
(Mishler and Rose 1995) today. Kolankiewicz argues that levels of trust 
in postsocialist transition societies is high and provides an element of 
predictability which is absent in the system devoid of formal rationality 
(1996:447). 
Most authors agree that there is a lack of conﬁ dence in the state and 
limited trust in institutions. Th is situation is considered to be one of the 
most salient problems in CEE: “Trust between the citizen and the state 
is conﬁ ned to those situations in which the citizen is certain to achieve 
personal beneﬁ t” (Tilly 1985:170). In terms of distinction between 
trust and protection it seems undeniable that many postsocialist citizens 
consider it more reliable, more eﬀ ective and therefore more rational to 
be part of a highly personalized network based upon the principle of 
protection than to rely on the state (Gambetta 1992). Th is should not 
be interpreted from a culturalist view that would reduce them to the 
expression of a presumed “Balkan asociality […] Th is is a system and 
representations and rational strategies that actors follow when a state 
The predominant view 
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repeatedly fails to perform its fundamental duties…” (Giordano and 
Kostova:75). At the same time, people continue to look to the state to 
resolve their collective action problems. In this regard, an overemphasis 
on policies that seek to strengthen private property rights may not only 
be out of place but also potentially harmful (Hann et al. 2002:5, also 
Verdery 1998).
Some of the main debates concerning trust in CEE center on the 
sources of trust production and on the question whether institutional 
change produces trust or is itself a product of trust. Overall, trust is 
seen as being beneﬁ cial for economic growth as it lowers transaction 
costs while in politics it is seen as a source of legitimacy and collective 
action (Stulhofer, 2001:27). Although there is agreement that trust is 
important, authors do not agree on which type of trust (interpersonal 
trust, trust in institutions, or general trust, or another) is decisive for 
the creation of democratic institutions and market economy. Often, 
deﬁ nitions of trust conﬂ ate very diﬀ erent ideas, concepts or social 
practices such as “motives,” “beliefs,” “dispositions,” “circumstances,” 
“interests,” and “power” (cf. Dasgupta 1988, Gambetta 1988, Harris 
2003, Harriss and Mihaylova 2003). 
Several authors ﬁ nd trust to be synonymous with social capital 
(for example Raiser 1999, Kolankiewicz 1996, Kunioka and Woller 
1999). For example, Kunioka and Woller (1999) claim that “social 
capital deﬁ ned in one word is trust” (p.579) by which they understand 
generalized trust: the extent to which people trust their fellow citizens. 
Further on, the authors claim that trust equals social capital or civic 
community (p.579). Also, as mentioned in the previous section, 
Kolankiewicz (1996) deﬁ nes the market situation as a network 
situation and social capital as networks. In the second part of his 
paper he expands the deﬁ nition of social capital to that of “trust,” 
that is, as a moral resource. Following Putnam, he argues that trust is 
essential for the emergence of a market order as it enforces contracts 
and predictability. He divides trust into thick (mechanic solidarity) 
and thin (organic solidarity) (p.436). Taking sides with Durkheim, he 
At the same time, 
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states that trust eases cooperation and cooperation increases trust. He 
deﬁ nes trust during socialism as speciﬁ c, because networks were used 
for speciﬁ c purposes; simultaneous (that is favors to be repaid in the 
future) and low in generalization because networks were not highly 
transitive (that is repayment to another group with hope of return was 
not always followed).
Many authors examine how the lack of various types of trust 
inhibits institutional and economic development (for example Holland 
1998). For some, the problem has to do with the lack of generalized 
trust while for others, only trust in institutions contributes to the 
institutional strengthening of new democracies. Only a few researchers 
highlight the possibility that trust may also engender corruption and 
amoral familism and not necessarily promote cooperation and the 
public good (for example Sandu 1999a). In the following sections, 
some of these main arguments are summarized.
2.4.1 Trust and Political Institutions
Kunioka and Woller (1999) use the data from the New Democracies 
Barometer Study in order to test the importance of social capital for 
popular support to democratic institutions. Th ere was no available data 
to measure “social trust,” that is trust between individuals or between 
groups in society a la Putnam. For that reason, they examined trust in 
institutions, which they deﬁ ne as an “important, though distinct, stock 
of social capital in support of democratic government” (p.584). Th ey 
use measures of trust/mistrust in institutions, minorities, immigrant, of 
patience and willingness to resort to measures of law and order, etcetera 
(pp.582–584). Th e authors also examine several variables that they see 
as forms of social capital: church attendance, political patience (the 
ability to endure the uneven track of democratization), and support of 
individual freedoms. Th e presumption is that higher levels of these will 
show higher levels of social capital. Supposedly, higher levels of social 
capital will be related to preference for parliamentary government 
rather than an authoritarian government. Th eir data conﬁ rmed 
A few highlight the possibility 
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their hypothesis although with the exception of church attendance, 
which was not found to be statistically signiﬁ cant in preference of 
parliamentary government. Th e comparison between social capital 
and economic considerations shows that social capital outperformed 
economic considerations as having an eﬀ ect on voting (p.593). Th us, 
the authors conclude that social capital measures should be considered 
alongside economic factors as important determinants of support for 
the democratic regimes (p.594). 
Miller et al. (1997) deﬁ ne trust as being the expectation of fair 
treatment. Th ey see this type of trust as weakly related to trust in 
people but as strongly related to trust in state institutions such as the 
government or the police (pp.600–601). Th e authors demonstrate how 
trust in government varied from country to country although they do 
not seek to explain why. People in the Czech or Slovak Republic who 
expected fair treatment tended to trust their governments less while 
people in Russia and Ukraine trusted in government but expected less 
fair treatment. Th e conclusion is that expectations of fair treatment 
reﬂ ect more than just general political satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
(pp.600–601). After a series of focus group studies and individual in-
depth interviews in the Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the authors 
analyze both qualitatively and quantitatively the interactions between 
citizens and oﬃ  cials and the culture of complaining and gossip about 
corruption. In their conclusion, they state that a culture of complaining 
and gossip as well as attention to press reports concerning high-level 
corruption can obscure immediate personal experiences with corruption. 
However, the results demonstrate that low-level corruption, or public 
sector corruption, has a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on trust in state institutions. 
Th e diﬀ erences between the two states reﬂ ect the diﬀ erences in the 
socialist experience as well as in the postsocialist context.
Lovell (2001) examines trust as a basis for extensive social co-
operation, which gives rise to voluntary associations and can lead 
to economic development within the framework of the rule of law. 
He argues that building trust can consolidate liberal democracy and 
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create a truly civil society (p.36). Trust may be understood as part of 
the political culture but it is both a cause and a result of democratic 
culture. Lovell suggests that researchers focus more on trust rather than 
on political culture as the latter has been largely contested (p.29):  it 
has been diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne not only “political culture” but also what 
produces it. For example, sometimes even strong democracies do not 
have a “civic culture.” Moreover, there is not one prescribed level of 
political culture that can qualify one state as a democracy. Trust may be 
deﬁ ned as part of political culture yet, in the view of this reviewer (see 
also Nichols 1996), it does not lead to as much confusion. It is always 
clear that higher levels of conﬁ dence in government leads to conﬁ dence 
in other transactions because laws regulate conduct over numerous areas 
of the polity (p.30). Th e author deﬁ nes trust also as: “a reciprocal social 
phenomenon, where cause and eﬀ ect are mutually reinforcing” (p.30). 
Th e author examines various empirical studies on trust and discusses 
the levels of trust in CEE, and the legacies of communism in terms of 
distrust. He then suggests that good leadership and revaluing politics 
should be the best ways to build trust in CEE. Revaluing policies here 
is recommended to include subordinating loyalties of informal groups 
such as families to loyalty to the state and a public adjustment towards 
political contest and competition (p.34). 
Mishler and Rose (1995) examine trust, distrust and skepticism in 
democratic governments and 15 institutions with the results of the 
New Democracies Barometer Survey. Th e authors argue that democracy 
requires trust but too much trust may create apathy (p.5). Skepticism 
is explored as a middle point between trust and distrust. Healthy 
skepticism is found to predominate in CEE while the ratio between 
trust and distrust was 1:2. Popular trust in institutions may be 
explained in the context of CEE with the expansion of civil rights and 
representative institutions (p.19). However, economic performance and 
personal characteristics (such as economic and social status, education, 
etc) were found to be important determinants for whether an individual 
held trust in institutions. Th e ratio between trust and distrust depends 
Trust may be understood as 
part of the political culture but 
it is both a cause and a result of 
democratic culture.
Healthy skepticism 
predominates in CEE.
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on the perception of the old regime and the new freedoms; on an 
evaluation of the macroeconomic and individual economic situation; 
and on the social and economic status of the individual. Th ere was 
not much trust in current macroeconomic developments but generally 
people tended to be optimistic about the future. Th e authors argue 
that individuals are more likely to evaluate institutions on the basis of 
the macroeconomic situation rather than according to their individual 
economic situation. 
Stulhofer (2001) attributes the decrease of generalized trust in 
Croatia mainly as a result of the war. Th e author argues that trust could 
be created through bureaucratic transparency and legal activities (p.28). 
Disrespect of social norms (for example cheating and corruption) creates 
less generalized trust. Popular beliefs that corruption is a problem may
in itself be an obstacle to economic reform and sociopolitical develop-
ment. Th e author argues that governments can eliminate obstacles to 
trust and this must be their major aim in the current situation (p.31). 
Using the World Value Survey data, Sandu (1999a) examines 
(among others) the relationship between tolerance and discrimination 
as forms of trust and distrust (p.2). He studies “tolerance” (towards 
marginals or strangers, including other ethnic groups) as “a form of 
minimal trust.” Respectively, “discrimination” is deﬁ ned as the opposite 
of “trust” and it is deﬁ ned as “an attitude or behavior of sanctioning 
in a negative way persons on the basis of their status or behaviors” 
(p.8). Th e author concludes that “religion and ideological experience 
are signiﬁ cant factors in shaping the social capital map of Europe, and 
respectively of tolerance and discrimination” (p.16). 
In a diﬀ erent and more detailed study, the same author (1999b) 
deﬁ nes faith, association and tolerance as forming the nucleus of social 
capital values. Th e author distinguishes trust from negotiation and 
argues that trust is a form of social exchange that, like negotiation also 
contains costs and beneﬁ ts, but in contrast to a situation of negotiation, 
cost and beneﬁ t are not directly comparable and the degree between 
investment and reward is much higher. Th e author compares it to the 
Popular beliefs that corruption 
is a problem may itself be 
an obstacle to reform and 
development.
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nature of the gift (after Marcel Mauss 1993): a symbolic exchange 
where one gives something away in exchange in order to conform 
to norms such as prestige and to derive satisfaction from conforming 
(pp.69–70). Th e culture of trust is speciﬁ c to “open social space.” In 
opposition, “closed social space” is characterized by distrust, which 
according to the author is found among poor people in poor areas. Trust 
is a part of culture and equals acceptance of calculated risk, openness 
to novelty, and cooperation (p.69). In terms of trust in institutions in 
CEE, Sandu argues that trust in institutions varies signiﬁ cantly in time 
and is thus very dynamic. He demonstrates how an understanding of 
the temporality of trust in institutions is crucial for understanding the 
legitimacy of the postcommunist reforms (p.71). In the ﬁ rst part of the 
section on trust, he argues that major democratic change is accompanied 
by the “gift of trust” from civil society to democratic institutions. Th e 
second part examines the speciﬁ c factors that inﬂ uence the individual 
variations of trust in institutions. Trust between individuals is signaled 
out as a root for trust in institutions (see the following section for a 
comparison with the works by Martin Raiser who rejects the link 
between interpersonal trust and trust in institutions).  
Bougarel (2002) describes how low levels of interpersonal trust 
arise out of the uncertainties of the postwar context in Bosnia. Th e 
author shows how sociability and mutual help decline. Using the 
distinction between bridging, bonding and linking social capital 
(introduced by Woolcock 1998) he demonstrates that, in some cases, 
this distinction is very diﬃ  cult to make. He argues that bridging social 
capital (relationships across bounded groups or communities) has been 
aﬀ ected more than bonding capital (interpersonal relations or relations 
within the same community) but still 43.9 percent of his informants 
said that there was no decline in socializing with old neighbors of 
diﬀ erent nationality. Th e latter demonstrates that there is still a high 
level of bridging social capital. Bougarel (2002) explores trust as part 
of local social organization where trust between local people always 
takes precedence over trust to outsiders. Th is type of social organization 
aﬀ ects civic values and conﬁ dence in civic institutions. 
Sandu argues that trust 
in institutions varies 
signifi cantly in time.
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2.4.2 Trust and Economic Growth
Van Shaik (2000:13) examines trust at a regional level in Europe and 
concludes that trust is unrelated to economic growth. He bases this 
conclusion on a comparison between GDP and how people respond 
to the following question asked in the World Value Survey: “Generally 
speaking would you say that most people could be trusted or that you 
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” While there was no direct 
relation between levels of trust and economic growth, the author did 
ﬁ nd that active membership in groups is positively related to economic 
growth. In contrast to van Shaik, Stulhofer (2001) ﬁ nds that trust is 
economically beneﬁ cial. He studies trust as one of the three dimensions 
of social capital (the other two being associatedness and shared values). 
For Stulhofer, trust is part of the initial motivation for cooperation and 
it has the consequence of lowering transaction costs (p.27). Following 
the same logic for coping with risk and diminishing transaction costs 
in the informal economy, Sik and Wellman (1999) state that “trust is 
everything” and that it is often drawn from networks of kinship, friends 
and neighbors or the same ethnic group.29
Raiser et al. (2001) examine the relationship between trust and 
economic growth in most detail. Th e authors argue that although 
generalized trust is related to economic growth in developed market 
economies, this is not the case in CEE. Instead, the authors argue that 
trust in institutions, what they call “formal social capital” is what will 
lead to economic growth in CEE countries. Th ey ﬁ nd that trust in 
institutions is lower than in OECD countries. Trust in friends in the 
richer countries of OECD is correlated with the level of generalized 
trust (trust towards outsiders) while in the postsocialist countries 
social circles appear smaller and more closed and do not suggest 
such correlation. Civic participation is also found to be lower than 
in countries with fully developed market economies. Trust in public 
institutions is found to be a consequence and not a prerequisite for the 
accumulation of social capital.
Generalised trust is unrelated 
to economic growth in CEE 
even though this is the case for 
developed market economies.
29 See the chapter on “Social Capital and Economy.”
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Th e authors argue that there is no convincing evidence that reforms 
work more eﬀ ectively where civic participation or trust in governments 
is high. At the same time, there is a correlation between civic participa-
tion and economic growth. Trust in public institutions such as the 
legal system and the police is correlated with economic growth while 
the connection with trust in political institutions is less marked. Th eir 
conclusions support Putnam and Coleman’s ﬁ ndings in relation to 
trust. Th e authors argue that keeping alive the hope of “returning to 
Europe” may be useful to help build trust in institutions. Another 
recommendation is that governments should eschew chauvinistic ten-
dencies within their countries, which only serve to exacerbate social 
divisions and undermine trust. 
Some have suggested that reducing high levels of income inequality 
could be important to increase trust in others and in the public 
institutions. However, Adam et al. (2001) question this theory in 
their investigation of trust in institutions in relation to inequalities in 
Slovenia. According to the author, while growing inequalities are usually 
associated with lowering trust, in Slovenia today the existing low levels 
of inequality parallel low levels of trust in institutions (pp.14–16). 
In an earlier article, Raiser (1999) examined the role of informal 
(interpersonal) trust in transition societies. He provides a brief review 
of the growing literature in the ﬁ eld and distinguishes between trust 
among kin, process based trust and generalized trust. He believes that 
interpersonal trust is important for the emergence of entrepreneurship 
and that it is a key ingredient of market economy. He sees bilateral 
trust (trust between individuals) as being diﬀ erent to generalized trust 
and deﬁ nes only the latter as social capital. He then searches possible 
determinants of extended trust and assumes that there is a relationship 
between trust and the quality of institutions (for a diﬀ erent opinion see 
Sandu 1999b)
Extended trust can be a result of expanding networks or moral 
innovations (creation and establishment of new moral norms), the 
homogeneity of a society and low risk of being cheated, but primarily it 
is the result of the enforcement of contracts by the state (p.6). A “kick 
Would reducing high levels 
of income inequality help 
increase trust in others and in 
public institutions?
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start” of generalized trust may be produced by the state (p.6). However, 
the more extended trust there is, the greater the reliance that may be 
placed on state enforcement only. Th is in turn can create problems such 
as stretching administrative resources (p.6). Th e author also argues that 
the predominance of ethnic cultures rather than the development of a 
national culture as well the persistence of clan loyalties will slow down 
the emergence of extended trust. 
Raiser (1997) examines two cases: that of strong states (China 
and Germany) and of weak states (Russia and Ukraine). He argues 
that rapid political change as seen in a country like Poland leads to an 
increase in trust in governments. A separate section examines the role of 
informal institutions within institutional changes such as privatization. 
Th e paper suggests that the strength and legitimacy of the state have 
to be considered in the design of institutions. Th e author oﬀ ers a 
strong argument that trust in government could be promoted by good 
political and economic performance. 
In contrast to Raiser et al. (2001), Sandu (1999b) argues that 
interpersonal trust is a root for trust in institutions (p.71). In addition 
to individual trust, the author adds religious belief as an important 
factor in determining trust in institutions (p.79). Sandu describes 
how trust in Romania in the 1990s results from hopes for the success 
of democratic transition and economic change. He shows how poor 
government performances diminish trust while good performances 
always increase trust. Th e case studies show that trust in government 
in Romania today is consistently a result of government performance 
(p.78). However, he suggests that once there is a tendency or trend 
towards the lowering of trust, this can reinforce itself and further lower 
trust despite the incidence of good performances. 
Th is theorizing of trust incorporates insightful culture and territorial 
considerations, that is, communal identity (spatial and historical). Th e 
author examines trust between Romanians and Hungarians and ﬁ nds 
that in mixed regions there is more trust between the two groups 
than in regions that are not ethnically mixed. Education was another 
variable on which trust depends on the type of settlement. Rural 
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people with a higher parameter of useful connections (that is, when a 
person is a member of diﬀ erent associations and has a larger number 
of connections to solve problems connected to health, justice, police, 
administration, banks and ﬁ nding a job, p. 89) have a tendency to lack 
trust and have less trust in state institutions at state level.30  Th e author 
believes this is due to the more frequent interaction of rural people 
with these institutions and thus the higher chance of disappointment if 
they malfunction. People in cities were found to have a higher amount 
of trust but the author assumes that it may be the result of well-learnt 
media clichés, for example by answering questions regarding interethnic 
tolerance with clichés assimilated though media consumption (p.86). 
Th is author is perceptive as he critically examines the reasons for 
some answers to survey questions, something that is rarely found in 
other sociological, economics or political scientists studies on social 
capital. Th e case study method is also valuable and demonstrates the 
importance of distinguishing between diﬀ erent contexts (for example 
rural/urban) and diﬀ erent segments of population (for example 
educated/religious/women/aged/well-connected, etcetera) before making 
generalizations about social capital. Th e conclusions raise many signi-
ﬁ cant questions that challenge certain prevailing assumptions regarding 
trust and social capital. 
According to Bjornskov (2000) although social capital does have 
an impact on social and political phenomena, for the economists, the 
important question is whether it has any eﬀ ect on individual income. 
He compares social capital and individual income in Slovenia and 
Estonia, and then compares both of these with Denmark, taken as a 
state with very high levels of social capital. Both Estonia and Slovenia 
are found to have less social capital than Denmark. Th e author suggests 
that social capital in CEE may be strengthened through increasing the 
quality and credibility of national institutions, which should increase 
trust. Social capital has a very real eﬀ ect on individual income and civic 
In mixed regions there is more 
trust between ethnic groups 
than in regions, which are not 
ethnically mixed.
30 To compare conclusions regarding the importance of socializing in rural areas for 
social capital building cf. Creed (2002).
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engagement is the statistical predictor in both countries. For this reason, 
one of the best ways to increase social capital is to stimulate civic 
engagement. 
Th e ﬁ ndings about Slovenia suggest that education and trust in 
institutions exist in a linear relation. In Estonia, people in country 
towns, older people, students and housewives were found to be more 
trusting (the author suggest the reason may be that they have smaller 
social networks). In Slovenia, people in smaller habitats were found 
to be more trusting of their fellow citizens whereas those who are 
unemployed are less-trusting (a pattern which is similar to other CEE 
countries). Th e results also show that, in Slovenia, trust in institutions 
is not positively related to civic engagement. In Estonia, trust in 
institutions is related to civic engagement and trust emerges as a 
predictor of individual income too (pp.14–16).
One very useful work on trust is by Giordano and Kostova (2002). 
Th ey examine the social production of mistrust in Bulgaria, describing 
how the privatization process diﬀ ered from what was expected 
and, instead of producing a family run enterprise based on private 
smallholdings, it has created a host of new social agents (individual 
and collective: the authors examine the leaseholders—arendatori, the 
cooperatives, and the commercial intermediaries and foreign players) 
representing speciﬁ c interests and economic strategies. Th e winners of 
the transition, the arendatori, preferred to play the role of small-scale 
rentier capitalists. A discrepancy between social practice and the legal 
framework highlighted a gap between legality and legitimacy. Public 
institutions were seen by local actors as foreign bodies and obstacles 
to be avoided (pp.88–89). Th e social production of mistrust thrived 
because of misinterpretations, tensions and conﬂ icts between the state 
and citizens. Citizens defend their adaptive strategies as “weapons of the 
weak” (p.89) even if they are not legal. Relations of mutual suspicion 
between state and society that date from the Ottoman Empire aggravate 
this situation. Th e presocialist and the socialist period widened the gap 
between legality and legitimacy through the clientelistic strategies of 
elites and their physical separation from citizens. Th e authors conclude 
Mistrust thrived because of 
misinterpretation, tensions 
and confl icts between the 
state and citizens.
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that the social production of mistrust, well tested in past performances, 
seems to be the ﬁ tting response to the pernicious eﬀ ects of the new 
public institutions” (p.90) and it “is based on speciﬁ c practices that 
necessarily stem from past negative experiences, which are reactivated 
in the present through the group’s collective memory” (p.75).  
2.4.3 Local Institutions
Only a limited number of published research papers examine the 
local level institutions in CEE but these works are growing more 
signiﬁ cant. Th ey demonstrate that studies on social capital should 
pay more attention to various contexts and situations, that is, that 
diﬀ erent geographical and administrative regions may have diﬀ erent 
trajectories in the development of “stocks of social capital.” Social 
capital research would do well to avoid working at the level of the 
whole region of CEE and maybe even at the country level. Regional 
studies (for example Marsh 2000, Sandu 1999) demonstrate signiﬁ cant 
diﬀ erences between regions. Th e studies that focus on just one region 
and provide case studies of success or failure of institutional change are 
very insightful because they reveal in detail those mechanisms that are 
able to contribute to the production of social capital. Th is is illustrated 
in the study by Petro (2001). He asks the extremely important question 
– can the state create social capital? Th e author divides the two groups 
in this debate into statist and antistatist approaches. According to the 
ﬁ rst, the state through its institutions and mainly its governments 
(central and local) can create social capital through politics and creating 
a proper environment. Similarly, Raiser (1997) argues that the state 
can create social capital through third party contract enforcement. Th e 
second approach, the anti-statist one, claims that state institutions can 
destroy but cannot create social capital that exists outside them in the 
formations of the “civil society” (Petro 2001: 229–231).
Petro (2001) provides a very detailed account of how the local 
government in Novgorod managed to successfully implement reforms. 
Th e article provides a very detailed account of the local government 
Can the state create 
social capital?
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strategies to develop the region: for example to ﬁ nd foreign investment 
as an alternative to the lack of government or business investment, to 
push through an eﬃ  cient privatization program, to pursue local cost-
cutting measures, and others. 
Despite some setbacks, the local government has been successful 
in increasing the number of local jobs. Th e regional administration has 
supported the local government. Th e town has a Social Chamber—
where registered social organizations meet once monthly and public 
involvement and debate is thus encouraged. Civic organizations of 
various types thrive in this town. Parallels to the Indian province of 
Kerala can be made in terms of the success of the Kerala local government 
in facilitating the acceptance of new social rules, codifying them into 
agreements and using them for conﬂ ict resolution. Th us, in regards 
to the three most oft-stated consequences of social capital: economic 
development, trust in government and civic activism, Novgorod has 
developed a high level of social capital. Th is demonstrates, according 
to the author, that governments can gain from increasing level of 
public participation. One particularly interesting section describes 
the role of the elite and the reasons for their support of the changes. 
Good governance and foreign investment are seen as major factors in 
strengthening the elite. It is suggested that local government has thus 
created most of the social capital in this case. 
Th e study by Uhlir (1998) provides a similar case study but makes 
an even stronger case for the crucial role foreign investment makes 
in strengthening social capital. He argues that regional change in 
the Czech Republic can be analyzed as a combination of network 
restructuring and struggles for the redeﬁ nition of symbolic capital. Th e 
case of Lanskroun demonstrates that symbolic capital and ﬁ nancial 
capital of foreign investment may be combined successfully with 
local pre-1989 networks to invigorate regional economics. Th is article 
contributes to the understanding of the highly diﬀ erentiated outcomes 
of the internationalization of postcommunist regional economies. 
Some studies of the World Bank have been especially perceptive 
concerning the relationship between people and institutions in CEE. 
Governments can gain from 
increasing level of public 
participation.
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Th e Voices of the Poor reports for Bosnia, Bulgaria and Russia have a 
special section on institutional change. Th e World Bank report on 
social capital in Bosnia (Bougarel 2002) is also extensive and has useful 
sections on local level institutions. Bougarel (2002) examines how 
social capital functions at the level of local institutions. He ﬁ nds that 
Bosnians turn to institutions only when they lack rich or inﬂ uential 
relatives. Fragmentation of local institutions has been extensive and, 
according to the author, reveals the higher signiﬁ cance of bonding 
and bridging social capital in comparison with linking social capital 
Th e author describes some of the limits of top-down approaches to 
institutional reintegration despite the necessary interference of state to 
overcome deadlocks and deliberate obstructions (p.29). Some eﬀ orts 
to establish cooperation may be destroyed by top-down approaches 
that neglect local forms of social capital. Moreover, some clientelistic 
practices (especially with donor agencies) may be installed through 
certain top-down approaches.
Many other important themes in institutional change and social 
capital remain unexplored, especially for CEE: gender and institutional 
change (Hesli and Miller 1993), ethnic relations and institutional 
change (Csergo 2002), alternative service provisions (Snavely 1996), 
and labor relations (Mako and Simony 1997).
2 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n
Institutional change is one of the most complex ﬁ elds in research on 
CEE. Th e use of a social capital approach has shifted research from 
transition and structural examinations towards a more dynamic and 
complex study of transformations around social networks and trust/
distrust. Social networks, trust and elite studies are very diverse ﬁ elds 
and open up other research spheres that cannot be neglected in the 
studies of social capital. For this reason, a review of the social capital 
literature and institutional change cannot be only limited to studies 
that explicitly utilize the concept of “social capital.” Many other works 
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addressing the same issues must be considered. To the above-discussed 
research must be added the research of development agencies on how 
local institutions of power work and on principles of participation. 
Published research on these topics is very limited in CEE and yet 
most of the policies and developmental aid are directed towards such 
initiatives. Many reports remain inaccessible. 
Th e brief review of the literature on institutional change and 
social capital demonstrates that several important debates all centered 
on the question: how is the economy and democracy embedded and 
disembedded in social relations? However, there is rarely an agreement 
among scholars, neither about ﬁ ndings and analysis, nor about what 
is the best methodology to use in the study of these questions, despite 
that this question obviously calls for an interdisciplinary approach. 
Th e theories and methods used by scholars from various disciplines: 
economists, anthropologists, political scientists, socio-legal scholars, 
etcetera; have remained largely closed within their discipline. In terms of 
methodological drawbacks, it should be mentioned that some scholars 
have been tempted to rely solely on large-scale surveys such as the World 
Value Survey or the New Democracy Barometer.  Th ese instruments have 
not received adequate critique even though they often muddle into 
one concept many diﬀ erent ideas, for instance patronage, protection, 
motivation, incentive, and conﬁ dence all being subsumed under the 
heading of trust. It is arguable that these shortcomings undermine to 
some extent the credibility of the resulting policy solutions.
 In contrast, work that draws the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods has produced rather insightful studies. Such 
studies have been able to show the processes and very mechanisms that 
social relations operate within. Th ey can also investigate how these 
may work through institutions in speciﬁ c contexts and situations. 
Instrumental and rational choice theories, an uncritical adherence to 
the modernization paradigm as well insisting on rigid dichotomies 
between East and West have been characteristic features of many 
studies of institutional change in CEE. Networks have been studied 
Policy solutions based on 
unreliable data should be 
treated cautiously. 
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as instruments rather than as having special relational and dynamic 
qualities. Trust has not yet been deﬁ ned convincingly to allow for the 
analysis of power relations and interests. A possible criticism of many 
of the works on trust may be the use of “trust” in a meaning that is 
incompatible with local meanings. It is important to know if there are 
any local deﬁ nitions of “trust” that correspond to the meaning of the 
sociologists or the economists. If a diﬀ erent meaning is being measured, 
then the interpretations of the results should also be very diﬀ erent (see 
the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional Change”, see also 
Harriss 2003, Harriss and Mihaylova 2003). Such problems could to a 
certain extent be avoided through nuanced and speciﬁ c deﬁ nitions of 
trust (for example in the works by D.Sandu).
Th e examination of embeddedness of economic activities in 
social relations has often relied upon culturally essentialist and even 
“orientalist” attitudes that describe the “premodern” or “antimodern” 
character of social networks in CEE. In this view, informal social 
networks in CEE are treated as obstacles to the market economy and 
democracy. Th is is an example of one of many generalizations which, 
when examined closely at the level of locality and particular case studies, 
can reveal very diﬀ erent results. Institutional change can be understood 
better through the concept of social capital, but this would do well to 
be examined more critically through systematic empirical research and 
crossdisciplinary fertilization of theory and method.
3 .  S O C I A L  C A P I TA L  A N D  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  
3 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Th e research on social capital and civil society in CEE often seems to 
have one central question, namely how could we build or consolidate 
democracy. Lovell (2000) argues that democratic consolidation is 
crucial and can be achieved through building trust (p.36). Th e author 
Confl ict should be treated 
as both normal and politically 
benefi cial.
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argues that conﬂ ict should be treated as both normal and politically 
beneﬁ cial. Th e primary political change in postsocialism is the building 
of new democratic institutions or adding democratic content to old 
ones (p.36). Th e following overlapping questions are the result of this 
dominant standpoint:
• How can we strengthen democratization through citizen parti-
cipation?
• If and how does social interaction contribute to building a 
democratic culture?
• How can civic engagement be stimulated?
• What is the relationship between state and civic organizations?
• What is the role of international agencies in democratization?
• What is best: top-down or bottom-up approaches to participation 
or a balance between the two?
• How can social cohesion be enhanced?
Th e following section provides a summary of the main trends in the 
published research on social capital and civil society.
3 . 2  C i v i c  E n g a g e m e n t 31
A majority of researchers ﬁ nd that civic participation in CEE is low in 
comparison with Western democracies. Th e main reasons are usually 
the socialist past or a mixture of socialist legacies and contemporary 
socioeconomic and political conditions. Some researchers oﬀ er reﬁ ned 
pictures of the complex inﬂ uences of the past (Buckowski 1996, 
Spulbeck 1996, Anderson 1996). Another group refer to contemporary 
state ineﬃ  ciencies as blocking greater civic participation (Alapuro 
2001). Th is focus on civic participation has led to examination of 
31 See also the section on networks in the chapter on ”Social Capital and Institutional 
Change,” which contains more data on some of the problems related to networks and 
civic participation.
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voluntary associations (or forms of civic engagement) as forms of social 
capital. Th e relationship between NGOs and the local and central 
governments has also been a topic for research. 
Several scholars share the proposal of Gibson (1998:4) that instead 
of examining the existence and functioning of formal democratic 
institutions, researchers should focus on social networks as a key 
attribute of civil society. Gibson believes that the antithesis of a civil 
society is atomization – when citizens are disassociated from each other 
and that a vibrant civil society requires well developed social networks 
(p.4). Expansive social networks could be the basis for eﬀ ective 
and autonomous organizations (p.4). Social networks are means of 
transmitting information and values in society and those with more 
networks should be able to adopt more democratic values (p.4). 
Th e aims of Gibson’s study were to uncover the density of social 
networks, to examine how far network members engage in political 
discussion, and to ﬁ nd out the degree to which these ties cross social 
groups. Th e survey was conducted in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, France, Spain and the USA in 1995. Th e ﬁ ndings reveal that 
social networks as such are unrelated to existing attitudes towards 
democratic institutions where the country has recently experienced 
political transformation. Th us, the author argues that the central 
hypothesis that social networks are an especially useful means of 
social learning in transitional regimes must be rejected and that social 
networks seem to be more politically signiﬁ cant in the West rather than 
in the East. 
Gibson (1998) believes that the ﬁ ndings do not so much point 
to erroneous assumptions about the nature of social networks. Rather 
the story might be that there is not much “novelty” to be distributed 
along those networks, as democratic regimes were well under way in the 
postsocialist countries. Th e data also shows that the communist legacy 
was not an atomized society and that attributes of social networks have 
little (if anything) to do with political legacies.
Th e study by Aberg (2000) stands in stark contrast. He examines 
some limitations of Putnam’s social capital theory when applied to CEE 
Researchers should focus 
on social networks as a key 
attribute of civil society.
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and in particular in Ukraine. He argues that those aspects of culture that 
create the country’s political culture depend on both time and context: 
“Political culture and historical legacies, institutions, state/agency and 
structural factors, such as level of socioeconomic development, do 
as most people would agree, mutually intervene to produce speciﬁ c 
outcomes in terms of polities and without following the deterministic 
model suggested by Putnam’s theory” (p.299). 
Aberg studies how exactly the noncommunitarian social capital of 
the former socialist states impedes the building of democratic culture 
and democratic institutions (p.299). In the section on “political culture” 
he points to some diﬃ  culties identifying which social organizations in 
Ukraine could be considered as interest organizations of a deﬁ ned 
political interest (p.303). People trust less in formal organizations 
(p.307) but this should not automatically lead to the conclusion that 
people do not solve practical problems through the mediation of civic 
networks, interest groups and political parties as may be found in 
Western democracies (p.307). 
Th e author asks “why the kind of exchange relations this social 
capital [noncommunitarian] is built from, do not facilitate collective 
agency and trust in a situation in which nonauthoritarian and less 
vertical formal institutions are attempted” (p.307). Th e answer is in 
the type of social capital: a noncommunitarian one: “the nature and 
transactions and the mode of reducing social transaction costs typical 
to noncommunitarian social capita” impede trust and action (p.309). 
Th is social capital is in the particular type of informal networks and in 
the informal social organization. Exchanges are limited within closed 
networks such as those based on family ties, kin and close friendships 
as created during socialism (p.311). Th e author believes that as long 
as institutional design and state policies do not prove to be eﬃ  cient in 
collective problem solving, this noncommunitarian social capital will 
function (p.313)
In a similar vein, Rose (1999) claims that antimodern networks are 
obstacles to democratization. In his view, the existence of free elections 
is not enough to understand the democratization process. Th e absence 
Non-communitarian social 
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of a modern state and strong institutions of civil society or rule of law 
and accountability also need to be considered. Election winners are not 
bound by law or accountable by the electorate, nor are they checked 
by the institutions of civil society (p.30). Th e author suggests that an 
examination of the nature of social networks (social capital) is a more 
useful approach to understand democracies than a more traditional 
analysis of election behavior. 
Nichols (1996) also argues that we cannot use political culture 
alone to judge the level of democracy. He suggests that democracy 
should be deﬁ ned as the numerous and dense horizontal networks 
of voluntary engagement (p.636). He argues that today Russians see 
civil society organizations as unnecessary if not dangerous due to their 
past experiences with the forced associatedness imposed by the state: 
“the alienation and fear bred by the system meant that the Soviets 
were individuals bound into groups, not individuals associating in 
groups—crucial diﬀ erence from the perspective of social capital” 
(p.636). He also suggests that networks of civic engagement need to 
be studied especially concerning how they transform into political 
organizations and market economy institutions. Th e author discusses 
the impact of institutions on society and concludes that only some 
institutions enhance democracy. Th ese are usually characterized by 
inclusive political practices (for example proportional representation). 
Th e exclusive institutions (for example presidentialism and winner-
take-all elections) undermine democratic values and norms (p.640). 
Stulhofer (2001) also examines the lowering participation rates and 
argues that strengthening the positive trends in social capital through 
better working institutions will enhance not only the growing stability 
of democratic procedures but also economic eﬃ  ciency. 
Lonkila (1998) argues against the view that socialism was detrimental 
to civil society and social interaction. He examines how, in comparison 
to teachers in Helsinki, work has more importance as a social milieu for 
Russian teachers providing an arena for socializing, childcare and access 
to informal resources. Together with geographically condensed social 
Networks of civic engagement 
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networks is linked the strengths of social patterns inherited from the 
Soviet era. According to Lonkila, people in everyday socialist life were 
not passive but actively transformed the socialist context and continue 
to mould the transition today despite transformations in the ways their 
networks work (cf. Hann 1996 who argues that there was a continuous 
movement and great diversity among and within each of the East 
European countries during socialism).
Also in contrast to skeptical views on civic participation in CEE, 
Alapuro (2001) argues that the claim that civil society in Russia is weak 
could be a misinterpretation of what is an eﬀ ective social organization 
in the context of limited governmental eﬀ ectiveness. Teachers in Russia 
for example create inward-oriented networks as a survival strategy. 
Th e author argues that democratic development and an increase in 
the eﬀ ectiveness of the state would reinforce the integration of teacher 
networks through organized interest struggle. A further increase in 
state ineﬀ ectiveness could accentuate the importance of the mutual 
trust networks.
Letki (1999) examines citizens’ membership in organizations in CEE 
and ﬁ nds that the relation between social capital and democratization 
and citizens’ membership in organizations is very weak. Th e scores 
on the associational index show very little engagement in voluntary 
organizations in all CEE countries but, at the same time, the diﬀ erence 
between the countries of highest and lowest scores is not that great. 
Th is, according to Letki, proves that the link between organizational 
aﬃ  liation, citizens’ satisfaction and social capital is very weak. Th is also 
means that membership in voluntary organizations is by no means a 
principal indicator of a truly democratic system, contrary to Putnam’s 
or Nichols’s suggestions. Th e author argues that, because membership 
in associations and the stocks of social capital32 were unrelated before 
1989, they do not seem to inﬂ uence each other in the transition (p.11). 
Although stocks of social capital have been crucial for the success of 
32 Th e latter refers to the assumption that everyone naturally wishes to take part in 
associations if they do associate (for example neglects other types of motivation).
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political and economic reforms, the levels of civic engagement does 
not directly reﬂ ect this. Th us, any understanding of democratization in 
CEE must take into consideration the speciﬁ cities of the region. Letki 
concludes that the theory of Robert Putnam cannot be used in CEE as 
it was used in Italy or in any other Western country (p.12).
Marsh (2000) explores the nature of social capital and democra-
tization. He criticizes research that argues that there is no civil society 
in Russia (for example Coulton 1995) and demonstrates that there are 
certain regions that are characterized by their civic community. He 
achieves this through an index of civic community that he claims is 
adequate to the Russian context. He tries to develop indicators that 
are qualitatively comparable where he ﬁ nds that analogous indicators 
cannot be found (for example instead of using newspaper readership, 
he uses newspaper production). Marsh also stresses the importance of 
crossregional analysis. He ﬁ nds that diﬀ erent regions have diﬀ erent 
civic communities. Th e second measurement he applies is by level of 
democratization. Th e comparison of results demonstrates that regions 
that are more “civic” are also more “democratic.”
In his turn, Van Shaik (2002) states that research has not clearly 
established how associational activity increases wealth of nations, 
promotes the spill over of knowledge in networks and limit costs 
(p.13). And, he suggests that the mechanism between active group 
membership and (regional) economic growth could be explored 
through social capital as suggested by the World Bank (pp.13–14).
Bjornskow (2002) argues that civic engagement is the social capital 
proxi that is most related to individual income. His central ﬁ nding is 
that civic engagement is a strong predictor of individual income (p.13). 
His data shows that levels of civic engagement in Estonia and Slovenia 
are comparable but only represent one half of the Danish level. Th e 
author also found that richer Estonians participate more while age 
and education were not signiﬁ cant. A concluding policy advice is that 
civic engagement must be strengthened to move out of the transition 
process and individual participation must be increased because “this is 
One fi nding was that 
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known to have beneﬁ cial eﬀ ect at the national level on both stability of 
democracy and economic growth” (p.17).
Other researchers have found a positive correlation between civic 
participation and economic growth, this time, economic growth at 
national level (Raiser et al 2001). Raiser et al. (2001) argue that unlike 
in market economies, trust in CEE is not positively correlated with 
economic growth but it is with trust in institutions. Th e measurement 
of participation by active membership in organizations ﬁ nds that 
participation in CEE is lower than in OECD countries. One of the 
predictions made in this paper is that people in CEE may remain tied to 
a subsistence economy and be politically passive and this increases the 
costs of the transition (p.22). Th e authors argue that civic participation 
may increase trust in institutions, while it also can act independently 
(not through increasing trust) on economic growth. 
One of the ﬁ ndings of Raiser et al. (2001) is that urbanization 
is negatively associated with civic participation. Th e authors suggest 
this may be due to the anonymity and isolation of towns. However, 
other research ﬁ nds that there is more civic participation in towns. For 
example, Bougarel (2002) describes how a higher level of membership 
in voluntary organizations is related to higher levels of economic and 
cultural capital. Th e reason is that NGOs attract middle class urban and 
educated people (p.44). At the same time a decline in associational life 
is registered. Th e number of NGOs is dropping but that may be a result 
of the maturation of the sector. Moreover the number of NGOs tells 
little about the level of democracy. Many associations do not actually 
function due to lack of resources. Th e author also found diﬀ erences 
between the forms of rural and urban participation. In general, people 
in rural areas usually collect money, contribute with work, organize 
gatherings, and they see themselves as responsible to improve their 
living conditions. On the other hand, there is a tendency for people 
in urban areas to more often complain to the media or international 
organizations and see the municipal services as responsible; and they 
organize demonstrations and protests. Participation is also related to 
age and gender. 
A large variety of traditional 
organizations cannot be 
classifi ed simply in terms of 
bonding. Nor can bridging 
and linking capital be entirely 
attributed to the new NGOs.
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 Bougarel (2002) ﬁ nds that poor people participate less in voluntary 
organizations. He examines collective action as an outcome as well as a 
source of social capital and as a building tool of trust and cooperation 
within and across groups. He identiﬁ es the frequency of various 
collective actions (self-organization, public protest, etc) and analyzes 
their social and institutional determinants. Th e data shows that there 
are signiﬁ cant cleavages in society. Th e most important ones at local 
level have a socioeconomic dimension but are perceived as cultural, 
moral or political categories. Th us, collective action must be studied 
in relation to growing inequalities (see also World Bank 1999b), and 
in the speciﬁ c context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it must also be 
regarded as a result from the forced population movement (p.13). Th e 
scarcity of ﬁ nancial resources in comparison with the actual needs of 
the population further exacerbates this fragmentation and has negative 
eﬀ ects on social cohesion and interpersonal trust (p.22). 
Th is report challenges the separation of social capital between 
bridging, bonding and linking capital on the grounds that it is sometimes 
impossible to distinguish between the three in practice. NGOs are 
often promoted at the expense of traditional organizations, such as 
neighborhood associations, which are considered as only carriers of 
bonding social capital. In fact, there are a large variety of organizations 
and their use, and traditional organizations cannot be classiﬁ ed simply 
in terms of bonding, nor can bridging and linking capital be entirely 
attributed to the new NGOs (pp.50–51). Interest based organizations 
are considered to be bonding, but they can contribute to the creating of 
bridging and linking capital and even mono-ethnic groups contribute 
to breaking barriers (p.51) (see also Engberg and Stubbs (1999). Th e 
central ﬁ nding is that impoverishment or lack of responsibilities of 
formal institutions (some of which abuse their authority but most 
simply have no capacity to carry it out) diminishes collective action (cf. 
Alapuro 2001, Lonkila 1998). 
Th is report also challenges the assumption that there is a lack of 
civic action in CEE. Collective actions related to local public services 
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were found to occur quite frequently. Th e ﬁ ndings suggest that 30 
percent of people have made contributions, 20 percent have taken 
part in collective work related to a local infrastructure project and one 
in ﬁ ve have taken part in a clean-up action of collective space. At the 
same time collective protest have attracted fewer numbers of people 
(Bougarel 2002:51). 
Th e research by Ekiert and Kubik (1998) is another example 
exploring forms of civic engagement, this time collective protest in 
postcommunist Poland. Th is work draws attention forms of collective 
action that are neglected within the literature, for instance, the role 
of trade unions (see Kramer 1995, Kubicek 2002). Th e main reasons 
for the relative decline in their activity can be found in the wider 
development of the political and economic order that previously 
precluded democratic consolidation. As their economic eﬀ ectiveness 
shrinks, some unions diminish activities, while others continue to 
maintain broad social involvement (for example Kubicek 2002). In 
some cases, the lack of participation in trade union protests should be 
explained by the apparent political consensus. Th e latter may positively 
aﬀ ect social transformations leading to a genuine “social contract” in 
CEE (Kramer 1995). Th is means that lack of social involvement is not 
always a sign of an unhealthy society.
Engberg and Stubbs (1999) provide a very insightful analysis of 
local associations. Th eir report has a section outlining the development 
of NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although very short, it is 
extremely useful because it analyzes some processes that are rarely 
commented upon. Th ese are the counterproductive role of international 
organizations, the relationship of NGOs in formal politics, and the 
production of mistrust by NGO obsessions, that is that only NGOs 
could apply for certain funding of development organizations (cf. for 
example the works by Steven Sampson, Bateman 2003, Cellarius and 
Staddon 2002, Bougarel 2002). Th e authors propose that the task of 
social development should not be the imposition of foreign notions of 
NGOs. Such notions have already led to the production of mistrust 
International donors sometimes 
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among people. Instead, Engberg and Stubbs argue that already existing 
stocks of trust should be identiﬁ ed and eﬀ orts given to how these could 
be rebuilt (p.3). 
Engberg and Stubbs make another important observation, which 
is shared in parts by several authors (Cellarius and Staddon 2002; 
Bougarel 2002, Sampson 1996). Th is is that international donors 
sometimes create a kind of “antipolitical opposition that marginalizes 
formal political parties and turns social movements into bureaucracies” 
(p.5). Th e authors see a danger in the promotion of extremes within the 
state and civil society rather than encouraging new alliances, coalitions 
and compromises (pp.5–6). 
Cellarius and Staddon (2002) ﬁ nd Bulgarian environmental NGOs 
to be a mixture of complex and amorphous organizations. According 
to the authors, arguments about the size or the diversity of the sector 
often ignore issues of motivation, intention and the structures of 
opportunity or constraint. Th e authors criticize the idea that the mere 
possibility of participation is in itself a suﬃ  cient good or that there 
is an a priori “existential” will to engage which exists in participatory 
activities.33 Th e authors also address in detail the need to reassess the 
relationship between the state and the NGOs. Numerous informal 
networks between NGOs and state institutions and para-state (such 
as international donors) are analyzed to demonstrate the relative lack 
of independence of NGOs from the state. Th e authors argue that the 
concept of “civil society” should be reformulated to better recognize 
aspects of power within society. 
In a similar vein, Hann (1996) argues that certain “Western biases” 
have contributed to  “theoretical distortions of the concept” of civil 
society. According to him, one problem stems from methodological 
diﬃ  culties in establishing the exact nature of the abundant network of 
33 See Evans (2002) for a counterargument regarding the role of the Russian Orthodox 
Church demonstrating its closed intertwining with the nation-state and its preference 
for political action over an ecclesiastical dialogue.
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associations outside the state. Hann questions the utility of a supposed 
antagonism between state and society. He observes that, as a term, the 
popularity of “civil society” is fading in CEE. It has become clearer 
that it is more rhetorical than reﬂ ecting social reality. Yet, despite its 
limitations, the notion undoubtedly has a continuing appeal to many 
people and this is a valid justiﬁ cation for its continuous research. 
Hann suggests that “civil society” would be best theorized in the 
changed context of wider debates such as state, modernity, indivi-
dualism, pluralism and the boundaries between private and public. 
Th e contributors to the volume by Hann (1996) depart from simple 
dichotomies to explore the complexity of institutions that meditate 
between self and society and the social relationships that underpin 
the functioning of both states and markets (p.21). In particular, the 
contributions on CEE focus on the important role of civil associations, 
the informal networks, international institutions and the state of 
(mis)trust during and after socialism. Th ey demonstrate a need to shift 
debates about civil society away from formal structures and towards 
and investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices. 
A diﬀ erent theme in this ﬁ eld of research is related to the importance 
of local and central government for active civic engagement (Engberg 
and Stubbs 1999, Lonkila 1998, Alapuro 2001, Aberg 2000, Cellarius 
and Studdon 2002, Hann and Dunn 1996). Detailed case studies 
provide illustrations of those mechanisms that diminish participation 
or on the other hand, lead to successful cooperation between civic 
organizations and NGOs. For example, Krzyszkowski (2000) sees 
NGOs as key actors in building social capital. Building social capital 
(activating the State and transferring social assistance to agents, setting 
up nongovernmental public partnerships, etcetera) is seen as essential 
to cope with recognized problems. Th is paper focuses on social capital 
as an aspect of successful collaboration between governmental, private 
and nongovernmental institutions at local level. Th e author concludes 
that the legal framework for local partnership between public and social 
partners and the nature of ﬁ nancial support from central government 
are the most important elements in this process.
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A paper by Brunell (2002) also addresses the relationship between 
local government and NGOs. An example from Krakow shows how 
the local government cooperated with NGOs in a selective manner by 
choosing predominantly Catholic ones. Catholic activists had sought 
an alternative to the secular and feminist organization of the shelter 
for women in the town. Brunell examines the process of awarding a 
contract to run the shelter in detail and gives a useful illustration of the 
importance of local government in shaping civil participation. In this 
case, as the author puts it, local government views the Catholic charity, 
Caritas, as being principally concerned with family reuniﬁ cation and 
less explicit protectors of women. Th is is perhaps why it does not trust 
the feminist groups (predominantly members of the intellectual elite). 
As a result, certain elites within Krakow have abandoned local politics 
to focus on “outsider” strategies such as protest, seeking alternatives 
to established public policies, and establishing organizational links 
with feminist organizations in Warsaw and the West. In the author’s 
view, this demonstrates how a citizens’ approach to local policies does 
not always lead to fruitful partnership with the state but to eﬀ orts to 
circumvent the state. 
Th e case of Krakow is contrasted with that of Lodz, where 
political polarization prevented one-sided provision of services. Some 
pre-existing connections between the central state and quasi-public 
organizations ﬂ ourished and contributed to local development. Th e 
shelter for women provides very high quality services and it is used for 
training of the social workers. Th e situation in Lodz also demonstrates 
the positive contribution of bureaucratic autonomy and political 
patronage for third sector initiatives. Th e paper is a useful introduction 
not only to issues of civil society but also institutional change of local 
government.
Several authors highlight the importance of a gendered approach 
to studying civil society and social capital (Hann and Dunn 1996, 
Bougarel 2002, Brunell 2002). Gal and Kilgman (2000) and Corrin 
(1999) for example, examine women’s participation and decision-
making in formal politics. On the whole, these are found to be less 
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common than amongst men. Women’s positions are further weakened 
by poverty, unemployment, and lack of adequate social services, 
domestic violence, prostitution and traﬃ  cking. Gal and Kligman’s 
book (2000) contains three chapters examining women’s activities 
in NGOs respectively in Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia. NGOs in 
Romania are depicted as being underinvolved in the speciﬁ c problems 
of women, those in Bulgaria promote traditionalist discourses about 
the position of women in society, and the Serbia case study describes 
the important links between individual violence against women and 
violence of the war. Th e limitations and prospects in front of women’s 
groups are described insightfully for the cases of Slovenia and Albania 
in Corrin (1999).
Dowley and Silver (2002) provide another perspective to civic 
participation. Th ey examine social capital, ethnicity and support for 
democracy in Eastern Europe. Th e authors base their work on previous 
research according to which interest in politics and levels of participation 
may grow due to ethnic polarization of society in the conditions of 
institutional breakdown and transition (p.506). Th ey ask the following 
questions: How do the usual makers of social capital (interpersonal 
trust, political interest and voluntary group participation) correlate 
to the respective levels of democratization in CEE? Th en, they ask 
what are the eﬀ ects of ethnic diversity on democratization and levels 
of social capital? (pp.506–507). Th e analysis of the World Values Survey 
data show that the most successful cases of democratization are those 
in which levels of political interest, participation and trust were at or 
below the average level for CEE (p.518). 
Th is conclusion points to the weak overall correlation between 
indicators of social capital and democratization in CEE. Th e analysis 
of individual data found some evidence of a positive correlation 
between social capital and attitudes supportive of democracy (p.524). 
Th e examination of political interest and membership in voluntary 
organizations has mixed results. For ethnic majority members greater 
political involvement was associated with greater support for democracy, 
the government and regime institutions. Among ethnic minorities, the 
Among ethnic minorities, the 
more mobilized members are, 
the less supportive they tend to 
be of democracy.
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more mobilized members are the less supportive they tend to be of 
democracy compared to the more passive members (p.524). Th ese 
ﬁ ndings suggest that a more reﬁ ned research hypothesis must be built 
in relation to the links between civic participation and democracy. 
Dowley and Silver conclude that it may be more diﬃ  cult for ethnically 
plural societies to democratize if there are exclusivist nation-building 
projects or if ethnic minorities are mobilized against it. Th ey caution 
against research instruments and social capital theory being directly 
transported to CEE (pp.524–525). 
Social capital and religion is another important ﬁ eld that remains 
understudied. Th e works of Luse (2001) and Kharkordin (1998) 
present two very diﬀ erent approaches that aim to highlight the role of 
social capital in democracy and civil society. Khakourdin outlines the 
new forms of social networks in the Russian society and assumes that 
the role of the Church will only be compromised if it interferes in the 
civil sphere.34 An opposing view is presented by Luse (2001) who ﬁ nds 
that the church of the Charismatic Christians in Latvia acts as a pool 
of “weak ties” (in Granovetter’s terms) that can be utilized for ﬁ nding 
jobs, providing health and social services, friendships, etcetera Th anks 
to the numerous and regular contacts within and across congregations, 
the members multiply their ties. In this way, such organizations are 
instrumental in creating new opportunities for social mobility and 
personal development.
Th e work of Anheier et al. (1998) examines the relationship between 
civic participation and the state. Th e authors describe the existence of 
mass organizations in the GDR as similar in their operations and 
functions to today’s nonproﬁ t organizations, especially at the local 
level. Th ese cannot be viewed as a third sector as they did not exist 
independently from state control or party ideology. Th e authors examine 
the changes in these organizations with the breakdown of GDR and the 
Research questions on civic 
engagement have not always 
been productive as they leave 
out elements such as gender, 
ethnic divisions, religion 
and the state.
34 For example Phillis and Kaser 1992, Karsten and Major 1994; Bereford-Hill 1998, 
Wolf and Sayer 1999, Muckle and Morgan 2001; see also Journal Education in Russia, 
the Independent States and Eastern Europe edited by J. Muckle.
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uniﬁ cation with Western Germany (cf. Grix 1999). Th e East German 
NGOs seem to have carved out an important political and social space 
for themselves (pp.2–3). At the same time, participation levels are 
lower than in Western Germany. Th e main reason is found to be the 
bad economic situation and the development of the labor market (p.4). 
Despite this, the East German nonproﬁ t sector stands out in economic 
weight and higher growth compared to Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary. While it shares relatively low levels of volunteering with 
the other countries, it is larger in both relative and absolute size. Th e 
authors argue that this is due to the substantial amount of government 
funding that supports its operations and development. Such a funding 
source is much less available to organizations in the other countries 
(p.7). 
Th us, the subsidiary principle in Germany reveals the decisive 
role of the state in the life of civic organizations. Th ere have been two 
diﬀ erent types of organizations developing: one consists of the societal 
embedded ones in the areas of recreation, sports and culture, the 
other, of organizations that are active in welfare and health services (cf. 
Hassan and Kyle Peters 1996). Th e later are becoming more business-
like organizations leaving behind the ideological roots of the past 
and growing increasingly similar to their West German counterparts. 
Membership is related to various political and economic issues of the 
day. Th e East German organizations are seen to be more dynamic and 
more adequate to the local context than the West German extensions 
of civil organizations. 
3 . 3  C o n c l u s i o n
Research on social capital and civil society in CEE has focused mainly on 
the examination of civic engagement and its eﬀ ects on democratization. 
Some authors adhere to the neoliberal concepts whereby civil society 
is seen as constituting a separate sphere from the state. Such works are 
usually based on quantitative methods. Ethnographic studies ﬁ nd less 
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such separation and explore the complex mechanisms of interaction 
between various actors in postsocialist countries. Th e relationship 
between the state and nonstate actors is seen as crucial in the production 
or hindrance of civic engagement. 
Most works conclude that the theoretical and methodological 
instruments for examination for social capital in Western countries 
should not be transferred directly to the CEE countries. Th e speci-
ﬁ cities of the CEE context and past are signiﬁ cant and must be taken 
into consideration. Moreover, the research questions concerning civic 
engagement have not always been productive as they leave out important 
elements such as gender, ethnic divisions, religion and the state. 
Th e anthropological works are a proof that there is a need to 
shift the debates about civil society away from formal structures and 
towards and investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices. 
Th ese, as pointed out by Hann (1996), are best addressed by a political 
anthropology (demonstrated in this volume) that overcomes the 
constraints of liberal-individualism as well as of both relativism and 
universalism.
4 .  S O C I A L  C A P I TA L  A N D  E D U C AT I O N  
 I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Th e educational systems in Central and East European (CEE) countries 
have undergone rapid structural changes in the last decade. Numerous 
research publications describe the implementation of these changes and 
suggest policy improvements in the new education in CEE countries: 
in legislation, curricula, schools, etcetera35 Th e reports of the World 
Bank, UNDP, UNESCO, and other developmental agencies and think 
35 See the section on “Social Capital and Civil Society.”
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tanks also contain rich accounts of the educational change processes, 
and register the speciﬁ c problems and coping strategies in the region as 
well as in each country. 
Researchers have most often been occupied with the macrostructural 
changes of educational institutions, and the redeﬁ nition of their 
relationship with the state. Generally, their aims are to highlight the 
ways in which past and/or current cultural, economic, and sociopolitical 
processes relate to educational change. Poverty, and lack of adequate 
economic, political and legal environment, and poor infrastructure have 
been signaled out as the main determinants of access to and inequalities 
in education. Some of these issues, especially as they are studied in 
development reports, seem to be related in meaning (often without a 
speciﬁ c reference) to the broader deﬁ nitions of social capital as a force 
for increasing participation, empowerment and cohesion.36 “Social 
capital” could be understood in those works (even when it is not used 
as a term) as a force for replacing oﬃ  cial structures and mechanisms 
that should be responsible for public education, for example when the 
central state is very weak ﬁ nancially or politically.
However, there is still a signiﬁ cant lack of systematic research 
dealing with the relational deﬁ nitions of social capital and education. 
Access and inequalities in education relate to the informal networks 
in the educational system, such as the schools’, teachers’, students’, 
parents’ and other stakeholders’ informal networks, as well as the 
informal economies based on them. Th ere has been limited research 
on how schools, parents and other institutions relate (or could relate) 
in order to strengthen the education environment. Th is review of 
In this context, “social capital” 
can be understood as a force 
for replacing offi cial structures 
and mechanisms that should 
be responsible for public 
education.
36 Th e direct and uncritical introduction of Western educational research as well as 
Western models of educational structures is largely criticized by many authors on 
the basis of the unsuitability of Western models to the CEE contexts. For example in 
Weber and Liikanen (2001). Also, Polyzoi and Cerna (2001) examine the essence and 
principles of educational change in CEE against the Western models of educational 
change. Th ey argue that more research is needed to outline the speciﬁ cities of the CEE 
context where such change is unprecedentally rapid unlike those in the West. Th ey 
also pose questions on the eﬀ ects of the inheritance of the socialist regime, something 
whicch is often understudied or misconceptualized.
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educational research in CEE demonstrates that some insightful research 
eﬀ orts already exist and these usually provide a balance against the so 
far predominant focus on macrosystemic and structural reforms. 
An example of such promising research is that which focuses on 
informal networks that connect educational institutions to wider 
society and, as a result, reinforce or diminish educational inequalities 
and achievements depending on the situation (for example Weber and 
Liikanen (2001) and Lonkila (1998)). Th is research could be extremely 
useful in policy improvements as it demonstrates how schools, teachers, 
parents and other stakeholders actually operate together or against 
each other in day-to-day life to strengthen or weaken educational 
institutions.
Research ﬁ ndings from other regions are also entering the CEE 
countries.37 For example, there are numerous “social capital studies” 
from other parts of the world that demonstrate the important role 
of parents in the educational achievement of children (for example 
Hagan et al. 1996). Th is is relevant to some of the current context of 
the CEE countries where, for example, busy parents can delegate the 
entire upbringing obligations to the schools (cf. Hagan and Radoeva 
1997–98).
Th e main area where “social capital” currently enters educational 
research in CEE concerns the role of educational institutions in the 
reproduction of inequalities, in particular, the reproduction of elites38 
through education. Th ese works deﬁ ne social capital as networks and 
the resources acquired through those networks (cf. Bourdieu 1996). 
Th is research represents only one possible aspect of studying the 
diminished access to education in the region. 
Another body of research, closely related to the problems of access, 
deals with education as an exit strategy from poverty where, in theory, 
the greater the access to education, the greater the chance for poorer 
37 See also the section on elites in the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional 
Change” of this review.
38 See the last section of this chapter for some examples.
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people to overcome poverty. Th is theme is usually examined as a 
motivation to reinvigorate the educational institutions and it is most 
often found in the special sections on education in the international 
developmental agencies reports (for example Th e Human Development 
Reports or the reports on CEE by the World Bank).39 Th e term 
social capital rarely appears in these sections although, in the view 
of this reviewer, its broader applications could be relevant here. An 
underrepresented area of research concerns the training and civic 
education with which developmental agencies and numerous NGOs 
throughout CEE have been occupied. It has been diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd any 
research on these issues apart from the often inaccessible evaluation 
reports on training projects.
 Th e following sections examine the main areas of educational 
research where social capital or its synonymous concepts (networks, 
trust, participation, etc) have been applied in CEE countries:
• Elite reproduction;
• Informal networks;
• Education as an exit from poverty.
4 . 2  E l i t e  R e p r o d u c t i o n
Th e ﬁ eld where social capital entered educational research in CEE the 
earliest after socialism, relates to the main questions posed by Bourdieu 
and Coleman (for example see Mateju and Paschar 1990). One central 
topic has been the role of education in reproducing inequalities. Th e 
39 Fees are new phenomena in CEE countries and a major factor in creating educational 
inequalities. In some cases, schools have made eﬀ orts to widen access by waving oﬀ  
fees for poorer students in exchange for various contractual engagements by these 
students after graduation. Such an example was found in a brief report about a 
privatized school in Tirana (Tooley 2001). It demonstrates how the private school 
charges very high fees to its students but also accepts children of poorer families 
who pass the entrance exams. Th e latter are expected to initiate or maintain school 
businesses to pay back their fees and employ other poor students. In opposition to 
this one sided report, one might argue that this practice could become the source of 
possible maintenance of inequalities. 
One central topic has been 
the role of education in 
reproducing inequalities.
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study of educational institutions as a system that legitimizes power and 
reproduces old elites is a central feature of this discussion. Wong (1998) 
demonstrates how, during the socialist period, political institutions were 
critical for educational attainment. Th e author deﬁ nes social capital as 
one of the four elements of family capital that play an important role 
in educational attainment (human capital, ﬁ nancial capital, cultural 
capital and social capital). Social capital includes social relationships 
and networks outside but accessible by the family.
In a similar vein, Hanley and McKeever (1997) argue that social 
groups maintain intergenerational social statuses from before socialism 
and until today. Th ese authors provide a dense and critical summary 
of the main debates in the ﬁ eld (pp.1–4). Th ey studied the class 
composition of Hungarian high schools and universities to show that, 
especially in higher education, the socialist system reproduced old and 
new inequalities. Furthermore, their results demonstrate that socialist 
class composition was not transformed signiﬁ cantly after socialism. 
Th e unequal distribution of cultural and social capital (in this context, 
social connections) seems to maintain educational inequalities today. 
Children of professionals (having more cultural capital, that is higher 
education) proceed to tertiary education more often than children of 
administrators (who have more social capital). Th is article underlines 
the overriding importance of cultural capital in comparison to social 
capital.  
In contrast Tomusk (2000) argues that socialism did not allow 
its “predating inequalities” to continue, instead replacing them 
with elites engineered by the socialist state. He agrees that with the 
demise of socialism, some old elites were transformed into new ones. 
Th e international agencies, such as the European Union, are seen as 
having a negative inﬂ uence because they sometimes take an active 
part in the ﬁ ght over the monopoly of elite reproduction through 
the new educational institutions. “Foreign agencies have been given 
a substantial role in re-establishing the postcommunist ﬁ eld of elite 
production, where masses of institutions aim at the establishment 
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of the monopoly…” Th e author refers to the lucrative accreditation 
of East European higher educational institutions which has become 
signiﬁ cant business for some Western agencies or market driven higher 
educational institutions (p.280). 
4 . 3   I n f o r m a l  N e t w o r k s
Th e studies of Russian private schools by Lisovskaya and Karpov 
(2001) are extremely insightful on the role of informal networks in 
ensuring the survival of schools in the context of a weak state. Th eir 
research broadens understanding of private school realities through 
studying informal networks as the major coping mechanism. Although 
these schools are formally independent, in reality, they depend heavily 
on elites and the manipulation of public resources. An interesting 
observation is that the better funded the schools are, the more accessible 
they become in that they require less or no fees (for example the Jewish 
schools).40 
Th e dual economy in which the schools are involved includes 
transactions based on informal connections, barter exchanges with 
city oﬃ  cials and other interested groups, and cash ﬂ ows that are 
not accounted for in tax reports. Some observations show that the 
connections of the school principals to the local governments can be 
crucial for the school’s development. Th e best related principals were 
previously close to or occupied positions in the nomenklatura. Th ose 
who did not have such connections had to rely upon connections and 
networks at lower levels in order to ﬁ nd shelter under the old regime. 
Th e creation of good connections with the parents of the pupils has 
been an extremely useful survival strategy, where support ranging from 
help with the security protection of schools to help organizing holidays 
abroad for the students.
40 See also White (2001).
Connections of the school 
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Th e authors argue that the independence of private schools is 
undermined by economic instability and legal indeterminacy. Th e 
paper concludes with a prediction that a large number of these schools 
will close due to the socioeconomic crises and the competition from 
elite state schools. According to the authors, this would aﬀ ect the 
educational sector negatively as they see the value of private schools 
in diversiﬁ cation of educational opportunities. It is suggested that 
private schools can address needs that are beyond the public sectors’ 
responsibilities or capacities.
Another study of informal networks in the changing educational 
institution broadens our understanding of the special patterns of social 
cohesion in the postsocialist context. Markku Lonkila (1998) provides 
a fascinating case study of the social lives of Russian teachers in com-
parison with teachers in Helsinki.41 He ﬁ nds that there are much 
greater numbers of teachers, pupils and parents in the Russian teachers’ 
networks than is the case amongst their Finnish counterparts. Th is, he 
argues, indicates the weaknesses of the professional sphere. At the same 
time, it compensates for these weaknesses by recreating a social milieu 
that provides access to informal resources. Th e conclusion he draws is 
that this pattern of condensed social and professional networks may be 
largely inherited from the socialist era but it is not a passive inheritance 
from the past. Rather, it is an active way to counteract the lack of 
formalized access to resources and to mould the transition in everyday 
life. 
Alapuro (2001) develops this theme further and argues for the 
study of everyday experience and interpersonal practices in order to 
understand preconditions for solidarity or lack of them among teachers. 
Th e author challenges the view amongst some scholars concerning the 
41 Another publication (Hagan et al. 1996) deals with this issue both theoretically and 
empirically in a publication on Toronto’s children, migration and parental support. 
Th ey argue that the loss of the supportive community based social milieu could 
be replaced successfully by parental support of children. Th e authors suggest that 
“parallel analysis of parental occupational and community processes of closure and 
connectedness may account for outcomes as seemingly diverse as work and crime and 
at varying levels of aggregation” (Hagan et al. 1996).
Continuous government 
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weakness of the civil society in Russia and the lack of collective action 
that is supposedly due to the atomization of society. Rather, the reasons 
for an apparent lack of collective action are grounded in a completely 
diﬀ erent social organization in the postsocialist context. Th e eﬀ orts of 
the Russian state to exercise new forms of governmental control were 
met with an organized interest struggle. However, the continuous 
government ineﬀ ectiveness has made the inward-oriented survival 
strategies persist. Th e author outlines three diﬀ erent modes in which 
governmental control and degree of eﬀ ectiveness (that is capacity of 
the state to implement policies) aﬀ ect intra and extracommunity ties. 
Th e ﬁ rst one is the collective action to sustain pressure on the state 
while the second is a defensive orientation within the workplace as the 
basis of solidarity. An example where both modes appear to be mixed is 
the Union of Workers in Education and Science: it is both an interest 
organization of teachers and at the same time a provider of social and 
cultural facilities as was the case during socialism (pp.22–23). Th e 
author gives this example to illustrate how there is “a new repertoire 
in the form of the organized interest activities, but it is imbued by 
the earlier sociability and copying strategy,” that strengthens teachers’ 
informal networks and intercommunity trust (p.23). Th is fusion of 
the old and the new is the adequate response to a new situation, in 
which the state has both democratized and failed to be eﬀ ective (for 
example in control of inﬂ ation). Th e author assumes that in this 
situation, a strengthening of state eﬀ ectiveness will enhance organized 
interest struggles and increased state ineﬀ ectiveness will accentuate the 
importance of mutual trust networks (pp.23–24).
Th e third mode, in the case of return of an authoritarian govern-
ment, portrays trust networks between teachers not only as survival 
mechanisms but also “as a vehicle of evasion of governmental detection, 
and even, in extreme cases, as a source of active defense against the 
state,” not as an interest organization but in the form of a disruptive 
protest (p.24). 
Th e research by Hagan et al. (1995) highlights a diﬀ erent aspect of 
the importance of social capital in terms of networks and relations. Th e 
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authors study East Berlin youth’s delinquency and oﬀ er insights into 
the main factors that could increase social control and social capital. 
Th ey consider the processes of informal social control as processes 
of social capital building that can protect youth from drifting into 
deviance and disorder during adolescence. Th e ﬁ ndings suggest that in 
the comparisons between East and West Berlin youth, parental control 
was less important than educational attainment in schools in explaining 
diﬀ erences between the two. At the same time both were found to be 
very important factors in the control of deviance. Unfortunately, this 
paper does not discuss the parent-school relationships, which play an 
important role in control.42 
Another contribution of educational research and social capital in 
CEE has been the study of the possible ways to reduce the harmful 
eﬀ ects of war. Stovel (2000) analyses the activities of some NGOs in 
their educational programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. 
She demonstrates how education in a postwar environment is a slow 
and complex process. It is interwoven with the state of trauma, grieving 
and approaches to resolving the conﬂ icts of participants and their 
communities. 
One example given was how an NGO attempted to create 
interethnic mixing,43 in one case requiring teachers, students and 
parents to participate in joint decision making in order to receive 
material assistance. Two schools shared a courtyard but neither the 
students nor the teachers communicated with each other. Th ey were set 
a task to produce a common newsletter, but meetings between the two 
sides were diﬃ  cult and although it was ﬁ nally produced, the author 
doubts there was any signiﬁ cant impact. It seems that NGOs working 
in divided communities need many years of building trust before they 
42 In opposition to the projects that argue for the importance of mixed ethnically and 
religiously groups, Bougarel (2002) suggests that, in some cases, even non-mixed 
groups could create social capital extending beyond their boundaries. For the same 
argument, see also Engberg and Stubbs (1999).
43 Contrast this with the more skeptical views of Stovel (2000).
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could convince people (who would otherwise meet in homogenous 
groups) to risk participating in ethnically mixed sessions (Stovel 2000:
9). Instead, multiethnic conferences of young activists were found to 
be more eﬀ ective in creating interethnic bridges. Th ese activists were 
committed to a multi-ethnic Bosnia and it was important that NGOs 
provided them with an opportunity to meet, share ideas and break their 
feelings of isolation and form alliances. 
Th is report by Stovel (2000) outlines the limits of education in 
solving certain social problems. While for example, in Croatia there 
was more education on tolerance, in Bosnia, education for tolerance 
was not seen to be in the interest of certain political and educational 
authorities.
Moreover, Stovel (2000) argues that for education to challenge 
chauvinism, it has to be psychologically astute. It is unhelpful to simply 
present lists of rights and moralistic arguments. Education should help 
individuals to recognize, understand and confront their own biases and 
the biases of other communities. At the same time, eﬀ orts challenging 
chauvinism that are linked to trauma need to be speciﬁ c and be part of 
a dynamic process. Th ey should be individualized to suit each person in 
their stage in the process (depression, aggression, revenge, etc). 
Another very important set of formal and informal networks is 
produced in the course of international cooperation inside CEE and 
between CEE and the West. Th e TEMPUS Program is one example 
of a major initiator of crossnational projects that builds social capital 
along international formal and informal networks. A good example 
that had a signiﬁ cant impact on CEE context but was also beneﬁ cial 
to the Western counterparts is a project on teacher training for special 
educational needs. Th e project is described in detail in Sayer (2002). 
One chapter refers speciﬁ cally to the way the educational institutions 
interacted with parents (Laczik 2002). Laczik (2002) investigates 
home-school relationships in one primary school in Perm, Russia. 
Th e researcher employs qualitative methods to explore the various 
forms and activities that bring parents into schools such as parental 
Efforts challenging chauvinism 
that are linked to trauma need 
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meetings, establishment of parental committees, informal meetings 
with one parent or several parents to discuss individual or whole class 
performances. Th e author observed that teachers have a leading role 
in establishing the school-parent relationship and that much depends 
on their personal attitudes and abilities as professionals. Parents also 
stressed the importance of communication and cooperation with the 
teachers. Th e conclusion suggests that such cooperation can lead to 
positive results and that both view points should be investigated in 
future research that seeks to understand how children can proﬁ t from 
better parent-school relationships. 
  
4 . 4  E d u c a t i o n  a s  a n  E x i t  f r o m  Po v e r t y
Education, together with gender and age, is usually considered as an 
attribute of human capital and not of social capital. However, it has 
been demonstrated how education can empower by positioning people 
in resourceful networks (see the sections above) and it is diﬃ  cult to 
separate it from research exploring social capital. On the other hand, 
higher levels of social capital, in terms of increased participation 
in educational institutions and processes, have also been seen to 
contribute signiﬁ cantly to human development. Th ese have been 
examined in the developmental agencies reports (see further below). 
When Orazem and Vodopivec (1994) discuss the winners and losers 
of transition in Slovenia one of their main ﬁ ndings relates to the 
importance of education in the relative rise of wages and employment. 
In the development agencies reports, education is considered to be the 
key for human development. 
Th e general reports, such as the Human Development Reports of 
the UNDP, contain useful information about the challenges facing the 
educational sphere in each country. Th e major issue they deal with is 
the relationship between poverty and education. When they discuss 
strategies to exit poverty through education or through improving 
educational institutions, they often address (even if not directly or 
The deterioration of education 
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consciously) issues of social capital. Most reports deal with the issues 
of community empowerment and participation as alternatives to weak 
state structures and in the context of decentralization of state structures 
and of education in particular. Th ese themes are dominant in the 
reports given as examples below. 
Th e UNDP Human Development Report for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS (1999) deﬁ nes the deterioration of education in 
CEE as the “sixth cost” of transition. Th e growing inequalities in access 
have increased with the rising costs of school attendance, the worsening 
quality of education, the ineﬀ ective privatization of schooling and 
growing poverty. 
Th e UNDP Human Development Report on Kosovo (2002) regards 
education in the same chapter as arts and culture: Empowering society 
through education, arts and culture. It stresses the integrative role of 
education and views arts and culture as contributions to the growth 
and strength of a tolerant and cohesive society by supporting a network 
of new ideas, interests and traditions.44 Here, the role of education in 
empowerment through capacity building and training is stressed too. 
Th e World Bank Report on Slovakia (2001) contains a very good 
yet short section on education in the section on “Poverty Proﬁ les.” Th e 
authors argue that poverty risks can be surmounted by educational 
attainment but still do not ﬁ nd a clear causal link between education and 
poverty. Th e most insightful is the section on Roma education where 
they describe how the social isolation of Roma is reproduced through 
diminished access to schools. Special schools are examined in detail and 
described as both institutions of segregation and as institutions that 
are often preferred by the Roma for their security from discrimination. 
Th is section includes some good lessons where teachers’ close relations 
with the community led to increased attendance in schools.  
44 For a critical commentary on such approaches see Harriss 2003 and Harriss and 
Mihaylova (2003).
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4 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n
Th e research on education and social capital in CEE is growing but 
still very limited. Th e main achievements of educational research in 
CEE lie so far in ﬁ lling the general informational gap about the pace of 
structural educational reforms in each country. It remains to develop 
the more challenging aspect of educational research: the study of the 
actual mechanisms and processes that structure the educational sphere 
in diﬀ erent situations. Some examples of research on social capital 
discussed in the previous sections achieve these aims fully or partially 
by focusing on elite reproduction, informal networks, and education as 
an exit from poverty. Among the most useful studies in this respect so 
far are the ethnographic ones – the observation of everyday interactions 
between diﬀ erent actors. In the view of this author, the problems of 
classrooms, schools and their links with other institutions, the NGOs’ 
activities, and the interaction between formal and informal networks 
for education are all best understood through a systematic collection of 
ethnographic data on speciﬁ c social processes. 
Such studies presuppose an ethnography of the state and its 
institutions, as the volumes by Weber and Liikanen (2001) and Lonkila 
(1998) demonstrate. According to Webber and Liikanen (2001) this 
approach demonstrates the relationship between civic culture and the 
state rather than assuming the separation between the two. Th ey also 
argue that Western modes of organization should not necessarily be 
sought as examples as there are speciﬁ c conditions and phenomena 
in the postsocialist world, which cannot be directly translated into 
Western political or scientiﬁ c discourses. Webber and Liikanen suggest 
that the important role of education in inﬂ uencing patterns of social 
relations is yet to be recognized. A new kind of social conﬂ ict in the 
postsocialist countries is appearing from the restrictions of children to 
nonfee paying education. 
Th is discussion can best be studied if the eﬀ ects of the socialist past 
are not exaggerated and attention is focused on the current processes. 
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Th e breakdown of the societal safety nets, which existed during 
socialism, has led today to the escalation of social problems, social 
exclusion and delinquency among students in the postsocialist world. 
Education policies have not been a suﬃ  cient tool to address such issues 
and this is where the relationship between education and civic culture 
needs to be studied better: some examples (among many possible ones) 
could be found among those described in Webber and Liikanen 2001:
4–8: the analysis of how the development of gender and women studies 
in Russia has been closely linked to women’s movements; the study of 
how diﬀ ering political traditions and notions of civic identity play a 
signiﬁ cant role in the interaction between educationalists from CEE 
and the West but could be overcome in a process of cooperation in 
an educational project; how the rivalry between those with “cultural 
capital” (higher education) and those with “political capital” continued 
in postsocialism; or how to organize teaching of various ethnic groups 
and about ethnic groups.
5 .  S O C I A L  C A P I TA L  A N D  H E A LT H  
 I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
5 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Th e social capital approach in health studies proposes three major 
arguments: 1. that national mortality rates are determined predomi-
nantly by income inequality; 2. that the way this works is by reducing 
the stock of “social capital” which then leads to poorer health in 
communities; 3. the most likely reason behind this process is related 
to psychosocial factors (Pearce 2003:122). Pearce argues that focusing 
on communities, as social capital proponents in health research 
suggest, may be ineﬀ ective, create resentment, overload community 
resources and lead to “blame the victim” at community level ignoring 
the macrolevel social and economic policies (Pearce 2003:122). In 
This discussion can best 
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this case, a social capital approach strengthens the lifestyle/behavioral 
side in its debate with the structural/materialist, or neomaterialist 
position (Pearce 2003:122). To date, social capital has been mobilized 
as a concept mainly in the study of the relationship between health 
inequalities. In most general terms social capital is associated with 
social networks, and thus, studies in health and social capital often 
examine the role of social networks and social cohesion for health of 
individuals and communities. Other themes are related to the role of 
trust and civic participation in determining health at an individual and 
community level (Pearce 2003:124–125). Neomaterialist explanations 
argue that interpretations of health should start with the structural and 
the material causes of inequalities rather than with just perceptions 
of inequalities that are studies by the social capital proponents 
(Pearce 2003:126). Pearce argues that the concept of social capital 
is only repackaging older notions such as “community capacity,” 
“empowerment,” “social support” that have been studied extensively 
and often criticized. For example, the argument that reduced social 
networks are in themselves causing ill health is not plausible because it 
may be that other socioeconomic factors inﬂ uence both social networks 
and health. Th is debate operates within health research in CEE in a 
similar fashion and the following section addresses this through a 
review of some of the major academic publications that use “social 
capital” or some of its synonymous concepts.
“Social capital” has also entered some of the action research 
initiated by the developmental organizations. Th e actual term “social 
capital” does not occur very often in the health reports on CEE that 
will be examined here. For that reason, the review includes some 
research that focuses on the same issues without using the term. Such 
research generally examines the reasons for the rapid deterioration of 
health in CEE, some of which by way of concepts that are close to or 
synonymous with social capital. Research that utilizes the term social 
capital is only now becoming established with developmental programs 
of the World Bank or the UNDP. Independent of whether the concept 
To date, social capital has been 
mobilized as a concept mainly 
in the study of the relationship 
between health inequalities.
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of social capital is used, the aim of these studies usually is to suggest 
possible ways to improve health in CEE. 
Th us, the two main themes regarded here relate to social capital 
as an explanation for poor health (poverty, social cohesion, lifestyles, 
context, structure, health systems and health reforms); and to social 
capital as part of the relationship between communities and the 
health care system. Th e latter is more often the object of the reports 
in development and concerns speciﬁ c health policies or actions that 
increase the accessibility of the health services.
Specialized or more general health reports (from the WHO, Th e 
World Bank, UNESCO and UNDP) contain sections on health where, 
as it was already mentioned, social capital is implied in the matter 
discussed even if the term itself is not used. Th ese reports stress the 
relationship eﬀ ects of poverty on health and the production of a closed 
circle of poverty and poor health in CEE among the disadvantaged 
and marginalized people. However, most authors agree that there is 
not enough research on health in CEE and, in particular, on how 
social issues aﬀ ect or are aﬀ ected by health. Despite the fact that “social 
capital” may have brought new life to old debates in health research, 
many issues still remain a challenge for researchers. 
5 . 2  M o r t a l i t y  a n d  I l l  H e a l t h
A rapid deterioration in health has been recorded throughout the 
whole region of CEE with the situation in Russia presenting the most 
alarming case. Growing mortality rates (especially among the middle-
aged men) have become the subject of an increasing number of health 
analyses. Th e main research themes address the reasons for the poor 
health in CEE. As mentioned in the previous section, they relate to 
older debates within health studies such as the role of “social cohesion,” 
“social support” and “social networks” in health. Th ese three concepts 
are connected to explanations of the supposed cultural East-West 
divides, socialist legacies, lifestyles and education (human capital) or of 
Most authors agree that there 
is not enough research on 
health in CEE.
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the salience of the contemporary context (socioeconomic and political 
crises).
Scholars often approach current mortality rates as a logical con-
sequence of the socialist regime. Th eir argument is undermined by 
the fact that, in some cases, mortality was higher before socialism and 
only stable after socialism. Also, despite certain negative features of 
socialist health provision and socialist societies in general, there were 
many improvements in health services and in health during socialism. 
Th e study of Nowa Huta in Southern Poland (Watson 1998), for 
example, shows that speciﬁ c socialist contexts and not socialism as an 
undiﬀ erentiated force played an important role in health. 
5.2.1 Civic Participation and Health
Th e ﬁ rst group of publications (discussed here) demonstrates a relation-
ship between social cohesion in terms of civic participation (electoral 
behavior, membership in political or nonpolitical associations), trust in 
governments and health. According to some authors, low participation 
together with worsening material factors aﬀ ects health negatively 
(Marmot and Bobak 2000). Other authors examine civic participation 
without investigating the eﬀ ects of other material factors. For example, 
Kennedy et al. (1998), Reitan (2003) and Carlson (1998) study 
participation rates exclusively and reach the general conclusion that 
countries with higher rates of civic participation (expressed in voting or 
in membership in nonpolitical organizations) have better health. 
Kennedy et al. (1998) attempt to establish particular ways in which 
individual health is related to social context. Th ey argue that if people 
do not vote and do not show interest in politics (which prevents good 
governance), their quality of life and health will worsen. Th e authors 
rely on secondary data (that is not on their data but on social capital in 
the sociological literature) to support their argument about the salience 
of “social capital” and the assumed “lack of civil society” in Russia. 
Some of their ﬁ ndings suggest that the mortality rates of isolated 
people is twice or three times that of more well-connected people. 
Countries with higher rates 
of civic participation 
have better health.
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Bypassing the large ﬁ eld of criticism of the social support theory (see 
further below) the authors argue that it is a well-established fact that 
social cohesion enhances well-being.
In a more critical manner, Reitan (2003) examines the relationship 
between life expectancy and electoral turnout. He concludes that his 
research has not found a clear causal link between the two despite 
some existing correlations. Moreover, the author suggest that there will 
be other factors at play even when regions with relatively higher life 
expectancy are more likely to produce higher turnout at elections. He 
names higher income and regional prosperity, both of which are context 
related factors. Th e author suggests that there may be an independent 
path of public health (that is that public health may be inﬂ uenced by 
other factors) whose path trajectory (that is the way health improves or 
deteriorates) just happens to coincide with the electoral turnout’s one. 
Despite certain self-admitted limitations Carlson (1998) presents 
more nuanced data than the previously mentioned research. His 
results show that countries with a higher degree of membership in 
organizations have better self-perceived health. However, for people 
in Eastern Europe it was found that life-control matters more than 
membership in organizations in assessing self-perceived health. Th e 
most powerful predictor of self-perceived health in both Western and 
Eastern Europe remained economic satisfaction. In this way, the author 
concludes that household economies must be improved ﬁ rst despite the 
importance of control in everyday life and the need for a stronger civil 
society. Th e author argues that processes at both micro (at individual 
and household level) and macro (for example macroeconomic or 
political) levels should both be considered in relation to health
Unfortunately, all three publications are concerned with very 
large areas (Europe as a continent, whole countries, or regions) and 
their ﬁ ndings tell little about the day-to-day realities and the actual 
mechanisms through which their ﬁ ndings work. All of them present 
diﬀ erent evidence about the causal (or other) links between social 
cohesion (in terms of civic participation) and health. Two of the 
Political disengagement can be 
protective and lead to a better 
psychological health and, thus, 
a better ability to cope with 
post-confl ict situations.
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authors show that there may be no link at all and that there may be 
other signiﬁ cant factors aﬀ ecting health. Rose (2001) demonstrates that 
most of his indicators of social integration (for example membership in 
organizations) consistently fail to appear to have a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence 
on health. Th e work by Jones (2002) even suggests that, in particular 
situations, such as the postwar one, lack of participation may be more 
constructive in some respects. 
Jones (2002) provides data from an extensive qualitative research 
on youth and political engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She 
argues that while political engagement may be useful for health in low-
level conﬂ icts (where there is a scope for action), in other cases political 
disengagement may be protective and may lead to a better psychological 
health and, thus, to a better ability to cope with the postconﬂ ict 
situation. She points however to one drawback in disengagement in 
this situation: the risk of ethnic separatism remaining unquestioned. 
Th is study highlights the great importance of context in 
considering civic engagement and health and the need to address the 
entire complexity of the society. Th e author also shows that focusing on 
individual psychological recovery is important but structural changes 
(reenergizing the economy, integration and modernization of the 
education system, political initiatives, etc) have equally important and 
sustainable results on psychological well-being. 
Th e research on these themes suggests that there might be very 
limited conclusive evidence about health and civic participation and 
the only certainty is that there is no clear or solid causal link between 
the two.
5.2.2 Health and Lifestyles
According to some authors in the ﬁ eld, eg (Pearce 2003) work on social 
capital is advancing a lifestyle hypothesis where individual lifestyles 
are seen as responsible for poor health. Th ese studies argue that lack 
of information about health, particular types of behavior, a greater 
belief in uncontrollable inﬂ uences (such as destiny) and diminished 
Did state paternalism promote 
a false sense of security and 
careless behavior?
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emotional well-being all contribute to ill health in CEE (Steptoe and 
Wardle 2001). Th e main proponents of the lifestyle theory in CEE 
(Cockerham 1999; Cockerham 2000) paint a particular picture of 
socialist health policies and their lasting eﬀ ects. Th e regimes are blamed 
for their patronage orientation and limiting individual responsibility. 
Individual health was not valued and health care was inadequately 
funded. Th e authors argue that state paternalism dominated in CEE, 
promoting a false sense of security and careless behavior (Cockerham 
2000). Th ese features of socialism are seen to a large extent as 
determining the high mortality of middle-aged men after socialism. 
Some sociodemographic characteristics (such as working class, or 
urban) and some unhealthy life style behaviors (such as smoking, 
heavy alcohol consumption, etcetera) are seen as important or major 
determinants of high mortality rates.
Th us, while some research (as in the previous section) demonstrates 
that an exclusive focus on individuals as members of civic associations or 
participating in civic activities is an unreliable guide to understanding 
health, other research suggests that a focus on individual attributes is 
insuﬃ  cient as well. Th us, it cannot be concluded which one has more 
impact than the other. 
Although lifestyle choices are important for health, a number 
of other studies argue against the often a-contextual approach of 
the lifestyle theorists. Alternative approaches stress that lifestyles 
are signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced by social circumstances and can only be 
grasped if their context is understood (Kee and Shkolnikov 2001). Th is 
approach paints a picture of contemporary societies where people face 
social and economic disruption on a large scale for which they are not 
prepared and this results in ill health (McKee and Shkolnikov 2001). 
Levels of social support, control over ones’ life, lifestyles and education, 
are all very signiﬁ cantly shaped by the general socioeconomic and 
political context. 
Other authors argue that ill health among some groups of population 
is related to lack of “social support,” that is to exclusion and inadequate 
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participation in a society’s structures or opportunities (Siegrist 2000). 
Some studies have demonstrated that separation, or loss and lack of 
support, and lack of companionship in informal social networks cause 
higher mortality risks (Siegrist 2000). Both health damaging behavior 
and exposure to stressful environment should be considered together to 
explain the health related problems in CEE (Siegrist 2000). Th e link 
between social networks and health is examined in more detail further 
below.
5.2.3 Inequalities and Health
Th e link between socioeconomic status and mortality is one of the 
best-documented ones. Th e greater the diﬀ erence between poor and 
rich the higher the mortality rates, in other words, it is not the absolute 
level of wealth in the society that matters but the economic diﬀ erences 
within that society (Kopp et al 2000). Th e polarization of society is an 
important factor in health deterioration in Hungary, especially among 
men. Kopp et al. (2000) ﬁ nd a very close relation between economic 
deprivation and ill health. Th e mediation of relative deprivation by 
subjective, psychological factors is also important, especially in a 
suddenly and rapidly changing society. Decrease in control at the work 
place and decrease in perceived social support are one of the most 
striking changes that also aﬀ ect health (Kopp et al. 2000).
Some authors conclude that income inequalities lead to increased 
mortality through disinvestment in social capital. Social capital 
has been nominated as a possible mediating variable in the relative 
income hypothesis. Following Putnam, some authors argue that the 
widening gap between poor and rich leads to higher levels of mortality 
through the breakdown of social cohesion (cited from Hawe and Shiel 
2000). Income inequality exerts inﬂ uence through psychological and 
cognitive mechanisms, but social inequalities are equally important. 
Pearce (2003:126) argues that “we should start by examining the 
material, institutional and political factors that are major determinants 
both of community levels of social capital and of health inequalities.” 
The polarization of society 
is an important factor 
in health deterioration 
especially among men.
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Psychosocial mechanisms (for example perceptions of place in the 
social hierarchy) may play a role as just one among many other 
potential pathways between macrolevel forces and health (Pearce 2003:
125). As it was mentioned earlier, research that focuses too easily on the 
individual or the community without considering the wider context 
may result in blaming the victim and produce ineﬀ ective interventions 
(Pearce 2003:126).
Some authors take a middle ground between lifestyle and context 
and argue that acute transition combined with low social cohesion and 
inequality leads to a decline in health that, at least in part, is mediated 
by behavioral changes. In this scenario, cohesion can ameliorate the 
eﬀ ects of transition on health (Walberg et al. 1998). Such is the work 
by Bobak et al. (2000) who state that material deprivation may have 
appeared as powerful predictor of health status in the context of the 
postcommunist economic crisis. Th e model suggested by Bobak et al. 
(2000) describes how the broader social environment (for example 
income inequalities) leads to immediate socioeconomic circumstances 
(for example deprivation) that, in turn, lead to psychosocial factors (for 
example control) that, in their turn, lead to speciﬁ c behaviors, which 
lead to health (self-rated health) (Bobak et al. 2000).  
5.2.4 Social Support and Social Networks
Social capital in terms of social networks and social relations has been 
the subject of several health focused research projects in CEE. Th ese 
projects have been focused on individuals and households. O’Brien 
et al. (1996) and Rose (2001) suggest that people who can rely on 
networks (formal or informal) have better health (especially mental 
health) as they receive more support. O’Brien et al. (1996) suggest that 
larger percentage of kin in the social networks as well as larger total 
number of ties in helping networks are associated with lower depression 
scores. Th e authors study the eﬀ ects of ties on economic growth and 
conclude that larger percentage of kin is not associated with economic 
growth. At the same time, the total number of helping ties and the 
Social capital has a positive 
effect on both household 
economy and household health.
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degree of integration into the village community is positively associated 
with economic growth. Th ey conclude that more social capital has a 
positive eﬀ ect on both household economy and household health. 
Rose (2001) supports these ﬁ ndings and argues that household 
income inﬂ uences mental health positively in parallel to reliable 
networks. Th e author does not ﬁ nd that education is a signiﬁ cant 
predictor of health and the results suggests a questionable role for 
trust as predictor of health. Trust in other people has not been proved 
to be a signiﬁ cant predictor in physical and emotional health. Also 
“the importance of the relationship between trusting other people 
and health is muted by the fact that the Russians are distrustful. Th e 
relationship between emotional health and trusting friends rather 
than newspapers or television for information is less strong and 
negative. Th is implies that face-to-face sources of information may 
be an indicator of “backwardness” or, alternatively, of stress generated 
by experiencing the gap between Soviet media and everyday reality 
(p.39). Th e contribution of his work lies in that he demonstrates that 
an approach to health that considers only socially signiﬁ cant attributes 
of individuals is incomplete and that networks between individuals and 
between individuals and formal institutions matter too. 
However, the author does use rather large data sets based on 
general surveys (the New Democracies Barometer) whose reliability 
is questionable. For example, the author only uses one question to 
measure trust in institutions and one question to measure trust in 
other people (How much do you trust most people you meet?) to about 
1000 people in each country making it diﬃ  cult to explore the actual 
relationship between social networks and health.45 Th e eﬀ ects of health, 
and speciﬁ cally of ill health, on social networks are thus only partially 
explored. For example, is it possible that less social networks are also a 
product rather than only the cause of ill health?  
Moreover, the social support literature (long predating the 
concept of social capital) has already amassed a huge body of work 
45 See Franks et al. 1992, and for a more critical overview see Harpam (1994).
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on the links between social relations and health. Th is body of work 
has signiﬁ cant drawbacks already recognized by many authors.46 Th e 
study of networks and health belongs to a wider debate, which needs 
to be carefully considered before further research is undertaken. Some 
of the main criticisms refer to the fact that social relationships are not 
always necessarily beneﬁ cial (Franks et al. 1992) or that there may 
be confusion of social networks (the structure of linkages) with the 
social support (behavior) (Harpam (1994). While most social support 
theorists agree that social support is “good,” social exchange theorists 
argue that there is cost to social relationships as well as rewards, and that 
this is underestimated by social support theorists (Harpam, 1994). 
If research is expected to provide advice for eﬀ ective interventions in 
social support to enhance well-being, then this would best be addressed 
by a community level research. A parallel and thorough examination 
of the cultural and social contexts could be achieved by a number 
of methods and perhaps most thoroughly through ethnography: for 
example the descriptions of patterns of shared cultural meanings, 
behavior and experience (Harpam 1994). Th en, there might also be a 
case for a cost/beneﬁ t analysis to help assess the implications for health 
spending priorities, some nationwide or perhaps region wide surveys 
to try and assess whether policies inspired by this approach could be 
drawn up at that level or a more local level, a historical analysis to see 
whether there are particular organizational innovations which may be 
picked up, etcetera47  
 
5 . 3  H e a l t h  R e f o r m  D e v e l o p m e n t  R e p o r t s
Th e reports of the development organizations add another aspect 
to the discussion of social capital in health. Th e implication of their 
work is that social capital could be understood in terms of community 
46 Th is last sentence is an incorporated comment by Andrew Cartwright.
47 See the section on networks and the section on trust in relation to economic growth 
and entrepreneurialism in the chapter on “Social Capital and Institutional Change.”
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empowerment and participation in health management and provision. 
Th ey address the actual health reforms and suggest that in the context 
of state withdrawal, decentralization must be eﬀ ectively implemented 
and based on the principle of participation of all stakeholders in the 
implementation of the health reform in CEE. 
5.3.1 UNICEF (2000) A decade of Transition
Th is report has a whole chapter (Chapter 3) on health where the 
following issues are discussed: achievements in health, disturbing 
trends, health over the life cycle (with a focus on young children, 
adolescents and women), growing health inequalities, challenges for 
health policy and conclusions. Th e report opens up with a deﬁ nition 
of health from the World Health Organization: that health is a state 
of complete physical mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or inﬁ rmity (p.47). 
A special section is devoted to health as a predictor of economic 
growth. It is also suggested that countries that revived their economic 
growth and have made serious economic and political reforms have 
managed to increase economic growth in a sustained basis. Th e 
authors bring attention to the importance of increased life expectancy: 
for example, for a sample of several countries, the increase of life 
expectancy with one percent in 1965 has brought up an increase in 
GDP of three percent per each year for the subsequent quarter century 
(p.48). Th e report explores some of the reasons for increased mortality 
and points out to increased psychosocial stress as a major factors causing 
cardiovascular disease and hence, mortality. Levels of HIV/AIDS in the 
region are still relatively low; however, a trend of increase has been 
detected. Th e report recommends the implementation of government 
policies to tackle this problem: making safe behavior less costly, 
creating awareness and targeting the underlying socioeconomic causes, 
especially youth unemployment; as well as providing whole population 
education on HIV/AIDS. Tuberculosis has also been singled out as a 
growing threat of health in the region.  
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 Th e report recommends that governments should address the 
underlying socioeconomic causes of health (for example unemployment) 
at the same time as stressing heath education programs. According 
to the authors: “public health initiatives are a classic domain of the 
government. Th e private sector does not have suﬃ  cient incentives to 
supply public health programs of general beneﬁ t to the population 
at large (p.65). Access to the health care system and particularly 
inequalities in access is also pointed as a serious concern that must be 
targeted by the government: “poor and marginalized groups should 
beneﬁ t like everyone else from public health policies. To these ends, 
the eﬃ  cient management of resources and the assurance of an adequate 
ﬁ nancial basis for the public health system are as important for the 
poor and the marginalized as they are for everyone else. […] Improving 
health care and health outcomes for the disadvantaged contributes to 
a more cohesive society as well as expanding the capabilities and the 
productivity of the individuals concerned” (p.66).
Th e report examines the health of children, young people and 
women from the life-style perspective: A very insightful section deals 
with the informal payment system as increasing inequalities in access 
to health care. Th is topic is studied in much more detail by Balabanova 
and McKee (2002). Th ey demonstrate how these payments result from 
the socioeconomic and not from the cultural or traditional situation in 
Bulgaria. Th e ﬁ ndings suggest that informal payments after socialism 
have increased and have thus become less aﬀ ordable. Th ey have, thus, 
obstructed access to quality health care for many people. Balabanova 
and McKee conclude with very speciﬁ c and aﬀ ordable policy measures 
that could be the starting point in reducing the importance of informal 
payments.
5.3.2 Th e UNDP Human Development Reports
Th ese reports are prepared annually for each country and contain 
sections on health. Th ey deal predominantly with the structural changes 
to the health system and contain useful information about ongoing 
Informal payments obstruct 
access to quality health care 
for many people.
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health reforms. As the reports are country speciﬁ c, they provide insights 
into the particular problems or achievements of each postsocialist 
country. Without mentioning social capital, these reports deal with 
most of the issues addressed by the wide deﬁ nition of the concept. 
However, despite the fact that they often reference social cohesion as a 
major issue, they generally pay less attention to the relational sides of 
social capital. Th e reason is they are usually general reports and focus 
predominantly on the material sides of the reform. Access to health 
care, reducing the eﬀ ects of poverty and war, inequalities and risk, 
community participation and empowerment, and decentralization are 
some of the main concepts used in the reports in general and in the 
sections on health in particular. Th e systematic research of such reports 
could provide a comparative basis between countries but also between 
diﬀ erent stages in each country.
Th e report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002) contains a section, 
“Health Care Reform,” where the eﬀ ects of war and poverty are 
seen as the main factors aﬀ ecting health. Th is report stresses the 
importance of decentralization and access to health services. It suggests 
that socioeconomic determinants of health (employment, income 
distribution, housing, health policy, etcetera) need to be addressed 
alongside institutional strengthening. A controversial ﬁ nding (in the 
context of various works suggesting widespread mistrust towards 
institutions in CEE) is that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina espouse 
an outdated and exaggerated belief in institutions and public systems 
even while these are currently functioning inadequately. 
Th e report on Kosovo deals with similar issues of war and poverty 
but it also joins health and environmental issues together in the section 
of “Ensuring Longer, Healthier Lives and a Clear Environment.” 
Despite the recognition of the eﬀ ects of war and poverty on health, 
and the eﬀ orts to reduce risk caused by poor social and economic 
conditions, lifestyles are also targeted. However, it is important to note 
that often treating lifestyles is treating symptoms rather than causes of 
ill health. Often, the individual choices of life styles are constrained 
Treating lifestyles is treating 
symptoms rather than causes 
of ill health.
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by structural factors, by the postwar context and poverty. In this 
report community mental health services and active participation are 
seen as the best solution to outstanding problems, which address the 
importance of social capital. 
5.3.3 Th e World Bank Reports
Th ese reports are a part of a global research eﬀ ort on poverty and 
development. It is the ﬁ rst large-scale comparison that draws on a 
participatory research in a systematic fashion. Th e value of these reports 
lies in that they present the situation as ordinary people experience it 
and use concepts that people use to describe their situation. All reports 
from postsocialist countries present health as one of the ﬁ rst three 
everyday life concerns, especially among women and the elderly. 
Th e economic situation is seen as the main reason for increased 
ill health. Socializing is also described as reduced due to the eﬀ ects 
of poverty. Th e deﬁ nitions of poverty provided here could be used to 
operationalize the concept of social capital and study its eﬀ ects more 
precisely elsewhere. Th ere is extremely valuable information that 
may be used to build hypotheses in the sections on coping strategies, 
pointing to amongst other factors to the importance of social cohesion 
and family. Th e report on Bulgaria stands out with its exhaustive and 
rich material that provides very insightful comparisons between urban-
rural populations and between various ethnic and religious groups.
In addition to the above reports, there have been more speciﬁ c 
works providing examples for collective community eﬀ orts in 
combating health problems. Such cases studies are very insightful on 
how social capital (communities together) operates. Th e study on drug 
abuse by Kramer (1990) in Russia provides an example of such a case 
study. He shows how private citizens and institutions have been actively 
engaged since 1985 in a common eﬀ ort to support drug addicts and 
formed the Society of Friends and Parents of Drug Addicts. 
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In conclusion to this section, one may argue that social capital 
would not bring many new insights on how to build relational ties: 
community development has had a long tradition and has long aimed 
to strengthen existing networks (Hawe and Shiel 2000). One area where 
the social capital concept could contribute is related to the need to 
maintain reciprocity across networks and not to replace culture speciﬁ c 
support styles with professional support (Hawe and Shiel 2000). It is 
suggested that capacity building and empowerment could provide a 
possible continuum from micro (individual and community) to macro 
(local and central health care or state institutions) dimensions of social 
capital. However, both capacity building and empowerment are very 
context speciﬁ c and not likely to be transferable from one context to 
another (Hawe and Shiel 2000). 
McKeehan, for example, argues that a preventive health policy 
should be informed by a multilevel theoretical perspective that can 
identify those structural conditions that increase the disadvantages 
experienced by some groups. His research demonstrates that the social 
context of a community aﬀ ects the health of people independently of 
the eﬀ ects that individual health style or social connectivity (existing 
social relations) may have. Among the psychosocial factors, it was 
poor diet, lack of social cohesion and social support that consistently 
predicted ill health. Th e author suggests that the increase of relative 
social inequality may be the causal factor to individual lifestyles that are 
responsible for ill health. Th us, the lifestyle approach remains highly 
questionable when it is not contextualized.  
5 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n
Th e review of the published research on social capital and health in 
CEE reveals that the concept has only recently been imported in the 
region. Th e import process has led to some unsuccessful as well as to 
some more adequate eﬀ orts to deﬁ ne it and operationalize it for the 
Social capital may not bring 
many new insights on how to 
build relational ties.
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speciﬁ c context of CEE countries. Th e concept has usually failed to 
take root in well-established areas of health research and it often only 
readresses older theories of social relations and social support. Th e 
concept of social capital has been utilized with very diﬀ erent meanings 
that can be roughly divided into relational and material dimensions 
(cf. Pearce 2003). Social capital may be a useful metaphor to address 
the need to formulate clear individual and collective responsibilities 
and the links between the two. Th e criticisms of the use of the concept 
should be carefully considered in order to determine if this concept is 
indeed bringing new insights. As demonstrated above, many authors 
discuss issues that are synonymous with social capital without referring 
to it at all and their works do not seem to suﬀ er from this. In this 
situation, it may be very diﬃ  cult to introduce “social capital” unless it 
is the speciﬁ cally deﬁ ned use of the concept meaning “networks and 
the resources drawn from them.” However, the extensive experience of 
network studies should then be considered too. 
General criticisms of social capital’s application in health research are 
abundant but they are not cited in most of the works discussed above. 
In a very rich review of the literature and recent debates, Hawe and 
Shiel (2000) agree that there may be some rhetorical and metaphorical 
value in “social capital” as well as in the concept’s relational approach 
(including networks and trust). At the same time, they argue that it 
fails to adequately capture the qualitative diﬀ erence between micro and 
macrocontexts and that it neglects a direct (ﬁ rst -hand and realistic) 
assessment of the social institutions and environments that promote 
social capital (in families, classrooms, groups, community agencies, 
etcetera). It is pointed out that there is 25 years of health research in 
those ﬁ elds that is not to be neglected and simply retheorized (Hawe 
and Shiel 2000). 
Existing research often fails 
to capture the qualitative 
difference between micro and 
macro contexts and neglects 
a realistic assessment of the 
institutions and environments 
that promote social capital.
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6 .  S O C I A L  C A P I TA L  A N D  E C O N O M Y  
 I N  C E N T R A L  A N D  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
6 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Social capital has been utilized in a number of diﬀ erent meanings 
and disciplinary approaches to describe various economic processes in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Th is concept or its synonymous concepts 
(trust, networks, civic participation, social cohesion, reciprocity, 
cooperation and some others) can be encountered in numerous ﬁ elds 
of economic research though always related to one of the following 
questions: 
• If and how does social capital aﬀ ect the development of a market 
economy and economic growth?
• How does economic growth, economic crisis or income inequality 
aﬀ ect social capital? 
Th e answers to these questions are then translated into suggestions 
for better policies that would stimulate “more” or “less” of  “social 
capital” depending on how its role is perceived. Some analysts go 
further and examine the relationship between social capital, the 
economic situation and democratization. Th e major debates where 
“social capital” was introduced are concerned with state interference 
versus self-enforcement of market rules, shock therapy versus a gradual 
introduction of market rules and ﬁ nally, the role of the informal 
economy. 
If one is to include works that do not utilize the social capital 
concept itself but deal with similar issues, then the research on 
economic activities and social capital becomes virtually unlimited. 
Moreover, it overlaps with other large ﬁ elds such as institutional change 
and the state or culture and economy. For this review, I focus on the 
most representative examples of two diﬀ erent trends in which “social 
capital” seems to be entering the CEE region. 
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Th e ﬁ rst approach has a macroperspective and is usually based 
on quantitative research, examining the relationship between the 
economic growth of larger entities such as whole countries and 
social capital (deﬁ ned mostly along Putnam in terms of trust, civic 
participation, etcetera). Th e second examines predominantly smaller 
geographical areas and focuses on individuals and the household. It 
combines qualitative and quantitative data and views social capital as 
interpersonal networks and the resources acquired through them.48 
Th e research of the informal economy also falls within the second 
group of works. Further, I present the main arguments of both groups 
consecutively.
6 . 2  H o w  t o  I n c r e a s e  E c o n o m i c  G r o w t h  i n  C E E ?  
  T h e  M a c r o a p p r o a c h
Raiser et al. (2001), Raiser (1999) and Bjornskov (2002) examine 
the role of social capital, by which they mean levels of trust and 
civic participation, in economic growth. Bjornskov (2002) compares 
economic growth and social capital at the individual level in Slovenia 
and Estonia. His ﬁ ndings suggest that trust in institutions and 
generalized trust are signiﬁ cant predictors of individual income only 
in Estonia (Bjornskov 2002:14). Civic engagement was found to be a 
strong predictor of individual income in both countries and the author 
argues that more participation in society is likely to have a positive 
impact on individual income (Bjornskov 2002:17). Th e work does 
rely on large data sets collected using questionable survey questions. 
Moreover, the results are less certain when read in the light of more 
qualitative research. For example, Bougarel (2002) suggests that civic 
engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was less widespread among 
the poor. Although this at ﬁ rst sounds like a similar ﬁ nding, in fact it 
48 See the section on civic participation in the chapter on “Social Capital and Civil 
Society” in CEE.
Levels of trust in institutions 
and generalized trust are not 
always signifi cant predictors of 
individual income.
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denotes the complexity of the situation. Simply mobilizing the poor 
“to participate” will not resolve their situation and reduce poverty.49 
Such arguments might be taken as undermining the responsibility of 
the state institutions and policies in poverty reduction (see Bateman 
2003 for extensive criticism of the “social capital industry” and its role 
in arguing against state “interference”).
In contrast, Raiser (1999) defends the importance of state action. 
He claims that extended trust (trust beyond family and existing 
business contacts) is a key ingredient in the institutional infrastructure 
of a modern market economy characterized by a complex division 
of labor. Based on this, he suggests that distrust in the state is a 
signiﬁ cant factor behind disappointing economic performance. His 
paper contains a very detailed discussion of various forms of trust 
in order to highlight the relevance of extended trust for economic 
growth. A challenging argument to be further explored is that contract 
enforcement by the state is a crucial determinant in the emergence and 
maintenance of extended trust (Raiser 1999:6). Th e author points out 
the mutual dependency between extended trust and state enforcement: 
each one is necessary for the other one to grow. Th is would mean that 
extended trust is necessary for both the state to grow and the state’s 
capacity to enforce contracts to grow. Th e state having to intervene to 
enforce contracts would be a sign that trust has broken down and the 
other party has no faith in the other’s willingness or capacity to rectify 
a situation. Raiser also points that the state can directly inﬂ uence the 
social basis for extended trust (Raiser 1999:14) and that the state can 
also directly promote the development of business networks (Raiser 
1999: 15). Th e lack of trust is also seen as the major obstacle in the 
creation of entrepreneurship.
49 But note that Raiser (1997) argues: “While governments cannot directly inﬂ uence 
trust in public institutions, they can do so indirectly through formal institutional 
reforms that limit the scope for predatory behavior by public oﬃ  cials and improve 
political and economic performance.” (p.28)
The state can directly 
infl uence the social basis 
for extended trust. 
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In a later publication, the same author (Raiser et al. 2001) deﬁ nes 
more precisely the type of trust that could be related to economic 
growth. Th e paper explores the initial conditions for the creation 
of social capital (in terms of trust and civic participation) so that 
economic growth is increased. Th e authors ﬁ nd that, in contrast to the 
established market economies, the CEE transition economies are not 
characterized by a positive relation between trust among anonymous 
individuals and economic growth. After the authors deﬁ ned trust more 
speciﬁ cally as trust in public institutions, they found that this type of 
trust is positively related to economic growth. 
Holland (1998) analyses the successes and failures of a community 
development project in Northern Albania. She argues (based on 
Szompka 1993), that trust can substitute for inadequate law-
enforcement systems (cf. Giordano and Kostova 2002). She attributes 
to lack of trust Albanian’s little savings, little investment in skill 
acquisition and little cooperation. Apart from this type of distrust, 
the local people also distrusted each other as well as the outsiders (for 
example the community development workers). Adhering strictly 
to the modernization and neoliberal paradigm, Holland blames the 
underdevelopment of a liberal market economy in Albania on lack of 
social capital and trust and on the availability of what she calls (rather 
strongly and in an orientalist fashion) a “primitive social capital”: “…the 
level of development is considerably lower, while cultural deprivation 
has prohibited modern forms of civic engagement and stiﬂ ed social 
relations. Instead of trust and networks of civic engagement, the history 
has produced a vicious circle of distrust, reinforcing a form of primitive 
social capital which resided in the private world of family and clan, not 
in the networks of the market place where risks could be taken and 
economic cooperation sought” (Holland, 1998:70).50 A criticism of 
such culturalist explanations can be found in Giordano and Kostova 
50 See the section on “Social Capital and Institutional Change” where interpersonal 
networks and trust are discussed in more detail.
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(2002) who examine the social production of mistrust as a result of the 
interaction between people and state.
Th e link between civic participation and economic growth is 
examined in Raiser et al. (2001) and the ﬁ ndings suggest a positive 
correlation between the two. As a result the authors conclude that 
there may also be a correlation between trust and civic participation. 
Th ey assume that the costs of transition may leave people politically 
passive and locked in sublevels of distrust in society. Th e authors 
contend that civic participation increases economic growth because 
civic organizations have the ability to improve market eﬀ ectiveness 
by transmission of information, by lowering monitoring costs, by 
enforcement and by voicing the position of market participants in the 
political process (Raiser et al. 2001). In order to assess this argument 
better, exceptions may be usefully considered. Th e case study of the 
taxi drivers’ successful mobilization against the government policies 
described by Sik and Wellman (1999) oﬀ ers an alternative perspective 
on the preconditions for economic success and civic participation. It 
was the taxi drivers’ network born out of the informal economy rather 
than their generalized trust that eased their civic action and consecutive 
success in confronting the state (Sik and Wellman 1999:246–248). 
A qualitative approach to studying trust and the transformation of 
informal networks into market-players arguable sheds more light than 
ﬁ ndings solely based on large-scale surveys and country comparisons. 
For example, Th e World Bank Report Consultations with the Poor, 
Bulgaria (1999) oﬀ ers very useful data on the real life mechanisms of 
conversion or nonconversion of the subsistence economy into market 
economy. Th e authors describe in detail two typical case studies 
of rural people who plan how to produce and sell at the market: 
one of growing crops and the other raising pigs. Th ese case studies 
convincingly illustrate the vicious circle of the subsistence economy 
and why it can be so diﬃ  cult for it to be transformed into a market 
economy. Th e study shows how the current stalemate does not result 
from a lack of information or lack of desire to go to the market, or to 
The current stalemate in the 
rural subsistence economy 
does not result from a lack of 
information desire to go to the 
market, or to become private 
businessmen.
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become private businessmen. It is clearly shown that people do not 
lack market consciousness. On the contrary, they show full awareness 
of economic realities such as interest rates, tax, and borrowing, and 
they do not disapprove of private business. Th e real problem lies in 
the underdeveloped market situation for example ineﬀ ective expensive 
labor due to lack of machines and lack of market mediators; the lack 
of start-up money (bad lending terms, exorbitant taxes, etcetera); and 
problems resulting from land restitution or privatization (World Bank 
1999). Th is report also adds to another large discussion on the role of 
social capital for the household and in the informal economy that is 
discussed below. 
6 . 3  E c o n o m i c  G r o w t h  t h r o u g h  I n f o r m a l  
  N e t w o r k s
Social capital (in terms of interpersonal networks and trust) is frequently 
discussed in the literature on economic change and the informal 
economy in CEE. Most research that uses the term invokes social 
networks; various forms of social cohesion; reciprocity; interpersonal 
trust and the resources accrued through all of the above. Contrary to 
the studies described in the previous section, these focus more on the 
interpersonal level and on the actual operation and mechanisms of 
social networks. For that reason, they rely more often on qualitative 
data gathered through interviews and often participant observation, or 
at least they combine the quantitative approach with some qualitative 
data.51 
One of the most often cited works in the transitional literature on 
CEE is that by Kolankiewicz (1996) focusing on social capital and social 
change. Th e author views the market situation as a network situation 
and explores the concepts of trust. Generalized trust (or extended trust) 
51 See the section on “Social Capital and Health.”
Extensive network capital has 
been central to the emergence 
of new entrepreneurs.
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is seen to have little importance for asset conversion. Th is is explained 
as one legacy of socialism where generalized trust tended to be low. 
An important insight is that extensive network capital has been central 
to the emergence of new entrepreneurs. Th e author argues that the 
postsocialist conversion of “social capital” (together with its wide range 
of other capitals political, ﬁ nancial, cultural/symbolic/informational) 
needs to be examined in order to understand how the market situation 
has been socially constructed in CEE. 
Th e search for an explanation of the ability to transform political 
position or educational attainment involves examining the individual 
and the systemic level. Such research builds into the institutional 
analysis in both the economic and political sphere32 and addresses 
themes of elite transformation, closed elite networks, corruption, and 
the shadow economy. An insightful example is the study of economic 
groups in Bulgaria by Ganev (2001). He provides a good example of how 
those economic groups dominated the early stages of postcommunist 
restructuring, arguing that their interests have weakened the state and 
thus inhibited economic development and good governance (see also 
Bjornskov 2003, Paldam and Svendsen 2000).
Th e discussion about networks inherited from the socialist regime 
is a central part of debates on social capital and economic activities. 
Th e main question is whether the networks from the socialist period 
are conducive to economic development or not? Th is has brought 
attention to the formation, types and role that such networks played 
during socialism and to their transformation in the postsocialist period 
(including the informal economy). An outstanding study furthering 
the debates is that by Ledeneva (1998) on blat: the use of personal 
networks and informal exchanges to obtain goods and services in 
short supply and to ﬁ nd a way around formal procedures in Russia. 
Th e author argues that blat thrived during socialism and continues to 
function today (Ledeneva 1998). 
A central issue in the discussion of social capital and economic 
activities is the relationship between the state, the market and the 
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informal economy. Most research in this ﬁ eld discusses the social 
embeddedness of economic relationships (Hann 2002): it does not 
aim simply at examining questions of the relationship between state 
and market, but at demonstrating how this relationship evolves along 
social networks. As Hann (1990:9) puts it “the opposition between 
state and market has been a mainstay of political debate for most of the 
twentieth century” and it is continuing today. Hann (1990) called for 
a focus on the household as an alternative approach to focus analysis 
on the state or the market. Ethnographic detail (especially at the level 
of the household) could demonstrate “how the system works” (Hann 
1990:2). Th e focus of some research on social capital follows this 
recommendation to change the viewpoint to the household. However, 
some research is based on unreliable surveys (for example O’Brien et al. 
1996) and only few employ more participatory methods, which enable 
them to present a broader picture of the situation on the ground. Such 
examples are: World Bank (1999a) World Bank (1999b), Lawson and 
Saltmarshe (2002); Swain (2000), Hivon 1998 and others.
While some economists once argued for a “shock therapy” approach 
in CEE, the more common position today is that the state and state 
institutions remain very important for economic success. Th e role of 
networks, and thus social capital, in between the market and the state 
has attracted signiﬁ cant attention. However, the studies of households 
and their networks oﬀ er contradictory ﬁ ndings. 
Th e study of O’Brien et al. (1996) supports the neoclassical 
liberal “shock therapy” measures because their ﬁ ndings suggest that 
households can and will make adjustments and increase productivity 
if traditional services and work guarantees are removed. Th e authors 
base that argument on the research of Russian households and their 
networks (household structure, links of households to various areas of 
life, degree of household integration into the larger village community) 
against their income and mental health.52
52 In the view of this reviewer, a similar one to the destiny of the concept of “ethnicity,” 
cf. Banks, M. (1996) Ethnicity Anthropological approaches, London: Routledge.
Studies of households and their 
networks offer contradictory 
fi ndings.
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Th eir ﬁ ndings show that households with more social capital (more 
household members, more networks and higher levels of integration 
into the community) were more successful economically (and also 
had better psychological adjustment to the stress of transition). 
Unfortunately, the authors do not have suﬃ  cient qualitative data to 
give more ﬂ esh to their ﬁ ndings, and their conclusions raise more 
questions than answers. A more grounded study of the important 
role of the state is by Swain (2000). He examines how social and 
cultural capital acquired from activities during socialism is of most 
signiﬁ cance (more than what was inherited from rich or powerful 
parents) in determining economic success in the private agricultural 
business. Th rough a crosscountry comparison, he demonstrates that 
those who had less accumulated social capital from the past might 
nevertheless ﬁ nd a window of opportunity in a well-developed formal 
state structures and legislation. 
One discussion within debates about the relationship between 
market, state and people concerns the coexistence of the formal and 
informal sectors. According to Hann (1990) and Verdery (1999) it 
would be a mistake to make a clear separation between the formal 
from the informal economy as usually the two are intertwined in many 
ways. Despite the fact that many informal economies create obstacles 
to the development of the formal economy, some forms in the informal 
economy were found to be promising in economic and political sense 
(Hann 1990). Moreover, Hann argues that the informal economy may 
be a source for a creation of a “civil society.” In contrast, Raiser (1999) 
suggests that informal networks must be counteracted through the 
establishment of new networks and forms of generalized trust through 
policy and state interference. 
Other authors provide descriptions of how the informal economy 
might be an obstacle to entrepreneurship or how the informal economy 
and its networks may supplement the state structures or ﬁ ll their gaps 
(for example Ledeneva 1998, Sik and Wellman 1999). Some researchers 
argue that new economic forms and reactions to them are shaped by 
Is the informal economy a 
source for the creation of a 
“civil society”?
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the measures introduced by the government (for example Hivon 1998). 
Privatization and land restitution in CEE have often been cited as some 
of the main failures of the state. For example, the negative eﬀ ects of 
inadequate policies leading to increased inequalities have resulted in 
local resistance to private farming in the case study presented by Hivon 
(1998). Swain (2000) describes insightfully this postsocialist paradox 
when more government resources are directed towards private large-
scale farmers and thus antagonize those rural people who depend on 
agriculture for their subsistence. Both authors show how peasants’ 
protests defend a way of life based on dependence on agriculture and 
are against some private farming interests threatening their livelihood. 
Sik and Wallace (2000:710) deﬁ ne social capital as the use of 
investments in relationships that supplement or substitute ﬁ nancial 
capital. Th e main aim of traders is the eﬀ ort to ﬁ nd an optimal balance 
of strong and weak ties: they cannot have too many informal relations 
which can stiﬂ e their business by the larger number of obligations for 
example to family at the same time, the high level of trust supplied 
by strong ties are necessary to provide both protection and economic 
opportunities. For that reason people invest also in social capital, that 
is, in social relations. 
Sik and Wellman introduce the term “network capital” (connections 
with people and organizations (1999) and explore how it can be used as 
a substitute or an additive to the state and the market. It is a substitute 
when it operates as an independent institution of the state or the 
market. It is an additive (mostly in socialism and postsocialism) when 
it operates within the state and market structures. Th e authors support 
the argument that network capital was the only resource available in 
abundance during socialism and was thus the single way in which 
people could make the system work for them. 
When they examine the postsocialist context, they make the 
observation that there is more network capital born after the demise of 
the state markets, weak state and bureaucracy. Th e latter have increased 
the economic uncertainties that bring both threats and opportunities. 
Traders aim to fi nd an optimal 
balance between strong and 
weak ties.
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Th e authors present four typical case studies from Hungary to de-
monstrate how people use network capital for coping or grabbing as the 
only or the best strategy. Th e reliability of networks as a coping strategy, 
the authors argue, comes with previous investments in it and already 
existing behavioral patterns based on it (Sik and Wellman 1999).
Th e informal economy at household level is analyzed by Neef 
(2002) in the Romania context and, as mentioned earlier, by Th e 
World Bank Consultations with the Poor Reports respectively on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Russia. Th is research describes the 
extent to which mass poverty and decreasing formal employment 
are compensated by informal strategies. While these help household 
survival, they also place it in a dependency at the margins of subsistence 
especially in some particular branches of the economy and among some 
types of household structure (Neef 2002, see also World Bank (1999)a, 
(1999)b, (1999)c). 
Th e study by Brown and Kulcsar (2001) also addresses the organiza-
tion of household economic behavior and it is based on Hungarian case 
studies. Both inter-household exchanges and self-provisioning were 
also found to play an important role as a coping strategy. Th e authors 
demonstrate how these strategies are economically feasible but are also 
socially motivated, that is aiming to strengthen social networks too. 
Th e ﬁ ndings reveal that households with more economic and social 
resources are involved in more inter-household exchanges. Non-market 
economic activity in the rural areas had important unbroken historical 
continuity and as such it has become an institution of village social 
life. Th e objectives of such exchanges are to strengthen social networks 
as well as to provide economic success (cf. Hivon 1998, Swain 2000, 
Sik and Wellman 1999, Sik and Wallace 2000, cf. World Bank 1999b, 
Creed 2002). Th is paper suggests that economic activities are embedded 
in a particular context and social organization.  
Th e article by Lawson and Saltmarshe (2002) demonstrates how 
economic interests in their turn may aﬀ ect social relations in a complex 
way and not just in strengthening or weakening ties. Th e authors 
Non-market economic 
exchanges strengthen rural 
social networks and buttress 
local economic success.
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analyze a case study from Northern Albania and demonstrate how 
clan loyalties are being transformed in the market situation. When a 
member of the clan is involved in independent commercial activity, 
they avoid employing clan members, as they will more be expensive 
than outsiders. However, in order to be able to continue to draw on 
the clan’s important social functions (if a need arises), the businessman 
contributes lavishly at clan ceremonies. Th is gives him the opportunity 
to preserve his respect in the clan through sharing with the clan while 
at the same time allows independent space for market activities. 
A very useful research on the informal networks and the importance 
of interpersonal trust in such networks is the one by Wallace et al. 
(2000). In a very extensive account of the small-scale crossborder trade 
in several Central European countries, the authors bring together most 
of the debates in the ﬁ eld. Th e major hypothesis put forward is that the 
extent of moral obligation or the type of moral ties developing during 
postcommunism can aﬀ ect the type of capitalism that will develop in 
the region. Th e central characteristic of this type of trade is risk and, 
consequently, trust is necessary for the construction and maintenance 
of networks. Th e article describes in detail the ways in which social, 
ethnic and family ties are invoked in the course of the crossborder 
trading. Two speciﬁ c hypotheses are examined: that strong ties (those of 
family networks, ethnic solidarity and friendship) are used for securing 
trust and that the weak ties (wider group and acquaintances) will be 
used to avoid too much solidarity with dense networks which reduce 
proﬁ t. 
Th e authors ﬁ nd that both hypotheses are valid in diﬀ erent degrees 
and in diﬀ erent situations (cf. Lawson and Saltmarshe 2002 for the case 
of strong ties that are transformed but not lost). Strong and weak ties 
were both utilized to diﬀ erent ends: from reciprocity to a patron client 
relationship. Th e authors conclude that indeed market activity can be 
inhibited by strong networks that exist between parents, children and 
grandparents. Outside this group, weak ties are built on reciprocity, 
mutual favors or patronage. Th us, economic activity in the postsocialist 
The type of moral ties 
developing during 
postcommunism can affect the 
type of capitalism developing 
in the region.
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societies is seen as embedded in informal settings where networks are 
developed out of contacts and reinforced through family or ethnic ties.
6 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n
Th e brief review of the research on social capital and economic 
activities in CEE demonstrates that the concept of social capital has 
numerous meanings, some of them complementing each other, and 
some, of diﬀ erent scale and category altogether. Despite this conceptual 
diversity, the term appears in studies that search for answers to the same 
questions: what is the relationship between society and the economy and 
how can we improve the economic situation of states, households and 
individuals. Th e relationship between state, market and people could be 
approached by various research strategies. Some of the reviewed works 
do not take us very far by using the term social capital as an explanatory 
concept, especially when it is not operationalized adequately. Other 
studies that do not use social capital seem to address in an insightful 
way some theoretical as well as policy issues. Th is demonstrates that the 
use of “social capital” is not necessarily the solution for better research 
or a development project. However, it is undeniable that the concept 
seems to have taken a life of its own53 and in order to be employed in 
a productive way both academically or in applied projects and policy 
making, it must be deﬁ ned clearly and situated in a speciﬁ c context. 
Th ere are a variety of answers to the same question about the relationship 
between economy and social relations. Th is should not remind only 
about the diﬀ erences in context but also question the applicability of 
the methodological tools and pre-prepared concepts employed. Th ere 
should be a very clear position why a concept such as social capital 
must be used to explain and even improve economic life, when there 
are already concepts such as social networks or social relations. Most 
53 In the view of this reviewer, a similar one to the destiny of the concept of “ethnicity,” 
cf. Banks, M. (1996) Ethnicity Anthropological approaches, London: Routledge.
“Social capital” is not 
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works using social capital do not begin with a critique of the uselessness 
of synonymous concepts. Instead, they begin with an argumentation 
from secondary sources: the works of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam 
to argue the importance of the concept. However, their analysis and 
results do not always answer why the author really chose social capital 
as the most appropriate concept. A disciplinary crossfertilization may 
well be one of the possible solutions. 
7 .  C O N C L U S I O N  A N D  S O M E  R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S  
 F O R  R E S E A R C H
Th is review has demonstrated that research and practical applications 
of social capital are endless in scope and variation and, at the same 
time, can be very limited. On one hand, these limitations are apparent 
if one considers only research that explicitly uses the term social capital. 
Such research has only in recent years become inﬂ uential in the region. 
Other limitations stem primarily from the recent entry of the concept 
in CEE and the attendant lack of systematic experience and insuﬃ  cient 
empirical evidence. Th ey are also the result of the glaring lack of real 
interdisciplinary approaches. On the other hand, if one considers all 
research that deals more or less with concepts identical or close to 
“social capital,” then the research ﬁ eld appears without boundaries and 
crosscuts all social science disciplines. 
Th is research often has its own theoretical traditions, methodological 
tools and audience. It virtually encompasses all the work that examines 
the importance of social relations for economic and institutional 
change in the region. It is extremely challenging to uproot a certain 
study from its position in its own ﬁ eld and reclassify it as research on 
social capital, for example, to what extent is “network research” the 
same as “social capital” research?  Can we say that research on “elites” 
is “social capital” research. Moreover, research on “trust” is such a vast 
ﬁ eld alone (especially in business studies), that signaling out only 
There is lack of real 
interdisciplinary approaches.
?  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  S E R I E S
136
those studies that claim links to some of the fathers of social capital 
(Bourdieu, Coleman or Putnam) may be neither methodologically 
correct nor exhaustive. 
Th is reviewer agrees with the criticisms made by Fine (2001), 
Harriss (2002), and Adam and Roncevic (2003) towards the use 
and especially towards the uncritical use of social capital. Th ese 
criticisms not only highlight how sometimes the use of the term can 
be pseudoscientiﬁ c or lead to poor quality research, but how it can de-
politizise signiﬁ cant social processes and prevent understanding of how 
power operates in societies. As Adam and Roncevic (2003: 157) point 
out, the wide applicability of the concept has not solved the numerous 
problems with its deﬁ nition, operationalization and measurement, 
as well as with determining its sources, forms and consequences. 
Further, social capital is a context dependent phenomenon (Adam 
and Roncevic (2003:161) and this creates additional diﬃ  culties for the 
elaboration of a single deﬁ nition. 
 “What could be problematic, from our point of view is the 
tendency to consider social capital as the only variable that can 
explain micro- as well as macro-phenomena and is responsible for 
many positive outcomes, thus seeing it as a cure-all for the maladies 
of our communities and societies […] Th e explanatory potential 
of social capital is limited. Th erefore it is time to reduce the overly 
high expectations some authors have invested in it.” (Adam and 
Roncevic 2003:178). 
However, it is obvious that social capital has now ﬁ rmly established 
itself in scholarly discourse and development practice and has a life (or 
rather many lives) of its own which cannot easily be dismissed. If one 
undertakes research on social capital blindfold without understanding 
its numerous drawbacks and possible misleading tracks, one could easily 
be trapped by such problems as cultural essentialism, ahistoricism, 
functionalism, blind rational choice adherence, apolitical attitude and 
reductionism. In this situation, this reviewer argues, that if research 
There is a danger that 
social capital research 
can depoliticize signifi cant 
social processes and prevent 
understanding of how 
power operates. 
If research on social capital is 
to be undertaken, one should 
bear in mind that a political 
and not only a scientifi c choice 
is being made.
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on social capital is to be undertaken, one should bear in mind that the 
political context in which scientiﬁ c choices are being made, including 
the initial selection of a research problem. 
Th is question is more acute with social capital research because 
as is evident from the review it has undoubtedly become a central 
tool within international development policies and practice. It is un-
doubtedly true that “social capital” has great appeal in social mobili-
zation for change in the rapidly transforming societies of CEE. With 
an informed responsibility in mind, one could contribute critically and 
constructively to some of the better achievements in the study of social 
capital in CEE. “Despite problems with its deﬁ nition as well as its 
operationalization, and despite its (almost) metaphorical character, social 
capital has facilitated a series of very important empirical investigations 
and theoretical debates which have stimulated reconsideration of the 
signiﬁ cance of human relations, of networks, of organizational forms 
for the quality of life and of developmental performance.” (Adam and 
Roncevic 2003:177) Th ese authors argue that social capital, despite 
its deﬁ ciencies could still have some theoretical and applicable meaning 
for social sciences. Th ey ﬁ nd the concept a very “important theoretical 
innovation which can facilitate the theoretical integrations within socio-
logy and the inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration of sociology 
and other disciplines, especially economics” (p.155). “Our conclusion is 
that social capital should be treated as a part of a broader (multicausal) 
model containing numerous (sociocultural) variables or factors.” (p.178). 
Based on extensive criticisms of the applicability of Coleman’s 
rational choice theory or Putnam’s instrument and general approaches 
to the CEE context (for CEE context see for example Letki, 1999; 
Adam and Roncevic 2003; Aberg 2000; Bjornskov 2002, otherwise 
see Harriss 2002 and Fine 2001) this reviewer does not recommend 
replica research based on Coleman’s or Putnam’s school of thought. Th e 
recommendations by Adam and Roncevic (2003:174–177) are to be 
suggested by contrast and in particular their four possible pathways for 
conceptualizing social capital and future research (2003:174–178): 
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1. Social capital as a catalyst for disseminating human and intellectual 
capital. Here the authors stress the importance of social capital 
as social networks that can be used to create and maintain some 
principles of generalized reciprocity, trust and readiness to cooperate 
and that could become a channel for transfer and dissemination of 
knowledge and innovations (p.175). 
2. Social capital as the basis for greater levels of synergy and 
coordination. Th is refers to the results of some studies that already 
point to the signiﬁ cance of complementarity and embeddedness 
(for example in the formation of public-private partnerships). 
Th e major focus here should be on the “discreet reintegration of 
individual and collective projects and resources into more complex 
frameworks of strategic steering” (p.176).
3. Social capital as a “lubricant” of network (project) organizations. 
Th is recommendation is linked to the examination of the project 
based organizations that tend to be less hierarchical and more 
ﬂ exible and require a more demanding form of leadership and 
communication. Here, social capital as “spontaneous sociability” 
is important along with speciﬁ c know-how and a capacity for 
empathy and cooperation in any type of group from industry to 
research teams in universities (p.176).
4. Social capital as facilitator of intermediary institutions. Th is 
concerns relationships and networks within civil society and with 
structures that occupy the sphere between small life worlds and 
big instrumental institutions. Th is is where the transparency and 
democratic character of groups is very important otherwise clan-
like or clientelistic and rent seeking networks could dominate 
(pp.176–177).
Other recommendations for research may be based not so much 
on what could be productive, as this would be an endless list, but on 
what is to be avoided based on the scholarly and practical experience 
shown in this review. For example, the blind acceptance of sharp 
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cultural divisions between Western and Eastern Europe especially in 
Huntington’s terms (1993) usually results from lack of grounding in 
empirical evidence coupled with uninformed reliance on assumptions. 
It is however, important to recognize the cultural speciﬁ city of each 
region and see how this is a dynamic rather than a static composition 
of numerous variables among which stand, for example class, ethnic 
group, gender, age, or others. 
Th e socialist period did have a tremendous impact on CEE societies 
and this cannot be underestimated. However, rather than using general 
conclusions about the eﬀ ects of socialism on social relations and 
institutions, it is more constructive to consider the speciﬁ c eﬀ ects of 
socialism in each particular case and be conscious of the potential 
dangers of generalizations despite similar experiences in CEE. Also, 
the signiﬁ cance of the current context and the speciﬁ c circumstances 
(national, regional—including rural or urban, institutional, or social 
group) of each case must be examined as it has been proven that social 
capital is a contextual variable. 
Research on trust is extremely challenging. It demands a conﬁ dent 
recognition of various types of trust which so far have been lumped 
confusingly and unproductively under one concept: “trust.” Gambetta 
(1988) makes distinctions between “belief ” and “motive” as sources 
of trust; and by Dasgupta (1988) between “dispositions” and 
“circumstances.” Note that one of the implications of the distinction 
between “character assessment” and “incentive assessment” (Harriss 
and Mihaylova 2003) (Harriss forthcoming); following Moore (1999) 
is that those surveys in which the attempt is made to measure “the 
amount of trust around here” probably confuse and muddle together 
two rather diﬀ erent ideas. 
In this case, most research based on a few questions about 
trust (such as the methodology employed by the New Democracies 
Barometer or World Value Survey) has to be read with a lot of caution. 
However, the examination of the role of various types of trust for 
economic development and institutional change as well mechanisms 
for strengthening trust between citizens and state (without distortions 
Research on trust needs to 
recognize the various types 
of trust which so far have 
been lumped confusingly and 
unproductively together.
Despite its potential, research 
on local institutions is at an 
early stage. 
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such as populism) are important research problems. Th ese are yet to be 
developed in CEE as there has been very limited experience so far. 
Research on local institutions is similarly at an early stage despite its 
potential to shed light on how localities could be eﬀ ectively developed 
as integral parts of the wider society. In terms of developmental projects, 
as it has been demonstrated by the review, it may be a better option 
to focus on what the existing forms and pockets of trust are and only 
then should eﬀ orts to strengthen them be developed. It may be less 
productive to impose projects of trust building in contexts where there 
is no proof that these may be adequate. Th e role of government (central 
and local) should also be examined in this context. How people and state 
interact in everyday life in particular contexts could challenge some of 
the culturalist interpretations about the production of mistrust in CEE.
Institutional change in CEE, examined in the ﬁ rst chapter of 
this report, has been studied predominantly from a macrosocial and 
structural perspective and has remained largely a separate experience 
for sociologists and economists. However, smaller case studies based on 
qualitative research or on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods could be extremely illuminating for speciﬁ c development 
projects. Such case studies could be developed in either of the two 
main ﬁ elds of institutional change research in CEE: market economy 
and democracy. How do people relate to, build, transform and 
maintain institutions or how do economic and political institutions 
function in their cultural and social settings; to what extent is the 
transformation of institutions a transformation of values; how does 
the social embeddedness of economic relations operate; what are the 
eﬀ ects of market economy on social relations and vice versa; what are 
the informal institutions, how do they work and transform today and 
what is their role for the political or economic transformation; how do 
economic, cultural and political institutions interplay and what is the 
convertibility between diﬀ erent forms of capital. Th is research has very 
important consequences for legitimizing either liberal economic policies 
and self-regulating markets or more signiﬁ cant state intervention. For 
example, the former has sometimes been backed up by policies based 
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on social capital research (Bateman 2003) and has had detrimental 
eﬀ ect on socioeconomic and political life in CEE regions.   
Social networks have been shown to be either coping mechanisms 
or market and democratization obstacles depending on the type of 
approach or case study. However, this central concept for understanding 
social capital remains understudied in CEE. Although it is clear that 
informal networks do play a very important role in everyday life it has 
not been demonstrated suﬃ  ciently how exactly these operate, what 
their features, mechanisms and meanings are. Moreover, sometimes, 
scholars have been trapped by the modernization paradigm whereby 
modern societies consist only of formal institutions and thus, they have 
proclaimed the informal institutions as obstacles to modernity. Th is 
precludes the possibility of evaluating any possible positive roles of 
informal institutions objectively. 
Civil society and social capital is another underresearched ﬁ eld. It has 
become obvious that before the formulation of research agendas on 
social capital and its role for strengthening civil society, one has to adopt 
a clear deﬁ nition of “civil society.” Th is reviewer shares the proposal by 
Gibson (1998) that one should not only examine what the democratic 
institutions are and how they work, but focus also (if not predominantly) 
on social networks as a key attribute to civil society. Th e neoliberal 
approach to studying civil society has been extensively criticized and 
thus, the eﬀ orts in building social capital through increasing the 
number of associations (for example NGOs) have been reported as very 
problematic. Some researchers have suggested focusing on the quality 
of associations instead, and how they are embedded in their immediate 
socioeconomic and political contexts through a number and a variety 
of social relations. Th e very examination of “civil society” and “society” 
as separate ﬁ elds from “the state” could also be addressed critically 
following examples from other parts of the world, for example, Fuller 
and Benei (2001), Mitchell (1991), and Navaro-Yashin (2002).
Th is questions the proposition that citizens’ membership in civic 
organizations is necessarily a road to democratization. It has been 
demonstrated though that there is a three-way dynamic between 
Social networks have been 
shown to be either coping 
mechanisms or market and 
democratization obstacles. 
Efforts in building social capital 
through increasing the number 
of NGOs has been reported as 
problematic.
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central, local state and civil society, which is politically articulated and 
its particular forms and mechanisms must be further examined for 
each particular context (Harriss 2002). Another signiﬁ cant drawback 
that could be overcome in future research is the uncritical application 
of Western European models of research and development practice in 
CEE contexts. Some successful research examples have been proposed in 
Hann (1996) where authors shift debates about civil society away from 
formal structures towards investigation of beliefs, values and everyday 
practices. Th ese overcome the constraints of liberal individualism as 
well as of relativism or universalism.
Research on social capital could also contribute to ﬁ nding practical 
solutions to increasing economic growth in the region. However, the 
macroeconomic methods have proven insuﬃ  cient in providing insight 
into the relationship between state, market and informal economy. 
Th e social embeddedness of economic relationships could be studied 
through examinations not simply of the relationship between state and 
market but through examination of how this relationship evolves along 
social networks (Hann 2002). Ethnographic detail at the household 
level could indeed demonstrate “how the system works in everyday life” 
(Hann 1990:2). 
Th ere is still a signiﬁ cant lack of systematic research pertaining 
to the relational deﬁ nitions of social capital and education. Th ere is 
very limited research on how parents, teachers, schools and students 
relate in order to strengthen access to education and educational 
achievement. So far, the transformation of education in CEE has 
been studied through descriptions of the macrosystemic and structural 
reforms. It has been demonstrated that if social capital is deﬁ ned by 
participation, empowerment and cohesion, it has a signiﬁ cant role 
to play in compensating for the weaknesses of formal structures and 
mechanisms responsible for public education. Educational institutions 
could be strengthened or weakened by informal networks connecting 
educational institutions with the wider society and for that reason they 
should be studied. 
If social capital is defi ned as 
participation, and cohesion, 
it has a signifi cant role to 
play in compensating for 
the weaknesses of formal 
structures.
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Th e volume by Weber and Liikanen (2001) has demonstrated that 
the ethnographic approach is one of the most suitable methods to be 
applied towards such research problems. How could education be an 
exit from poverty, how does education reproduce elites and what role 
do informal networks play in the educational environment are all 
questions that are not widely researched while they have signiﬁ cant 
practical application too. As it has already been pointed in the review, 
the breakdown of the societal safety nets, which existed during 
socialism, has led today to the escalation of social problems, social 
exclusion and delinquency among students in the postsocialist world. 
Education policies have not been a suﬃ  cient tool to address such issues 
and this is where the relationship between education and civic culture 
needs to be studied better: some examples (among many possible ones) 
could be found among those described in Webber and Liikanen (2001:
4–8): the analysis of how the development of gender and women 
studies in Russia has been closely linked to women’s movements; the 
study of how diﬀ ering political traditions and notions of civic identity 
play a signiﬁ cant role in the interaction between educationalists from 
CEE and the West but could be overcome in a processes of cooperation 
in an educational project; how the rivalry between those with “cultural 
capital” (higher education) and those with “political capital” continued 
in postsocialism; or how to organize teaching of various ethnic groups 
and about ethnic groups.
Social capital and health in CEE is another underdeveloped 
research ﬁ eld with tremendous consequences for policy making. It 
is very important that research on social capital and health in CEE 
does not lead to what Pearce has described (2003:122). He argues 
that an overpowering focus on communities and health could create 
resentment, overload community resources and lead to “blame the 
victim” at community level ignoring macrolevel social and economic 
policies. Th ere is a question as to what extent the use of social capital 
concept brings new light in health research and to what extent it only 
revives some older concepts and approaches that have been largely 
An overpowering focus on 
communities and health could 
create resentment, overload 
community resources and lead 
to a “blaming of the victim.”
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criticized, such as: “social support,” “empowerment,” and “community 
capacity.” So far, social capital has been little used as a concept in 
health research and the two main themes addressed have been: social 
capital as an explanation of poor health (in terms of lifestyles, or social 
relations, or social cohesion, or social networks, or social support) and 
social capital as an intrinsic substance of the relationship between 
communities and the healthcare system. 
Th e latter has utilized the concept less often and also dominates 
the development reports that deal with health issues in CEE. Further 
research could address how people, doctors, health institutions and 
state institutions and regulations relate in order to improve access 
to and quality of health care that will improve the general health 
situation in CEE. It is, however, very important that social capital is 
not deﬁ ned as “lifestyle” whereby the lifestyle approach to health is 
endorsed. Th is approach often masks the real causal factors of poor 
health in CEE related to the wider socioeconomic and political context 
with individual choice. In this way, it proposes to treat the symptoms 
and not the causes of poor health—something that cannot lead to 
sustainable results.
In conclusion, I would like to stress that whatever the ﬁ eld 
of research, social capital studies in CEE lack suﬃ  cient empirical 
evidence. For this reason, comparative work is still not possible while 
it could be very insightful and suggest possible ways for generalizations 
based on a signiﬁ cant number of case studies. With the awareness of 
the major drawbacks of the use of social capital and of its relatively 
new scientiﬁ c tradition, a vast number of research agendas could be 
formulated. Most of these could have practical application especially 
in view of the growing number of development projects in the region 
focusing on the “building of social capital.” Another line of research of 
even greater applicability would be to provide analyses of these same 
developmental projects. Th ese could either be their evaluations or more 
extended ethnographies of project life and community development. 
Th is reviewer would propose that the ethnography of the state could be 
a central avenue for further research on social capital in CEE. 
Taking into account certain 
drawbacks a vast number 
of research agendas could 
be formulated and most of 
these could have practical 
application.
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